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ABSTRACT
Many writers on ettaics have presented arguments which are supposed to
show that moral absolutism is an unacceptable doctrine. However, very few
of these writers have tr ied to give a clear formulation of the doctrine that
they have attempted to refute. Furthermore, those who have tried to say
explicitly what moral absolutism is have not succeeded in formulating an
adequate definition. The problem of providing a satisfactory characterization
of moral absolutism is the primary focus of the first of this dissertation's two
parts. In Part One, I point out the shortcomings of several formulations of
absolutism and then try to provide a new definition that avoids these
inadequacies. In Part Two, I turn my attention to a variety of considerations
which have prompted people to reject moral absolutism. I argue that none of
these considerations constitutes a compelling reason for anyone to abandon
absolutism in ethics.
PART ONE (Chapters 1 - 3)
At the beginning of Part One, I set out simple adequacy conditions that
must be satisfied by any acceptable definition of moral absolutism. I insist
that an adequate definition must identify absolutism with a doctrine that is
incompatible with the theories of philosophers who are standardly characterized
as moral nihilists or moral relativists. I also require that an adequate
definition identify absolutism with a position that is consistent with the views
of philosophers who are standardly said to subscribe to absolutist moral
theories. After stating the adequacy conditions that must be met by any
acceptable definition of absolutism, I proceed to show that these conditions
aren't satisfied by any of the definitions of absolutism that appear in recent
philosophical literature. In particular, I argue that moral absolutism cannot be
equated with any of the following five propositions. (The names that appear
after each proposition identify philosophers who have equated it with
absolutism.)
A. For some ethical sentence !, what a speaker says by
asserting ! does not depend either on who he is or on
where or when he asserts!. (Jonathan Harrison)
B. There is always one, and only one, correct moral appraisal
of a given issue. (Richard Brandt)
c. There are no conflicting ethical opinions that are equally
valid. (Richard Brandt)
D. There is a single moral standard
applicable to all people at all times.
Philippa Foot, David Lyons, Walter Stace)
which is equally
(Fred Feldman,
E. All agents have categorical moral reasons. (J.L. Mackie)
After explaining why none of these propo~itions is a satisfactory formulation
of moral absolutism, I offer a new definition, defend its adequacy, and explain
its implications.
PART TWO (Chapters 4 - 7)
In Chapters 4 and 5, I examine several arguments which purport to show
either (a) that there are no moral facts or (b) that we have no justification for
believing that such facts exist. The first of these conclusions implies that
moral absolutism is false; the second implies that, even if absolutisnl is true,
we aren't justified in believing it. I contend, however, that the arguments
which philosophers have presented in order to establish these conclusions are
based on questionable ontological and epistemological assumptions.
In Chapter 6, I analyze and evaluate Gilbert Harman's objections to moral
absolutism. Harman presents data about the linguistic impropriety of certain
ethical assertions and argues that we can account for these data only if we
adopt a relativistic theory of morality. I respond to Harman by pointing out
that he has underestimated the explanatory resources that are available to
moral absolutists. I then go on to show that if an absolutist makes use of
these resources, he has no difficulty explaining Harman's data.
In the concluding chapter of the dissertation, I discuss the prof.'osition that
moral absolutism cannot be reconciled with the ubiquity of apparently
irresolvable moral disagreements. I propose various explanations of this
phenomenon and argue that none of these explanations suggests that there is
any need whatever to abandon moral absolutism.
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uINTRODUCTION
1. The Subject and Structure of This Dissertation
Many writers on ethics have presented arguments which are supposed to
show that moral absolutism is an unacceptable doctrine. However, very few
of these writers have tried to give a clear formulation of the doctrine that
they have claimed to refute. Furthermore, those who have tried to say
explicitly what moral absolutism is have not succeeded in formulating adequate
definitions. The problem of providing a satisfactory characterization of moral
absolutism is the primary focus of the first of this dissertation's two parts.
In Part One, point out the shortcomings of several formulations of
absolutism and then try to provide a new definition that avoids these
inadequacies. In Part Two, I turn my attention to a vari~ty of considerations
which have prompted people to reject moral absolutism. I argue that none of
these considerations constitutes a compelling reason for anyone to abandon
absolutism in ethics.
IPART ONE (Chapters 1 - 3)
At the beginning of chapter 1, I set out some basic standards for
evaluating the adequacy of proposed definitions of absolutism. Briefly stated,
I suggest that satisfactory definition should identify moral absolutism with a
statement that is incompatible both with moral nihilism and with ethical
theories that are standardly regarded as versions of moral relativism. I also
propose that an adequate definition should equate absolutism with a statement
that does not conflict with the views of philosophers who subscribe to moral
theories that are normally regarded as versions of absolutism. In the
remainder of the· first chapter, apply my adequacy standards to
characterizations of moral absolutism proposed by Jonathan Harrison and
Richard Brandt.
I look first at Harrison's contention that absolutism is identical to the
statement that, for some ethical sentence !, what a speaker says by asserting
! does not depend either on who he is or on where or when he asserts !.
argue that Harrison's proposal is incorrect because it identifies absolutism with
a statement that is entirely compatible with both moral nihilism and moral
subjectivism. After demonstrating the shortcomings of Harrison's position, t
turn my attention to two definitions of moral absolutism that have been
advanced by Richard Brandt. One ,of these defines absolutism as the view
that, for any issue i, there is exactly one correct moral appraisal of 1. The
other definition identifies absolutism with the statement that there are no
equally valid, conflicting ethical opinions. contend that each of Brandt's
definitions is unsatisfactory. The first initially fails because it can reasonably
be accepted by moral relativists who individuate issues in non-standard ways.
It fails a second time because, after it is revised to avoid the individuation
problem, it contradicts the views of certain philosophers whose absolutist
credentials are unimpeachable. Brandt's second characterization of absolutism
8is unacceptable because it rests upon an incoherent conception of the
(,onditions under which ethical opinions conflict.
In Chapter 2, I explore the suggestion that a moral absolutist is sonleone
who is committed to the proposition that there is one, and only one, correct
standard of morality. This suggestion has recently been endorsed in the
writings of David Lyons, Philippa Foot, and Fred Feldman. However, it is far
from clear what people really mean when they say that there is exactly one
correct standard of morality. Thus, I consiner several interpretations of this
clair". I argue that one of these interpretations is decidedly superior to the
others, but then go on to show that this interpretation rules out the
identification of moral absolutism with the doctrine that there is one, and only
one, correct standard of morality. In particular, I demonstrate that, under the
preferred interpretation, this doctrine is incompatible with the non-naturalistic
forms of absolutism espoused by H.A. Prichard and W.O. Ross.
I begin Chapter 3 by discussing a definition of moral absolutism that
appears in J.L. Mackie's book, Ethi,'s: inventing right and wrong. According
to Mackie, absolutism is the doctrine that all agents have categorical moral
reasons. I contend that this definition is unacceptable because it identifies
absolutism with a doctrine that is entirely consistent with certain versions of
moral relativism. Nevertheless, I argue that it is at least a necessary
condition for the truth of absolutism that all agents have categorical moral
reasons. Moreover, I incorporate this condition into a new definition of moral
absolutism and try to show that my new definition does not contain the
inadequacies that discovered in other characterizations of absolutism.
Finally, In the last section of Chapter 3, I investigate the problem of
conceptually distinguishing moral reasons from reasons of other kinds. One
promising suggestion is that the difference between moral and non-moral
9reasons is captured by Thomas Nagel's distinction between agent-neutral
reasons and agent-relative reasons. I- consider this suggestion in some detail
but argue that it is ultimately unacceptable. Furthermore, I show that Nagel's
distinction is predicated on a general theory of reasons that is critically
flawed.
PART TWO (Chapters 4 - 7)
In Chapter 4, I begin my examination of the considerations that prompt
people to reject moral absolutism. I look first at an argument that Mackie has
advanced in order to establish that there are never any facts of the matter in
ethics. Roughly speaking, Mackie contends that there are no moral facts
because, no matter what moral issue we choose, it is possible for two people
to disagree over that issue and for there to be no evidence that is capable of
persuading either party to revise his opinion. In response to this argument, I
point out that Mackie's hypothetical moral disagreements only pose a probiem
for ethics if the parties to those disputes are reasonable. 1 then go on to
examine two versions of foundationalism which seem to support the
proposition that, even when two individuals are perfectly reasonable, they may
be party to a moral disagreement that would go unresolved even if they had
access to all of the "relevant" factual data. suggest that neither of the'sa
foundationalist theories provides a compelling argument in favor of moral
skepticism because each con~ains statements that are either false or highly
questionable.
In chapter 5, I examine a new skeptical argument, one that is not based on
a foundationalist epistemology. This new argument contends that, unless
propositions are either themselves useful in explaining how we acquire our
beliefs or reducible to propositions that have this property, we have no
justification for believing them. I attempt to show that this premise is
unacceptable because it precludes justified belief in contexts where there is no
doubt that our beliefs are justified.
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In Chapter 6, I analyze and evaluate Gilbert Harman's objections to moral
absolutism. Harman presents data abou~ the linguistic impropriety of certain
ethical assertions and argues that we can account for these data only if we
adopt a relativistic theory of morality. examine David Lyons' attempts to
account for Harman's data within an absolutist moral framework and conclude
that Lyons fails to explain what he sets out to account for. I then go on to
show, however, that there is a perfectly plausible explanation of Harman's data
that is consistent with moral absolutism. Furthermore, I point out that
Harman's own relativistic explanation is unacceptable. Thus, absolutism comes
out looking significantly more plausible than relativism.
The concluding chapter of this dissertation examines a variety of factors
which give rise to unresolved moral disputes. I show, however, that most of
these factors do not indicate that the issues under dispute cannot be resolved
through further argument. I also indicate that the existence of disputes that
are absolutely irresolvable need not pose serious problems for absolutism.
2. Some Remarks on Sentence Schemas
Before going on to confront the substantive metaethical issues that I am
primarily concerned with in the seven chapters that I have just described, I
would like to explain the notation that I will be using in my discussions of
those issues. In many respects, this notation is similar to the schematic
language which moral philosophers often employ when they want to statl:!
metaethical generalizations. We find a typical example of this language in the
following passage from Harman's book, The Nature of Morality.
• • • to say that P ought to do 0 is not necessarily to say that
P's doing 0 is absolutely required. It would be better, if that is
what is meant, to say that P has to do 0 or that it would be
wrong of P not to do D. We can assume that P ought to do D
I'
without assuming that he absolutely must do D or even that it
would be wrong of him not to do D. To say that P ought to do
0, on the other hand, is stronger than to say simply that it would
be good of P if he were to do D. 1
Let us call the schema that I have just quoted "S.l". It is reasonable to
suppose that when Harman asserts 5.', he is saying something like this: any
grammatical sentence that can be formed from S.l by replacing "P" and liD"
with English word-strings is true. Thus, we may assume that when Harman
asserts 5.1, he implies that (1) is true:
(1) To say that David Rockefeller ought to do his own laundry
is stronger than to say simply that it would be good of
David Rockefeller if he were to do his own laundry.
Moreover, it seems clear that when Harman asserts 5.1, he also intends to be
making a claim which is sufficiently general to imply that the following
sentence is true :
(2) To say that Phyllis Schlafly ought to be home in time to
prepare dinner for her husband is stronger than to say
simply that it would be good of Phyllis Schlafly if she
were to be home in time to prepare dinner for her
husband.
But (2), unlike (1), cannot be formed by substituting English expressions for the
occurrences of "P" and "0" in the following part of 5.1 :
(5.2) To say that P ought to do D is stronger than to say
simply that it would be good of P if he were to do D.
In short, (2) is not an instance of 5.2. This being the case, it is a comp,ete
'Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality, pp. 116 - 117
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mystery how the truth of (2) could follow from what Harman is saying when
he asserts S.1. Thus, in asserting S.1, Harman seems to be stating a
proposition which is less general than the one that he wants to be stating.
I believe that if Harman were to make use of a schema that is similar to,
though distinct from, 5.1, he could capture the generalization that he intends to
be stating when he asserts 5.1. In particular, I think that Harman could say
what he wants to say by claiming that the following schema is true:
(5.3) To say that N1 ought to VP 1 is not necessari Iy to say that
N,'s VP ,-ing is absolutely required. It ~ould be better, if
that is what is meant, to say that N, has to VP 1 or that it
would be wrong of N1 not to VP1. We can assume that
N1 ought to VP 1 without assuming that N1 absolutely must
VP 1 or even that it would oe wrong of N1 not to VP 1 ·
To say that N1 ought to VPl' on the other hand, is
stronger than to say simply that it would be god of N1 if
N, were to VP1 •
Here we have a typical example of the schematic language that I shall be
employing throughout the chapters that follow. However, it may not be
obvious to the reader just what is implied by the claim that 5.3 is a true
schema. I shall therefore try to make clear what such a claim realty amounts
to.
Put succinctly,
(3) A schema ~ is true if, and only if, for any sentence (or
series of sentences) .!!. that is a well-formed completion
simpliciter of !, !!. is true in all relevant contexts of
utterance.
But what is it for a sentence a to be a well-formed completion simpliciter of
a schema !? And, supposing that !. is a well-formed completion simpliciter
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of !, which are the contexts in which a must be true if s is to be true? It
is plain that we must know the answers to these questions in order to
understand (3).
2.1. Well-formedness
In schema 5.3, we find numerous occurrences of the expressions "N 1" and
"VP1". These expressions are schematic terms. Two other such terms that we
shall encounter are "S," and "Pred 1". In order to form a completion of a
schema !, we must substitute word-string occurrences for some or all of the
schematic term occurrences in!. When we correctly substitute word-string
occurrences for all occurrences of a schematic term ! in a schema s, we form
a word-string .!!. which is a completion of ~ with respect to!. And, if ! is the
only schematic term in !, then ~ is a completion simpliciter of~. On the
other hand, if there are schematic terms in ! other than 1, .!. is only a partial
completion of !.
Whether it is or isn't legitimate to substitute occurrences of a word-string
.!! for occurrences of a schematic term ! depends on what l's schematic stem
is. Every schematic term consists of two elements: a schematic stem and a
numeric subscript. The schematic stems of "N,", "VP 1'" "S,", and "Pred1" are
"N", "VP", "S", and "Pred" respectively. Whenever two schematic terms 1,
and 12 have the same stem, the set of word-string occurrences that can be
legitimately substituted for occurrences of !, will be identical to the set of
word-string occurrences that can be legitimately substituted for occurrences of
12 • However, this will not be the case where 1, and 12 have different stems.
The following principle stipulates what kinds of word-string occurrences it is
legitimate to substitute for occurrences of schematic terms whose stems are
"N", "VP", "S", or "Pred""
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(P) For any schematic term t and any word-string fL,
(a) if the schematic stem of ! is "N", then
occurrences of .!! can be legitimately
substituted for occurrences of ! if, and only
if, !! is either a person's name or a
pronoun;
(b) if the schematic stem of ! is "VP", then
occurrences of !! can be legitimately
suhstituted for occurrences of ! if, and only
if, ~ is a verb phrase;
(c) if the schematic stem of ! is "s", then
occurrences of ~ can be legitimately
substituted for· occurrences of ! if, and only
if,
.!. is either a sentence or a sentence
schema; and
(d) if the schematic stem of ! is "Pred", then
occurrences of .!. can be legitimately
substituted for occurrences of ! if, and only
if, .!. is a predicate.
Given this specification of when occurrences of a word-string !! can be
legitimately substituted for occurrences of a schematic term !, it is cJear that
it is not legitimate to substitute an occurrence of "to make compromises with
Democrats" for the occurrence of "N " in2
(4) Although N1 doesn't like N2 ' N, can'tVP,.
Since the expression, "to make compromises with Democrats", is r.either a
person's name nor a pronoun, (4.1) is not a well-formed partial completion of
(4) :
(4.1) Although N1 doesn't like to make compromises with
Democrats, N1 can't VP 1 •
Similarly, (4.2) is not a well-formed completion simpliciter of (4)
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(4.2) Although Rt:Sagan doesn't like to make compromises with
Democrats, he can't ignore O'Neill's power in Congress.
On the other hand, (4.3) is a well-formed partial completion of (4), and (4.4)
is a well-formed completion simpliciter of (4) :
(4.3) Although N1 doesn't like O'Neill, N, can't VP 1 •
(4.4) Although Reagan doesn't like O'Neill, he can't ignore
O'Neill's power in Congress.
Consider now the following schema:
(5) Ns is identical to Ns ·
While (5.1) is a well-formed completiof1 simpliciter of (5), (5.2) is not:
(5.1) Kripke is identical to himself.
(5.2) Kripke is identical to Quine.
Rather than being a well-formed completion simpliciter of (5), (:;.2) is a we"-
formed completion simpliciter of (6) :
(6) Ns is identical to Ns ·
The fact that (5.2) is a well-formed completion simpliciter of (6) but not of (5)
incicatas that a string.!!. may fail to qualify as a well-formed completion of a
schema! even though we can transform ! into ~ simply by making legitimate
substitutions for s...hematic term occurrences in !. The same fact also
indicates that, in spite of the obvious similarity between (5) and (6), there is
an important difference between these schemas.
In order to understand precisely why (5.2) is a well-formed completion
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simpliciter of (6) but not of (5), we must first understand a particular relation
that holds between the occurrences of "Kripke" and "himself" in (5.1) but does
not hold between the occurrences of "Kripke" and "Quine" in (5.2). This
relation has some conriection to coreference, but it is not the same as
coreference.
The relation that I have in mind is particularly prominent in the following
sentence:
(7) Hellman loved Hammett is spite of the fact that he was
often disappointed in himself.
Under the most natural reading of (7), the reflexive pronoun "himself" refers to
the referent of "he", and "he" refers to the referent of "Hammett". We thus
have a chain of reference that runs from "Hammett" through "he" to "himself".
As linguists would say, "himself" is an anaphor whose antecedent is "he"; and
"he" is an anaphor whose antecedent is "Hammett". Or, to put the matter in
slightly different terms, the occurrences of "Hammett", "he", and "himself" in
(7) are links in an antecedent-anaphor chain. In general, we can think of
antecedent-anaphor chains as ordered n-tuples. In all such n-tuples, each
member subsequent to the first is an anaphor whose antecedent is the
preceding member. Thus, if we use the expressions "HAMMETT(7)", "HE(7)", and
"HIMSELF(7)" to stand for the occurrences in sentence (4) of "Hammett", "he",
and "himself",' respectively, we can say that <HAMMETT(7) , HE(7) , HIMSELF(7» is
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an antecedent-anaphor chain. 2 Similarly, <HAMMEn(7), HE(7» and <HE(7),
HIMSELF(7» are antecedent-anaphor chains.
So far as our purposes are concerned, <HAMMEn(7) , ~E(7) , HIMSELF(7» and
(HAMMEn(7), HE(7'> differ in an important way from <HE(7), HIMSELF(7».
Whereas the first element In the latter chain is an anaphor, the first element in
each of the former chains is not. Let us call an antecedent-anaphor chain
maximal just in case its first element isn't an anaphor. Thus, (HAMMETT(7) ,
HE(7), HIMSELF(7» is the maximal antecedent-anaphor chain that ends with
HfMSELF(7) ; and (HAMMETT(7) , HE(7» is the maximal antecedent-anaphor chain that
ends with HE(7).
It should be noted that some maximal antecedent-anaphor chains have only
one member. Indeed, if a string occurrence .!. has no antecedent, <.!..> is the
maximal antecedent-anaphor chain that ends with~. This being the case,
(HAMMETT(7'> is the maximal antecedent-anaphor chain that ends with HAMMETT(7).
Now that we are armed with the notion of a maximal antecedent-anaphor
chain, we can say very explicitly when a word-string !! is a well-formed
completion of a schema ! with respect to schematic terms !, - !" in ~.
Putting the matter as generally as possible,
(Of,) For any schema !, any word-string !!, and any schematic
terms ! 1 - !" that occur in!, ~ is a well- formed
2 1n a number of cases where I talk about specific SI, 'ng occurrences, I
adopt the following notational convention
For any numerals i and j and any expression !, if r(i)'
designates a sentence or sentence schema, then f eO),
abbreviates rthe 501.e occurrence of .!! in (j)' ; and rEi, (I),
abbreviates fthe jth occurrence of ! in 0)'.
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completion of ~ with respect to 1, - 1
n
if, and only if, for
any schematic term occurrences Q1 - 2
m
in §. such that Q 1
is an occurrence of a term in {!, - !n}' Q,2 is an
occurrence of a term in {t l - t }, .•. , and 0 is an- -n -m
occurrence of a term in {!, - !n}' there are m string
occurrences ~ 1 - ~m such that
(a) .!!. is the result of replacing .Q., with ~1' Q2
with ~2' • • • , and Q.m with ~m ;
(b) there is a word-string /l. and a schematic
term ! such that ~, is an occurrence of 11,
2, is an occurrence of 1, and occurrences of
A. can be legitimately substituted for
occurrences of !; there is a word-string Il.
and a schematic term ! such that ~2 is an
occurrence of 11, 2.2 is an occurrence of !,
and occurrences of 11 can be legitimately
substituted for occurrences of ! ; . . . ; and
there is a word-string A and a schematic
term t such that x is an occurrence of fl."
- -m
o is an occurrence of t, and occurrences of
-m -
IJ.. can be legit: nately substituted for
occurrences of ! ; and
(c) for any Oland 02 in {.Q, - ~} and any Xl
and X2 in {l!, - ~}, if Oland 02 are
occurrences of the same schematic term
and, in forming .!. from !, we replace 0,
with X, and 02 with X 2 ' then either
(;) X 1 and X 2 are occurrences of the
same non-anaphor, or
(ii) for some word-string i, there are
occurrences X 3 and X4 of Il. in !! such
that X3 is the first member of the
maximal antecedent-anaphor chain that
ends with X, , and X4 is the first
member of the maximal antecedent-
anaphor chain that ends with X 2 •
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At the beginning of my discussion of well-formedness, I provided a rough
statement of the conditions under which a completion of a schema counted as
a completion simpliciter of that schema.3 However, now that we have a
precise definition of what it is for a string ~ to be a well-formed completion
of a schema ~ with respect to schematic terms t1 - t
n
' it seems appropriate to
state an equally precise definition of what it is for a string ~ to be a well-
formed completion simpl iciter of a schema ~ :
(Df2) For any schema ! and any word-string .!!., .!!. is a well-
formed completion simpliciter of ! if, and only if, for any
schematic terms 1, - !" that occur in !, .!!. is a well-formed
completion of ! with respect to 1, - !" .
Given Of 1 and Of 2 ' it is not difficult tc see why (5.1) is a well-formed
completion simpliciter of schema (5) while (5.2) is not :
(5) Ns is identical to Ns .
(5.1) Kripke is identical to hilnself.
(5.2) Kripke is identical to Quine.
It is a consequence of Of 1 that (5. 1) is a well-formed completion of (5) with
respect to "Ns" just in case
(j) occurrences of "Kripke" and "himself" can be legitimately
substituted for occurrences of "Ns" , and either
(ii) KR1PKECS,1) and HIMSELF(S,1) are occurrences of the same non-
anaphor, or
(iii) for some word-string I., there are occurrences X 3 and X4
of IJ.. i'n (5.1) such that X 3 is the first member of the
3V1de p. 13 supra.
20
maximal antecedent-anaphor chain that ends with KRIPKE(5.1)
and X 4 is the first member of the maximal antecedent-
anaphor chain that ends with HIMSELF(s.l).
Now then, since "Kripke" is the name of a person and "himself" is a pronoun,
it follows from principle (P) that condition (j) is true. Thus, (5.1) will qualify
as a well-formed completion of (5) with respect to "Ns" if either (ij) or (iii) is
true. (iO, of course, is plainly not true. (Since KRIPKE(S.l) and HIMSELF(S. l' are not
occurrences of the same string, it follows that they are not occurrences of the
same non-anaphor. Furthermore, HIMSELF(S.1) happens to be an occurrence of an
anaphor.) Nevertheless, (iii) is true. For in (5.1) there are occurrences X 3 and
X 4 of "Kripke" such that X3 is the first member of the maximal antecedent-
anaphor chain that ends with KRIPKE(5.11 and X 4 is the first member of the
maximal antecedent-anaphor chain that ends with HfMSELF(S.l). In particular,
KRIPKE(S.l) is the first member of the antecedent-anaphor chain that ends with
KRIPKE(S.l) ; ar,d KRIPKE(S.l) is also the first member of the antecedent-anaphor
chain that ends with HIMSELF(s.l>. We thus see that (5.1) is a well-formed
completion of (5) with respect to 'IN "5 · Moreover, since "N "5 is the only
schematic term that occurs in (5), it follows from Of 2 that (5.1) is a well-
formed completion simpliciter of (5) if it is a well-formed completion of (5)
with respect to "Ns". Hence, (5.1) is a well-formed completion simpliciter of
(5).
Let us now look at (5.2) :
(5.2) Kripke is identical to Quine.
Given Of 1 and Of2' (5.2) is a well-formed completion simpliciter or (5) only if
at least one of the following statements is true :
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(iv) KRIPKE(S.2) and QUINE(S.2) are occurrences of the same non-
anaphor.
(v) for some word-string fl., there are occurrences X3 and X 4
of Il. in (5.1) such that X 3 is the first member of the
maximal antecedent-anaphor chain that ends with KRIPKE(5.2)
and X 4 is the first member of the maximal antecedent-
anaphor chain that ends with aUINE(s.2'.
Now then, the first of these two statements clearly isn't true; although
KRIPKE(S.2) and aUINe(S.2) are both occurrences of non-anaphors, they are
obviously occurrences of different non-anaphors. Furthermore, because they
are occurrences of different non-anaphors, (v) also isn't true. It follows from
(v) that the first member of the antecedent-anaphor chain that ends with
KRIPKE(s.2) is an occurrence of the same non-anaphor as the first member of the
antecedent-anaphor chain that ends with aUINE,s.2'. However, KRIPKE(S.2) is the
first member of the antecedent-anaphor chain that ends with KRrPKE(s.2), and
aUINE(S.2) is the first member of the antecedent-anaphor chain that ends with
aUINE(s.2). Since neither (iv) nor (v) is true, (5.2) does not qualify as a well-
formed completion simpliciter of schema 1'-).
Of course, the features of (5.2) which prevent it from qualifying as a well-
formed completion simpliciter of (5) do not prevent it from qualifying as a
well-formed completion simpliciter of (6) :
(6) Ns is identical to N6 •
Because "N " and "N " are not the same schematic term, we construct a well-S 8
formed completion simpliciter of (6) whenever we replace the occurrences of
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"N " and "N " in (6) with occurrences of people's names.45 6
2.2. A definition of truth for schemas
As I mentioned at the outset of my remarks about schemas, in order to
understand what it means to say that a given schema is true, one must know
the answers to the following questions:
(a) What is it for a sentence .!!. to be a well-formed
completion simpliciter of a schema! ?
(b) Given that a particular sentence !£ is a well-formed
completion simpliciter of a schema !, which Bre the
contexts of utterance in which .!- must be true if ! is to
be true?
Now that I have set out definitions 1 and 2 and discussed some of their
implications, the answer to (a) should be reasonably clear. However, at this
point the answer to (b) is still something of a mystery.
We can get to the heart of this mystery by looking at schema (8) :
(8) Either N, will VP, or N, won't VP 1 •
I would like (8) to turn out to be a true schema. But if it were necessary for
(8)'s truth that every completion of (8) be true in all contexts of utterance, (8)
4We also construct a well-formed completion simpliciter of (6) whenever we
both (a) replace the occurrence of "Ns" in (6) with an occurrence .Q of a
person's name and (b) replace the occurrence of "Na" in (6) with a reflexive
pronoun occurrence whose antecedent is 2. Consequently, (5.1) counts as a
well-formed completion simpliciter of both (5) and (6). In general, the set of
well-~ormed completions simpliciter of (5) is a proper subset o,f the set of
well-formed completions simpliciter of (6).
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would not be a true schema.5 To see why this is so, consider the following
completion of (8) :
(8.1) Either Kissinger will consult with the present king of
France or he won't consult with the present king of France.
If I were to assert (8. 1), I would either be implying or presupposing that there
is a present king of France. And, since there is no present king of France, I
would either be implying or presupposing a false statement by asserting (8.1).
But if one would either be implying or presupposing a false statement by
asserting a particular sentence !!.., one would not be making a true claim by
asserting 1£. And, if one would not be making a true claim by asserting !!,
then there is at least one context of utterance in which ~ isn't true. Thus,
there is at least one context of utterance in which (8. 1) isn't true.
Since I want (8) to turn out to be true even though (8.1) is a completion of
(8) which is not true in all contexts, I cannot say that a schema ! is true if,
and only if, every completion of ! is true in all contexts. However, what I
can say is this :
(Of3) For any schema !, ! is true if, and only if, for any context
of utterance ~ and any sentence (or series of sentences) !!,
if .!. is a well-formed completion simpliciter of !, then .!.
is true in £ if for any denoting phrase /1, every occurrence
of 11. in .!!. has a referent in £.
Given Df3 ' the truth of (8) is not undermined by the fact that there are
contexts in which (8.1) isn't true. For, in every context £. where (8.1) isn't true,
5 1n this sentence, I am using the word "completion" as an abbreviation for
the expression "well-formed completion simpliciter", For the sake of
convenience and brevity, I will often adopt this usage when I am talking about
schemas.
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there are denoting phrase occurrences in (8.1}--viz.
THE PRESENT KING OF FRANCE 1, (8.1) and THE PRESENT KING OF FRANce2, (s.1)--which don't
have referents in fo.
While Of3 allows (8) to be true, it guarantees that
(6) Ns is identical 40 Na
is not true. Although there are contexts in which some completions of
schema (6) are true, there are also contexts in which many completions of that
schema are not true. In particular, there are contexts in which
(5.2) Kripke is identical to Quine
isn't true. And, since KRIPKE(S.2) and aUINE(s.2) have referents in many of the
contexts in which (5.2) isn't true, it follows from Of3 that (6) isn't a true
schema.
On the other hand,
(5) Ns is identical to Ns
is true. As have noted, any completion of (5) is also a completion of (6).
But in every completion .!. of (6) that is a completion of (5), the string
occurrence in !!. that corresponds to the occurrence of "Na" in (6) is a member
of an antecedent-anaphor chain whose first member is the string occurrence in
.!.. that corresponds to the occurrence of "Ns" in (6). This bd;ng the case, for
any completion .!. of (5) and any context ~, if all of the denoting phrase
occurrences in .!.. have referents in ~, the string occurrence in .!. that
corresponds to the occurrence of "Ne" in (6) has the same referent in £. as the
string occurrence in !! that corresponds to the occurrence of "Ns" in (6). But
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it is clear that for any completion a of (5) and any context f, if the string
occurrence in !! that corresponds to the occurrence of "Na" in (6) has the same
referent in £ as the string occurrence in ~ that corresponds to the occurrence
of 'INs" in (6), then l!. is true in £. So, for any completion ~ of (5) and any
context £, .!!. is true in £ if all denoting phrase occurrences in .!! have referents
in~. But Df3 implies that a schema! is true if for anycompletion!!of!,!!
is true in every context where all of the denoting phrase occurrences in !!
have referents. It therefore follows from Df3 that (5) is true.
2.3. Truth-ascriptions
On the assumption that the implications of Of3 are now reasonably clear, I
would like to point out that we can ascribe truth to schemas in either of two
ways. These two ways are illustrated in (9) and (10) :
(9) The following schema is true:
(5.4) Whenever an individual says that N1 ought
morally not to have VP ,-ed, he implies that
it would have been morally permissible for
N, not to have VP ,-ed.6
(10) If Chomsky says that Nixon ought morally not to have
ordered the bombing of Cambodia, he implies that it would
have been morally permissible for Nixon not to have done
so. More generally, whenever an individual says that N1
ought morally not to have VP ,-ed, he implies that it would
have been morally permissible for N, not to have VP 1-ed.
If someone utters (10), he appears to assert schema 5.4 instead of making a
Sit will be noted that the morpheme "ed" is suffixed to the occurrences of
"VP 1" in 5.4. In general, whenever a morpheme is suffixed to an occurrence .Q.
of a schematic term whose stem is "VP", that morpheme becomes the suffix
of the first verb in any verb phrase occurrence that we substitute for .Q..
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claim about 5.4. However, I shall assume that v"hen someone "asserts" a
schema, he is merely employing a convenient way of talking to say that the
schema is true. Indeed, if this is not what he is saying, I don't see how we
can make any sense of his "assertion". Thus, so far as I am concerned, when
someone "asserts" 5.4 , he says precisely the same thing that he says when
he asserts (9).
2.4. Schemas and quantifiers
The reader may recall that I opened my discussion of schemas by pointing
out that philosophers often employ them in the statement of generalizations.
And, given my account of what it is for a schema to be true, it should be
evident that if someone were to say that
(5) Ns is identical to Ns
is true, he would be stating a generalization which is basically equivalent to
the one that he would state by asserting (11) :
(11) For any person ~, ~ ;s identical to ~.
This fact may lead one to ask the following question: Why bother using
schemas at all 7 Why not simply use the language of quantification theory to
state the generalizations that need to be stated ?
I think that I can best respond to this challenge by directing the reader's
attention to (12) and (13) :
(12) The following schema is true:
(S.5) If we know that N1 has committed an
utterly heinous crime by VP 1-ing, it is
inappropriate to say only that N1 ought
morally not to have VP1-ed.
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(13) For any person ~ and any act-type !, if we know that ~
has comr:nitted an utterly heinous crime by doing ~, it is
inappropriate to say only that ~ ought morally not to have
done a.
It might be supposed that, for all intents and purposes, (12) and (13) are
equivalent. But in point of fact, (13) does not even make sense. In (13),
certain variables that occur within referentially opaque contexts are bound by
quantifiers that stand outside those contexts. Quine, however, has
convincingly argued that such quantification into opaque cor,texts is
incoherent.? It is true that (13) can be revised in such a way th~t its bound
variable are shifted outside of opaque "know that" and "say that" contexts ;
but many logical complications arise when we do this.8 We avoid all these
problems if we simply use (12) in place of (13). For in (12), there is no
quantification into opaque contexts.
Moreover, there are problems with (13) that have nothing to do with
referential opacity. In order to understand (13), one must have some
understanding of act-types. Now, to the extent that I understand these entities,"·
I am inclined to think that each of the following phrases designates an act-
type:
(a) eating pork
(b) blowing out birthday candles
7W•V•O• Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes", in Reference and
Modality, Leonard Linsky, ad., pp. 101 - 104 ; Quine, "Reference and Modalitv",
also in Reference and Modal ity, pp. 22 - 26.
aQuine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes", pp. 104 - 106; David
Kaplan, "Quantifying In", in Reference and Modal ity, pp. 117 - '28.
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(c) walking down Fifth Avenue without any clothes on
(d) drowning a female baby
(e) ordering the crucifixion of captured enemy soldiers
But if (a) - (e) designate act-types, we end up with some very strance results
when we i.lstantiate (13). (",4), for example, is a typical instance of (13) :
(14) If we know that Vlad has committed an utterly heinous
crime by doing ordering the crucifixion of captured enemy
soldiers, it is inappropriate to say only that Vlad ought
morally not to have done ordering the crucifixion of
captured enemy soldiers.
However, here we don't even have a gram"matical sentence. As far as ordinary
English goes, the string "doing ordering the crucifixion of captured enemy
soldiers" is pure gibberish. Of course, we might decide to treat this string
merely as a term of art and interpret it to mean the same as the standard
phrase "ordering the crucifixion of captured enemy soldiers", Similarly, we
could interpret "done ordering the crucifixion of captured enemy soldiers" to
mean the same as "ordered the crucifixion of captured soldiers". Once we
have thus interpreted the problematic strings in (14), we have no difficulty
understanding that "sentence". But what are we to do with other instances of
(13)? It is obvious that these "sentences" will also contain strings that make
no sense in ordinary English. The most convenient way to solve the general
problem that this raises is to appeal to schemas. We can say, for example,
that any string of the form "doing VP1-lng" should be interpreted as meaning
the same as the corresponding instance of "VP1-ln9". However, if we are
going to employ schamas in order to make sense of the "sentences" implied
by (13), why not avoid (13) altogether and simply use (12) in its place? If we
do so, we won't have to worry about assigning interpretations to instances, of
(13) ; for such "sElntences" are not well-formed completions of S.5.
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To sum matters up, there are often more problems involved in the use of
quantifiers than is initially apparent. Since we can sidestep some of these
difficulties by employing schematic terms instead of quantified variables, a
case can be made for stating certain kinds of generalizations schematically,
rather than quantificationally.
Although there is a great deal more to be said about the use of schemas,
think that it would be best at this point to table furtrgr discussion of these
matters and proceed to moral substantive oroblems.
30
PART ONE
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CHAPTER 1
DEFINING MORAL ABSOLUTISM
In this chapter and in the two which immediately follow it, I analyze and
evaluate various attempts to define moral absolutism. My purpose in doing
this is to clear away certain misconceptions about a doctrine that has
frequently been attacked by philosophers and non-philosophers alike.
1.1. Some Standards of Evaluation
In evaluating proposed definitions of absolutism, I shall employ three
basic criteria of adequacy. These criteria can be summed up as follows :
A satisfactory definition of moral absolutism should
identify that doctrine with some statement S such that
(j) 5 does not conflict with the theories of
philosophers who are standardly categorized
as moral absolutists;
(in S does conflict with all theories that are
standardly thought to be opposed to moral
absolutism; and
(iii) S is sufficiently clear to enable us to
determine whether it satisfies conditions (I)
and (iU.
The class of philosophers who subscribe to moral theories that are standardly
called "absolutist" includes Plato, Kant, Sidgwick, Moore, and Ross. Thus,
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given condition (i), I shall reject any definition of absolutism which identifies
that doctrine with a statement that is incompatible with the basic tenets of
Kant's moral philosophy.
Whereas Kant's ethical theory is a paradigm of moral absolutism, the
views of other philosophers are clearly opposed to absolutism in ethics. For
example, Ayer's emotivism and Hare's prescriptivism must be regarded as
expressions of decidedly anti-absolutist sentiments. So, on the basis of the
second adequacy condition that I have imposed on definitions of absolutism, I
shall deem unsatisfactory any such definition which characterizes a doctrine
that Hare could reasonably accept without abandoning his brand of
prescriptivism.
1.1.1. Moral nihilism
Although Ayer and Hare are both opponents of moral absolutism, they
differ from each other in the following respect: whereas Ayer has maintained
that logical concepts cannot properly be applied to ethical statements, Hare
has proposed that genuine logical relations obtain among these statements.9
Thus, Hare holds that one ethical statement may logically imply a second and
logically contradict a third.
Where statements of a certain kind cannot enter into any logical relations,
there is no substantial sense in which they can be called either "correct" or
"incorrect". Ayer, then, is committed to the view that ethical statements are
neither correct nor incorrect. This view might be called "radical moral
9Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, pp. 107 - 108. See also Ayer,
"On the Analysis of Moral Judgements", in Philosophical Papers, pp. 231 - 249.
Hare's basic views on the logic of moral statements are set out in The
Language of Morals, pp. , 7 - 55.
nihilism".
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Proponents of a somewhat milder variety of nihilism merely
maintain that no positive moral appraisals are correct. When I speak here of
"positive" moral appraisals, what I have in mind are statements of the
following sort :
(a) Capital punishment is morally wrong.
(b) Franklin Roosevelt ought morally not to have ordered the
mass internment of Japanese-Americans during
World War II.
(c) It is sometimes morally permissible for a woman to get
an abortion during the second trimester of her pregnancy.
The negations of (a) - (c) do not count as positive moral appraisals. Roughly
speaking, to say that no positive moral appraisals are correct is to say that
nothing is morally right, morally wrong, or morally obligatory. This view,
which I shall call "simple moral nihilism", is endorsed by Mackie in Ethics:
inventing right and wrong. 10
If someone is a moral absolutist, he is undoubtedly opposed to both
radical and simple moral nihilism. Thus, it is clear that Plato, Kant, Sidgwick,
Moore, and Ross all believe that there are correct positive moral appraisals.
Yet one needn't embrace absolutism in order to oppose nihilism. There is a
third course: moral relativism. A moral relativist is opposed to both moral
nihilism and moral absolutism. consider Hare to be a moral relativist.
10J•L• Mackie, Ethics: inventing right and wrong, pp. 15 - 49.
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1.1.2. Three examples of moral relativism
Although I shall make occasional references to Hare's theory in the course
of evaluating proposed definitions of moral absolutism, I shall refer much
more frequently to a brand of relativism which is sometimes called "moral
subjectivism". This relativistic thesis implies that ethical statements are
propositions about ;Jeople's feelings. Explicitly formulated, moral subjectivism
is the doctrine that
(MS) Sentence schemas (f,) - (f3) are true :
(f,) If N2 said that it would be morally right for
N1 to VP 1 ' what N2 would be saying is that
the thought of N1's VP1-in9 arouses a
feeling of approval in N2 •
(f 2) If N2 said that it would be morally wrong
for N1 to VP 1 ' what N2 would be saying is
that the thought of N,'s VP 1-ing arouses a
feeling of disapproval in N2 •
(f3) If N2 said that N1 ought morally to VP 1 '
what N2 would be saying is that the thought
of N,'s not VP1-ing arouses a feeling of
uisapproval in N2 •
According to G.E. Moore, if MS is true, some actions are both morally right
and morally wrong. 1 1 It is not difficult to see why Moore draws this
conclusion. Consider, for example, the following completions of (f 2) and (f 3) :
(.!2) If Meyer Kahane said that it would be morally right for
Israel to annex the West Bank, what Kahane would be
saying is that the thought of Israel's annexing the West
Bank arouses a feeling of approval in him.
, 1G.E. Moore, Ethics, p. 39.
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(!3) If Vanessa Redgrave said that it would be morally wrong
for Israel to annex the West Bank, what Redgrave would be
saying is that the thought of Israel's annexing the West
Bank arouses a feeling of dis~pproval in her.
To reach Moore's conclusion, one simply has to reason as follows
1. Assume that MS is true.·
2. It MS is true, then both !2 and !3 are true.
3. Given the convictions of Kahane and Redgrave, it is
evident that the thought of Israel's annexing the West Bank
arouses a feeling of approval in the former and a feeling
of disapproval in the latter.
4. So, it is both the case that
(a) Kahane would be saying something true if he
said that it would be morally right for Israel
to annex the West Bank, and
(b) Redgrave would be saying something true if
she said that it would be morally wrong for
Israel to annex the West Bank. (from 1 - 3)
5. Consequently, it would be both right and wrong for Israel
to annex the West Bank. (from 4)
6. Therefore, if MS is true, it would be both right and wrong
for Israel to annex the West Bank.
Notice, however, that the inference from (4) to (5) is invalid. For, if we
are assuming that MS is true, what we are saying when we claim that it would
be both right and wrong for Israel to annex the West Bank is that the thought
of Israel's doing this arouses both a feeling of approval and a feeling of
disapproval in us. But it is clear that this does not follow from (4). Given
MS and (4), we may infer something about the feelings of Kahane and
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Redgrave ; but we are not entitled to infer anything about our own feelings.
Thus, Moore is mistaken when he says that if MS is true, some actions will
be both right and wrong. What we may conclude ;s that if MS is true, each of
two people may be sfatiLJ a correct claim even though one is calling an
action morally right while the other is calling the very same action morally
wrong.
Another relativistic theory thdt I will make use of in evaluating proposed
characterizations of moral absolutism is Cultural Relativism. Roughly speaking,
the cultural relativist maintains that when a person makes moral judgments, he
is stating claims about his society's norms. Explicitly, cultural relativism is
the doctrine that
(CR) Sentence schemas (f 4) - (f 6) are true :
(f4) If N2 said that it would be morally right for
N1 to VP 1 ' what N2 would be saying is that
N1 would not violate the norms of N2's
society by VP ,-ln9 .
(f5) If N2 said that it would be morally wrong
for N1 to VP 1 ' what N2 would be saying is
that N, would violate the norms of N2's
society by VP ,-ing •
(f 6) If N2 said that N1 ought morally to VP 1 '
what Nz would be saying is that N, would
violate the norms of N2 's society by not
VP 1-ing .
Given that some actions which would violate the norms of one society
would not violate the norms of other societies, if two people come from
different societies, each may be stating a correct claim even though one ;s
calling an action morally right while the other is calling the very same action
morally wrong.
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Here we see a definite similarity between CR and MS.
However, there are forms of moral relativism which are such that if N2 says
that it would be morally right of N1 to VP 1 while N3 says that it would be
morally wrong of N1 to VP 1 ' then either N2 is mistaken or N3 is mistaken.
One such relativistic theory has recently been advanced by Gilbert Harman. 12
Harman's relativism (HR) may be interpreted as the conjunction of the
following three statements
I. Sentence schemas (f7) - (f9) are true :
(f ,) If N2 says that it would be morally right of
N, to VP 1 ' then, in saying this, N2 is
(a) presupposing that the moral
conventions that N, intends to adhere
to are the same 8S those that Nz
intends to adhere to, and
(b) stating that, given the moral
conventions that N, intends to adhere
to, it would be reasonable for N1 to
VP1 •
(f8) If Nz says that it would be morally wrong
of N, to VP1 ' then, in saying this, N2 is
(a) presupposing that the moral
conventions that N, intends to adhere
to are the same as those that N2
intends to adhere to, and
(b) stating that, given the moral
conventions that N, intends to adhere
to, it would be unreasonable for N, to
VP1 •
12Gilbert Harman, "Moral Relativism Defen~ed", The Philosophical Review,
Vol. 84 (1975), pp. 3 - 22 ; Harman, The Nature of Morality, pp. 103 - 124.
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(f9) If N2 says that N1 ought morally to VP 1 '
then, in ;iaying this, N2 is
(a) presupposing that the moral
conventions that N, intenci~ to adhere
to are the same as those that N2
intends to adhere to, and
(b) stating that, given the moral
conventions that N, intends to adhere
to, it would be unreasonable for N1 not
to VP 1 •
II. The following sentence schema is true :
(f 10) If N1 would VP2 by VP 1-in9, the fact that ~1
would VP2 by VP1-ing is a moral reason· for
N1 (not) to VP1 if, and only if, by VPz-ing,
N, would promote N1's (non)compliance with
some moral convention that N, intends to
adhere to.
III. Not everyone intends to adhere to the same moral
conventions.
One salient feature of HR is that it makes a moral judgment into a claim
about the intentions of the agent who is being evaluated. Another important
characteristic of Harman's theory is its implication that moral judg'11ents
involve presupposition failures when the evaluator and the agent being
evaluated do not accept the same moral conventions. Thus, on Harman's view,
it is inappropriate for A to make a moral judgment about B if B has no
intention of adhering to the conventions that A intends to abide by.
Having now described (a) the standards that I will use in evaluating definitions
of moral absolutism and (b) some of the theories that I will appeal to in
applying those standards, I turn my attention to the characterizations of
absolutism that have been advanced by Jonathan Harrison and Richard Brandt.
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1.2. Harrison's Definition of Absolutism
According to Harrison, moral absolutism is identical with the statement
that
(MA,) Some ethical sentence ! is such that,. for any individual i,
if ! were to assert !, what 1 would thereby be saying
would not depend on any of the following :
(a) who 1 is,
(b) where l's assertion of ! takes place,
(c) when l's assertion of ! takes place.. 13
\
Thus, Harrison conceives of moral aosolutism as a linguistic thesis--a thesis
about the grammar of sentences that can be used to make ethical claims.
Given what he has proposed, if absolutism were true, there would be at least
one ethical sentence that differs from the foliowing sentence in three
important respects :
(1) Right now this place gives me the creeps.
If I assert (1) in some place 2 at a time !, the proposition that I then state
says something about my reaction to Q at!. However, if Jonathan Harrison
were to assert (1) in Q at 1, the proposition that he would thereby state would
say nothing whatever about my reaction to Q at 1. Thus the proposition that I
state when I assert (1) at a particular place and time is distinct from the
proposition that Harrison would assert were he to utter (1) at the very same
pla~e and time. We therefore see that the identity of a speaker partially
'3Harrl~on, "Ethlcal Objectivism", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3, pp.
71 - 75.
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determines what he says when he asserts sentence (1). In addition, the time
at which an individual asserts (1) plays a crucial role in determining what he
says by asserting that sentence. If I assert (1) at 1 pm in a place Q, the
proposition that I then state says something about my reaction to Q at one
o'clock in the afternoon. However, if I assert (1) in the very same place at
, am, the proposition that I thereby state says something about my reaction
to Q. at one o'clock in the morning, but nothing at all about my reaction to Q
at one o'clock in the afternoon. Finally, whenever someone asserts sentence
(1), what he says by asserting tnat sentence will be affected by where he is
when he asserts it. If at a given time! assert (1) in the city morgue, I
clearly state a different proposition from the one I would state were I to
assert that sentence at ! in the middle of a subtropical rain forest.
To sum matters up, if we want to know what proposition has been stated
by a given assertion of (1), we have to determine the values of three
contextual variables :
(a) speaker
(b) place
(c) time
On the other hand, in order to discover what a person says when he asserts
the following sentence,
(2) I like kiwi fruit,
it is only necessary to pay attention to variables (a) and (c)-speaker and time.
And, if we want to know what proposition someone states in asserting (3),
(3) Dodos are extinct,
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the only contextual variable that need concern us is time. Finally, we can
ignore time, as well as speaker and place, in determining what an individual
says when he asserts (4) :
(4) All wombats are marsupials.
In short, (4) is a sentence! such that
(5) For any individual 1, if 1 were to assert !, what 1 would
thereby be saying would not depend on any of the
following:
(a) who i is,
(b) where l's assertion of ! takes place,
(c) when l's assertion of ! takes place.
(5), of course, is the very condition that must be satisfied by some ethical
sentence if MA 1 is to be true.
1.2.1. The case In favor of Harrison's definition
If we examine the theory that I have called "moral subjectivism", we can
easily see what might have led Harrison to equate moral absolutism with MA"
According to subjectivism, each of the following sentence schemas is true:
(f 1) If N2 said that it would be morally right for N, to VP, ,
what Nz would be saying is that the thought of N1's VP 1-
ing arouses a feeling of approval in N2 •
(1 2) If N2 said that it would be morally wrong for N, to VP, ,
what Nz would be saying is that the thought of N1's VP,-
ing arouses a feeling of disapproval in N2 •
(f3) If Nz said that N1 ought morally to VP 1 ' what N2 would
be saying is that the thought of N1's not VP1-ln9 arouses a
feeling of disapproval in Nz •
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Now, i~ (f,) - (f3) are all true, it is clear that each of the following three
statements is also true :
(6) Whenever a speaker asserts a completion of
(1 1,) It would be morally right for N, to VP 1 '
what he says is identical to what he would say by
asserting the corresponding completion of
(1
,2) The thought of N,'s VP,-ing arouses a
feeling of approval in me.
(7) Whenever a speaker asserts a completion of
(f 13) It would be morally wrong for N1 to VP 1 '
what he says is identical to what he would say b'(
asserting the corresponding completion of
(1 14) The thought of Nl' S VP,-iog arouses a
feeling of disapproval in me.
(8) Whenever a speaker asserts a completion of
(f 15) N1 ought morally to VP, ,
what he says is identical to what he would say by
asserting the corresponding completion of
(f 16) The thought of N1's not VP 1-ing arouses a
feeling of approval in me.
A brief glance at (f 12)' (f 14)' and (f 16) reveals that each of these sentence
schemes contains an occurrence of the first-person pronoun "me". This being
the case, "me" will occur in all completions of (f 12)' (f 14)' and (f, 6)'
Furthermore, when a sentence ! contains. a first-person pronoun, no two
individuals will state the very same proposition by asserting!. Therefore,
what a person says in asserting a completion of (f 12)' (f 14)' or (f 16) will
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depend on who he is-in particular, it will depend on the fact that he is the
one who is doing the asserting. From this it follows that if a sentt!nce is a
completion of either (f 12)' (1 14)' or (f 16)' it fails to satisfy condition (5). And,
if no completion Clf (f 12)' (1 14)' or (f 16) satisfies (5), then, on the assumption
that (6) - (8) are true, (5) also won't be satisfied by any sentence which is a
completion of either (f 1')' (f 13)' or (f 15). Moreover, since cornplt!tions of
these schemas seem to be typical of ethical sentences in general, one might
infer that if nu compJetit')ns of any of these schemas satisfy (5), then no
ethical sentences satisfy (5}. And, if no ethical sentences satisfy (5), MA 1 is
false. We thus reach the conclusion that MA 1 is false if moral subjectivism is
true. This result tends to confirm the plausibility of identifying moral
absolutism with MA 1 ~iecause this identification explains the validity of our
basic intuition that subjectivism is incompatible with absolutisrrl.
1.2.2. The Inadequacv of Harrison's definition
Nevertheless, we must ultimately reject Harrison's suogestion that moral
absolutisrn is identical with MA 1. One reason why we ought to discard
H2Jrrison's proposal is that it identifies moral absolutism with 21 statement that
might well be embraced even by a moral subjectivist. Thus, consider the
following completions of schemas (f 13) and (f 14) :
(9) It would be morally wrong for Reagan to order the CIA to
assassinate Arafat.
(10) The thoupht of Reagan's ordering the CIA to assassinate
Arafat arouses a feeling of disapproval in me.
(9) is clearly an ethical sentence. And, on the assumption that moral
subjectivh;m. is true, what a person would say by asserting (9) is the sarr:e
thing that he would say by as&erting (10). This being the case, it ""auld be
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perfectly reasonable for a moral subjectivist to maintain that (10) is no less an
ethical sentence that (9). But now consider the following sentence :
(11) At 1 pm Eastern Standard Time on October 2, 1983, the
thought of Reagan's ordering the CIA to assassinate Arafat
arouses a feeling of disapproval in Jonathan Pressler.
What a person says in asserting (11) does not depend either on who he is, or
on where or when he asserts ft. (11), then, is a sentence which satisfies
condition (5). Consequently, j·r (11) were an ethical sentence, MA 1 wouid be
true. Of course, most people would not have the slightest irlclination to call
(1 1) an ethical sentence. But most people are not moral subjecti'/ists. For an
advocate of moral subjectivisrrl, the idea that (11) is an ethical sentence may
not seem at all implausible. We have already seen that if somoone is a moral
subjectivist, it is reasonable for him to regard (10) as an ethical sentence.
FurtherrllOre, insofar as it is reasonable for a subjectivist to view (10) in this
way, it is reasonable for him to take the position that people state ethical
propositions whenever they assert (10). Let us suppose, then, that an advocate
of moral subjectivism adopts this ;atter position. Such a subjectivist would
maintain that I would be stating an ethical proposition if I asserted (10) at
1 pm EST on October 2, 1983. But many philosophers would claim that that
proposition is id~nti~al to the one that I would state if I asserted sentence
(11'. 1~ So, if our subjectivist follows these philosophers, he will reach the
conclusion that I would state an ethical proposition by asserting (11). Given
14See R. Cartwright, "r'ropositions", in Analytical Philosophy, pp. 81 - 103.
E.J. Lammon expresses a similar position in "Sentences, Statements, and
Propositions", reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Language, J. Rosenberg
& C. Travis, ads., pp. 233 - 249. (Lemmon's terminology differs somewhat
from mine. He uses the term "statement" to describe the sorts of things that
t call propositions. When he talks of "propositions", what he has in mind are
sentenc& mean;ngsJ
this conclusion, it seems entirely appropriate to call (1 1) an ethical sentence.
And, since MA, is true if (11) is an ethical sentence, it makes perfect sense
for an advocate of moral subjectivism to embrace MA,. But if a subjectivist
is free to embrace MA 1 ' Harrison is clearly mistaken when he claims that
moral absolutism is identical with MA 1 •
Although the foregoing argument is sufficient to show that Harrison's
definition of absolutism is unacceptable, there is another reason for rejecting
this definition. As I noted in section (1.1.1), absolutism implies that moral
nihilism is false. Yet MA 1 is perfectly compatible with the proposition that
there are no correct, positive moral appraisals. In short, MA, is entirely
consistent with simple moral nihil ism. What this indicates is that moral
absolutism cannot be construed merely as a claim about the grammar of the
sentences that are used to assert ethical statements. Thus, Harrison's mistake
is a double one he has presented us with an unacceptable grammatical
thesis, and, in addition, he has failed to recognize that absolutism transcends
any proposal about the grammar of ethical sentences.
1.3. Brandt's Definitions of Absolutism
1.3.1. Brandt's ~Irst definition
An altarnative to Harrison's characterization of absolutism can be found in
an article by Richard Brandt entitled, "Ethical Relativism", According to Brandt,
a metaethical relativist is one who rejects the thesis that "there is always one
[and only one] correct moral appraisal of a given issue." 15 This suggests
that we might characterize a moral absolutist as one who accepts this thesis.
15Brandt, "Ethical Relativism", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3, pp. 75
- 78.
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In other words, moral absolutism is to be identified with the following
statement:
(MA2 There is always one, and only one, correct moral appraisal
of a given issue.
The first thing to notice about MA2 is that it appeals to the notion of an
issue. But just what is an issue? On a fairly straightforward interpretation,
each of the following is an issue:
(I) whether or not it was right for Harry Truman to have
authorized the use of atomic weapons against Japanese
cities;
Ui) whether or not Heisenberg deserved blame for having
worked for the Nazis;
(iii) whether or not Goldbach's conjecture is true.
But, of course, it doesn't make much sense to talk of a moral appraisal in the
case of (lin. So I expect that this issue is not in the extension of the term
"issue" as this expression is used in MA2• One might say that it is only
ethical Issues that moral absolutism is concerned with.
But even if we restrict ourselves to ethical issue·. the identification of
moral absolutism with MA2 is problematic. We can see where the problem
lies by turning once again to moral subjectivism. From this theory's point of
view, there is no such thing as the issue of whether or not it was right for
Truman to have authorized the use of atomic weapons against Japanese cities.
According to the sUbjectivist, if one person asserts sentence (12) while another
asserts sentence (13), they are not taking opposing stands on the same issue:
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(12) It was morally right for Truman to have authorized the use
of atomic weapons against Japanese cities.
(13) It was not morally right for Truman to have authorized the
use of atomic weapons against Japanese cities_
From the perspective of subjectivism, if Dick asserts (12), he is taking a stand
on the issue of whether he has a feeling of approval when he thinks about
Truman's having authorized the use of atomic weapons against Japanese cities.
On the other hand, if Jane as&erts (13), she is taking a stand on a completely
different issue: the issue of whether a feeling of approval arises in her
when she thinks about Truman's having authorized the use of atomic weapons
against Japanese cities. Thus, where a moral absolutist would say that
different people have expressed conflicting opinions about a single ethical
issue (viz_ the issue of whether it was morally right for Truman to have
authorized the use of atomic weapons against Japanese cities), a moral
subjectivist would say that different people have expressed perfectly
compatible opinions about entirely separate ethical issues_ And, with respect
to each of these ethical issues, the subjectivist might well maintain that there
is exactly one correct appraisal. Thus, an advocate of moral subjectivism is
free to embrace MA2- This fact is sufficient to show that moral absolutism
should not be identified with MA2-
One way of escaping from the problem that I have just raised is to
modify MA2 so that it reads as follows :
(MA3) There is always one, and only one, correct moral appraisal
of a given BCtion or state of affairs.
If Nz said that it would be morally right for N, to VP, and N3 said that it
would be morally wrong for N1 to VP 1 ' both N2 and N3 would be stating
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moral appraisals of the same action or state of affairs (viz. N1's VP ,-ing).
Moreover, given moral subjectivism, if the thought of N1's VP ,-ing arouses
both a feeling of approval in N2 and a feeling of disapproval in N3 ' then (a)
N2 would state a correct moral appraisal of N,'s VP 1-ing if N2 said that it
would be morally right for N, to VP 1 ' and (b) N3 would also state a correct
moral appraisal of N1's VP 1-in9 if N3 said that it would be morally wrong for
N, to VP1. Thus, so long as some sentence of the following form is true,
(14) The thought of N1's VP1-i"g arouses both a feeling of
approval in N2 and a feeling of disapproval in N3 '
there will be an action or state of affairs that has more than one correct
moral appraisal. But there undoubtedly are many true completions of (14).
Hence, if moral subjectivism were true, MA3 would be false.
This conclusion provides some degree of sU;Jport for the identification of
moral absolutism with MA3 • In the end, however, such an identification is
untenable. We cannot equate absolutism with MA3 because MA3 can be
shown to contradict the views of a great many moral philosophers who are
standardly categorized as absolutists. In particular, MA3 is incompatible with
Kant's moral theory.
Kant held that some actions are both morally right and lacking in moral
worth.'6 And it is surely the case that to claim that an action is right and to
claim that it lacks moral worth is to make two quite distinct moral appraisals
161mmanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 61 - 74. A
detailed analysis of Kant's views on the relation between duty and moral
worth can be found in Onora Nell's Acting On Principle, pp. 94 - 124. See
also Barbara Herman, "On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty", The
Philosophical Review, July 1981, pp. 359 - 382.
of a single action.
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Thus Kant was committed to a view that there is
sometimes more than one correct moral appraisal of a given action. In fact it
is obvious that Kant thought that there is more than one correct moral
appraisal of any action. For he believed that every action could be evaluated
along two ethical dimensions: deontic status and moral worth. Every action
either has or lacks moral worth, and every action falls into at least one of the
following four deontic categories: (a) morally permissible, (b) morally
impe·rm'issible, (c) morally obligatory, (d) morally nonobligatory. Moreover,
even if we look just at deontic status, it is clear that there can be more than
one correct moral appraisal of a given action. For if an act is morally
impermissible, it is also morally nonobligatory. Conversely, if an act is
morally obligatory, it is also morally permissible.
Given that Kant's views straightforwardly contradict the statement that
(MA3) There is always one, and only one, correct moral appraisal
of a given action or state of affairs,
we must either reject the identification of moral absolutism with MA3 or say
that Kant is not really a moral absolutist after ail. Of the~e two alternatives,
the former is clearly preferable.
In point of fact, an individual needn't give up a commitment to moral
absolutism even if he thinks that there are infinitely many correct moral
appraisals of any given action. Furthermore, a very strong argument can be
put forward in support of the claim that there are infinitely many correct
moral appraisals for each and every action that we care to give a name to.
To begin with, after only brief reflection it becomes clear that there are
infinitely many moral appraisals of any given action. In addition to judgments
about rightness and moral worth, there are judgments about the infringement
50
of people's rights. A judgment of this latter sort is stated by the following
sentenc:e:
(15) The assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes
Booth infringed Lincoln's right against Booth that Booth not
kill him.
Now ('5) is an instance of
(16) The assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes
Booth infringed N1's moral right against N2 that 51 .
And there are an infinite number of non-equivalent completions of (16). (This
is a consequdnce of the fact that there are infinitely many non-equivalent
sentences that can be substituted for 5,.) Moreover, insofar as each of these
completions says that Lincoln's assassination was an infringement of a right,
each completion states a moral appraisal of the assassination. Thus there are
infinitely many moral appraisals of this action. In addition, if we assume that
for every completion ! of ('6), either ! is true or the corresponding
completion of
(17) The assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes
Booth did not infringe N1's moral right against N2 that 5, .
is true, we reach the conclusion that there are infinitely many true (i.e. correct)
moral appraisals of Lincoln's assassination. For just as there are an infinite
number of non-equivalent completions of (16), there are an infinite number of
non-equivalent completions of (17). And just as each completion of (16) states
a moral appraisal of the assassination, each completion of (17) also states a
moral appralsai of that action.
Quite generally, for ~ny fixed expression X that designates an action, there
are inifinitely many non-equivalent completions of both
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(18) r X infringed N,'s moral right against Nz that 5, .'
and
(19) r X did not infringe N1's moral right against N2 that 51 .'
Each of these completions states a moral appraisal of the action designated
by X. Hence, there are infinitely many moral appraisals of any action we can
name. Furthermore, if it is the case that for any completion! of (18), either!
is true or the corresponding completion of (19) is true, there are also infinitely
many correct moral appraisals of any action we can name.
1.3.2. Brandt's second definition
In Ethical Theory, Brandt offers a definition of moral absolutism that is
somewhat different from the one that we have just been examining. What he
specifically proposes is that moral absolutism is identical with' the following
claim:
(MA4) There are no conflicting ethical opinions that are equally
valid. 17
Unfortunately, this characterization of absolutism appears to fall victim to a
rather obvious objection. For it seems that even advocates of relativistic
theories could accept MA4- In particular, it appears that a proponent of moral
subjectivism is actually committed to the truth of MA4• As I pointed out in
(1.2. 1), if subjectivism is true, then (6) and (7) will be true
(6) Whenever a speaker asserts a completion of
1'Richard Brandt, Ethical Theory, p. 272.
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(f 11) It would be morally right for N1 to VP 1 '
what he says is identical to what he would say by
asserting
(f 12) The thought of N,'s VP ,-in9 arouses a
feeling of approval in me.
(7) Whenever a speaker asserts a completion of
(f 13) It would be morally wrong for N, to VP 1 '
what he says is identical to what he would say by
asserting
(f 14) The thought of N;5 . VP 1-ing arouses a
feeling of disapproval in me.
Let us suppose that an individual A states his ethical opinion about something
by asserting a sentence 1 11 of form (f 11). Let us also suppose that B states
his ethical opinion about the same thing by asserting the corresponding
sentence ! 13 of form (f 13). Given moral sUbjectivism, what A says in
asserting !" is that a ~ertaln thought arouses a feeling of approval in him.
On the other hand, what B says in asserting ! 13 is that the same thought
arouses a feeling of disapproval in him (i.e. in B). But if this is what A and B
are saying, they are not making contradictory claims; each is merely saying
something about himself. Moreover, if they are not making contradictory
claims, then the opinions that they are stating are not in conflict. Surely,
though, if there are any conflicting ethical opinions at all, the opinion that A
states in asserting !" conflicts with the opinion that B states in asserting
!13. Hence, if moral sUbjectivism is correct, there are no conflicting ethical
opinions. However, if ethical opinions never conflict, it follows that there are
no conflicting ethical opinions that are equally valid.
subjectivism is correct, MA4 is true.
Thus, if moral
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The preceding argument seems to show that moral absolutism cannot be
identified with MA4 • According to the argument, moral subjectivism and MA4
are perfectly compatible; indeed, the argument maintains that the former is
true only if the latter is. However, since subjectivism is a brand of moral
relativism, it must be incompatible with MA4 if absolutism and MA4 are one
and the same.
If Brandt were confronted with the reasoning that I have just set out, he
would no doubt claim that it relies on quite a different conception of
conflicting opinion than the one he had in mind when he proposed MA4 as a
statement of moral absolutism. Thus, he would say, moral subjectivism turns
out to be genuinely incompatible with MA4 when we adopt an interpretation of
MA4 based on his conception of what it is for people's ethical opinions to
conflict.
In order to evaluate the adequacy of this reply, we must examine Brandt's
views on conflicting ethical opinion. These views are set out in the following
passage from Ethical Theory.
[S]uppose Mr. A makes an ethical statement, and Mr. B makes a
different ethical statement. How shall we tell whether the two
statements "conflict"? A sufficient condition of conflict is this:
that both statements are about the same subject . • ., and the one
applies to this subject an ethical predicate P, and the other
applies to it the same ethical predicate prefaced by the Engl ish
"not" or something that means or entails the :;ame. For instance,
one may say Iris morally right" and the other may say "is not
morally right" of the very same subject. But now, when do two
ethical statements have the same subject? .•• [S]uppose Mr. A, a
resident of the South Pacific, says it is right to bury one's father
alive on his sixtieth birthday, irrespective of his state of health;
and suppose I say this is not right. Are we talking about the
same thing? Not nece:;sarily. •.. Perhaps he is assuming that
the body one will have in the next world will be exactly like the
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kind one has just before departing this life (and hence, may think
it advisable to depart before feebleness sets in); whereas I may
think one has no further existence at all after one's earthly
demise•... In this situation, it is only confusing to say that our
ethical opinions "conflict." Let us say that two people are
talking about the same subject only in the following situation: Let
us suppose A and B make conflicting ethical predications about
something or some kind of thing, ostensibly the same for both.
But suppose further there is some property P that A more or less
consciously believes this thing or kind of thing has, whereas B
does not believe this. Further, let us suppose that if A ceased to
believe this, he would cease to have the same ethical opinion
about it but agree with B; and let us suppose that if 8 began to
believe this (other things being equan, he would change his
ethical opinion and agree with A. In this case, let us say that A
and B are not appraising the same subject. But if there is no
more-or-Iess conscious belief having the status described, then
we shall say that they are talking about the same subject, and
that their ethical opinions are conflicting. 18
I believe that there are several very serious problems with the proposal
that Brandt makes in the preceding passage. Indeed, these problems seem to
me to be so profound that I can only conclude that Brandt has altogether
failed to present a coherent account of conflicting ethical opinion. First of
all, Brandt refers to various properties of statements and speech acts in order to
explain what it is for opinions to conflict. Yet he never clearly specifies how
statements, speech acts, and opinions relate to one another. Furthermore, he
seems to slip back and forth between these notions without any awareness
that he is doing so. Thus, when setting out a sufficient condition of conflict
between ethical statements, he speaks of these staternents "applying
predicates" to things. But surely it is people who apply predicates to things.
The application of a predicate to something is a speech act; and statements
do not perform speech acts. Further confusions can be found in Brandt's
18/bid., pp. 273 - 274.
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description of the conditions under which two people talk about the same
subject. There he seems to suggest (a) that two people talk about the same
thing only when they apply conflicting ethical predicates to it, and (b) that an
individual is always stating some opinion that he holds when he applies a
predicate to something. However, there obviously are many cases in which
two people talk about the same thing without applying any conflicting ethical
predicates to it. They may talk about the same thing by applying compatible
non-ethical predicates to it. Likewise, they may talk about the same thing
when they merely discuss the question of whether a particular predicate
applies to it. As for the relation between stating an opinion and applying a
predicate to something, people very often apply predicates to things even
when they do not think that the predicates are true of those things. In such
cases their assertions simply don't correspond to their opinions.
Yet another ground for complaint is Brandt's failure to explicitly formulate
any condition whose satisfaction is both necessary and sufficient for the
presence of conflict between ethical opinions. What he does provide is a
statement of a condition that is alleged to be sufficient for the existence of
conflict between two ethical statements:
. . . both statements are about the same subject ..., and the one
applies to this subject an ethical predicate P, and the other
applies to it the same ethical predicate prefaced by the English
"not" or something that means or entails the same. 19
Yet, Brandt never explains why this is merely a sufficient condition for
conflict between ethical statements. Nor does he tell us how conflict between
ethical statements relates to conflict between ethical opinions. Perhaps he
19/dem•
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thinks two ethical opinions are in conflict when one can be expressed by an
ethical statement that conflicts with some ethical statement that can be used
to express the other. But can any pair of conflicting ethical opinions be
expressed by a pair of ethical statements that satisfies the sufficient condition
for conflict that Brandt has proposed? No answer to this question can be
gleaned from Brandt's discussion.
The foregoing criticisms do not show that Brandt's conception of conflict
between ethical opinions is inherently misguided. Brandt might be able to
meet my objections by paying closer attention to the ways in which
statements, speech acts, and opinions relate to one another. But even if
Brandt could do this, he would not have succeeded in giving us a coherent
formulation of the conditions under which ethical opinions conflict. In
addition to the shortcomings I have mentioned thusfar, two further problems
can be found in Brandt's discussion of conflicting ethical opinion. These
problems undermine his account of the circumstances in which two individuals
are appraising the same subject.
According to Brandt, when an individual A and an individual B make
conflicting ethical predications about something that is ostensibly the same for
both, they are making an appraisal about the same subject just in case there is
no property P such that
(i) A believes that the thing ir1 question has P,
(i i) B does not believe that it has P,
(iii) if A ceased to believe that it had P, he would cease to
have the same ethical opinion about it but would instead
agree with B, and
(Iv) if B began to believe that it had P, he would change his
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20ethical opinion and agree with A.
In this explanation of the circurT.stances under which A and 8 appraise the
same subject, it is clearly assumed th3t we already know what it is for A and
B to make eth!cal predications about something that is "ostensibly the same
for both". Indeed, unless we have this knowledge, the explanation cannot
succeed. However, it is difficult to see how we could have the requisite
knowledge without already under!:tanding what it is for A and B to make
appraisals about the same sUbject. When an individual says that A and B have
made ethical predications about something that is ostensibly the same for
both, he seems just to be sayin~ this:
A has made an ethical appraisal about something, B has made an
ethical appraisal about something, and it appears that, in making
these appraisals, A and B were appraising the very same sUbject.
Thus, in order to know what it IS for A and 0 to make ethical appraisals
about something that is ostensibly the same for both, we have to know what
it is for A and B to appear to be making appraisals about the same subject.
But we obviously can't know what it is for people to appear to be making
appraisals about the same sUbject unless we already understand what it is for
them actually to be doing tl1is. So, it would seem that we cannot know what
it is for A and B to make ethical predications abol't something that is
ostensibly the same for both without having an antecedent understanding of
what it is for them to appraise the same subject. And, since Brandt's
explanation of the circumstances under which two p~ople appraise the same
subject presupposes that we know what it is for those people to make ethical
predications about something that is ostensibly the same for both, it also
20 Idem.
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presupposes an understanding of the very thing that it is supposed to be
explaining. Such an "explanation" is no explanation at all.
In order to set the stage for my final objection to Brandt's account of
conflicting ethical opinion, let me repeat what he has to say about the
conditions under which two people appraise the same sUbject. According to
Brandt, when an individual A and an individual B make conflicting predications
about something that is ostensibly the same for both, they are appraising the
same subject if, and only if, there is no property P such that
(0 A believes that the· thing in question has P,
(ij) B does not believe that it has P,
(iii) if A ceased to believe that it had P, he would cease to
have the same ethical opinion about it, but would instead
agree with B, and
(iv) if B began to believe that it had P, he would change his
ethical opinion and agree with A.
Now then, Brandt puts forward this description of the circumstances under
which A and B appraise the same subject in order to clarify what it is for an
ethical opinion of A to ~e in conflict with an ethical opi~ion of B. Thus
Brandt's purpose in setting out the conditions under which A and B appraise
the same subject will be undermined if, in his formulation of these conditions,
he has appealed to a notion that is no less in need of explanation than the
notion of conflict between people's ethical opinions. However, a brief look at
conditions (Iii) and (iv) confirms the fact that Brandt has indeed appealed to
just the sort of notion that he is not free to use. In these conditions, he
talks about agreement between the ethical opinions of A and B. And, if the
notion of confl iet between people's ethical opinions requires explanation, so
also does the notion of agreement between their ethical opinions. Conflict and
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agreement are two sides of the same coin. Thus, if (as Brandt assumes) we
must know \Nhat it is for A and B to appraise the same subject in order to
know what it is for them to have conflicting ethical opinions, we must also
know this in order to know what it is for there to be agreement between the
ethical opinions of A and B. But in that case, talk about agreement between
the ethical opinions of A and B has no plac~ in an account of what it is for
A and B to appraise the same subject. Since Brandt employs such talk when
describing the circumstances under which they appraise the same sUbject, his
description is fatally flawed.
To sum matters up, I have been arguing that Brandt's account of
conflicting ethical opinion is plagued by at least three major problems. First,
Brandt mixes up talk about opinions, statements, and speech acts to such an
extent that it is not really clear what conditions he is proposing for the
existence of conflict between people's ethical opinions. Second, we can
understand Brandt's explanation of what it is for two people to appraise the
same subject only if we already know what it is for those people to make
ethical appraisals about something that is "ostensibly the same for both."
However, this knowledge itself presupposes an understanding of the conditions
under which two people appraise the same subject. Thus, Brandt is giving us
an explanation that can succeed only if we already understand the very thing
that it purports to be explaining. Third, and last, Brandt makes an illegitimate
appeal t~ the notion of agreement between people's ethical opinions in order
to tell us what it is for people's ethical opinions to conflict. Since agreement
and conflict are simply two sides of the same coin, it won't do to appeal to
the former in an explanation of the Jatter. When taken together, the forClgoing
criticisms constitute an overwhelming case against the coherence of Brandt's
account of conflicting ethical opinion. However, if Brandt does not have a
coherent account of this notion, then it is not at all clear what he is
proposing when he identifies moral absolutism with MA4 :
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(MA4) There are no conflicting ethical opinions that are equally
valid.
Moreover, as I showed at the beginning of this section, on one perfectly
natural interpretation of what it is for opinions to conflict, an advocate of
moral subjectivism could very happily accept MA4• Yet an advocate of
subjectivism is anything but a moral absolutist. Consequently, unless we can
come up with an acceptable alternative to this interpretation of confl icting
opinion, there is no reason to think that there is any reading under which MA4
is a statement of moral absolutism.
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CHAPTER 2
ABSOLUTISM AND UNIVERSAL MORAL 5TANDARD5
In The Concept of Morals, Walter Stace characterized the ethical relativist
as one who ".~enies that there is a single moral standard which is equally
I· bit II t II t· ,,2 1 Th· t · f t h' Iapp lea e 0 a men a a Imes..... IS concep Ion 0 e lea
relativism can also be found in the recent work of Philippa Foot and David
Lyons.22 If, as these philosophers claim, a moral relativist is one who denies
the existence of any universally applicable standard of morality/' a moral
absolutist should be one who affirms the existence of such a standard. Thus,
let us consider the following proposal: moral absolutism is identical with the
claim that
(MAS) There is a single moral standard which is equally
applicable to all men at all times.
This characterization of absolutism is only as clear as MAs itself. And,
unfortunately, MAs is both ambiguous and vague. So 'far as ambiguity goes, it
i-; possible to read MAs in either of the following two ways :
2 'Walter Terence Stace, The Concept of Morals, excerpt reprinted in Paul
Taylor, Problems of Moral Philosophy, pp. 52-66
22Philippa Foot, "Moral Relativism", in Relativism: Cognitive and Moral,
Mlchae' Krausz and Jack W. Melland, ads., pp. 152-166. David Lyons, "Ethical
Relativism and the Problem of Incoherence", also in Relativism: Cognitive and
Moral, pp. 209 - 228.
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(a) There is one, and only one, (correct) moral standard, and
that standard applies to everyone.
(b) There is one, and only one, (correct) moral standard that
applies to everyone.
Furthermore, the expression "applies to everyone" is ambiguous. It can mean
either
(c) determines the correctness of everyone's moral judgments,
or
(d) determines the moral status of everyone's behavior.
And even if we could decide which of these readings were appropriate, we
would be left with the very vague term, "moral standard". Someone might
claim that each of the Ten Commandments is a moral standard. But another
might say that the conjunction of the Ten Commandments is a single moral
standard. Thus, if one thinks that the Ten Commandments specify the totalitv·
of all moral obligation, one might say either that there are exactly ten correct
moral standards or that there is exactly one correct moral standard (which has
ten component propositions).
Despite the obvious ambiguity and vagueness of MAs ' philosophers who
are inclined to equate that statement with moral absolutism almost never
bother to explain how they want MAs to be interpreted. Indeed, so far as I
know, Fred Feldman is the only philosopher who has assigned an explicit
interpretation to MAs .23 In the following section, I introduce Feldman's
interpretation and argue that, if MAs is read in the way he suggests, it cannot
23Fred Feldrnan, I ntroductory Ethics, pp. 160 - 173.
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plausibly be identified with moral absolutism. In section (2.2), I indicate how
Feldman's interpretation might be modified to yield a new reading of MAs.
Furthermore, I show that this new reading avoids some of the more obvious
shortcomings of the interpretation provided by Feldman. However, in the final
section of this chapter, I argue that m'( new int~rpretation of MAs- can avoid
an unacceptable degree of vagueness only by coming into conflict with the
~iews of certain philosophsl s who are standardly acknowledged to be
proponents of moral absolutism.
2.1. Feldman's Characterization of Moral Absolutism
2.1.1. An Interpretation of MAs
Fred Feldman's interpretation of MAs may be viewed as a statoment about
sentence schema F1
(F,) For any agent ! and any time !, it is the case at ! that !
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, 51.
In particular, we can paraphrase Feldman's interpretation of MAs as follows
(MAe) Some sentence schema that is a completion of Fj with
respect to "S " is both eternal and non-trivially true. 241
If MAe is a satisfactory interpretation of MAs and moral absolutism is
identical with MAs' we may also identify absolutism with MA,s- In fact, this
is precisely what Feldman proposes.25
24/bid., p. '62.
25/dem•
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In order to determine the implications of Feldman's proposal, we must
have some conception of
(i) what it is for " sentence schema to be eternal,
and
(in what it is for a sentence schema to be non-trivially true.
So far as (0 is concerned, let us in general take a sentence schema s to be
eternal just in case some completion of ! states the same proposition in all
contexts of utterance. We may thus say that some completion of F1 with
respect to "51" is an eternal sentence schema if, and only if, there is a
sentence .!. and a sentence schema ! such that ! is a completion of F1 with
respect to "S1", !! is a completion simpliciter of ~, and a states the same
proposition in all contexts of utteranr,.,. So, if a given completion of F1 with
respect to "51" is eternal, that partial completion of F1 will have an important
property in common with
(1) If NP1 is an even number, NP 1 is divisible by 2 without
remainder. 26
that it does not share with
(2) Until recently, I never liked N,'s paintings.
26When one completes a schema that contains occurrences of "NP 1'" one
replaces each occurrence of "NP1" with a noun phrase. Any noun phrase can
be substituted for any occurrence of "NP,", Thus the possible substituents for
an occurrance of "NP1" comprise a broader class than the class consisting of
the possible substituents for "N,". The latter class is a proper subclass of
the former.
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Whenever we complete (1) by replacing both occurrences of "NP," with the
same numeral, we form a sentence which states the same proposition in all
contexts. However, no matter what expression we substitute for the
occurrence of fiN"1 in (2), the sentence that we form states different
propositions in different contexts. This is due to the indexicality of the
temporal adverb "recently" and the first-person pronoun "1".
On the assumption that moral absolutism is identical with MAs' an
absolutist is committed not only to the view that some 5 1-completion of F1 is
eternal, but also to the view that some eternal 5 1·completion of F1 is non-
trivially true.27 We will return later to issues involving eternality; but for the
moment let us focus our attention on the question of what it is for an
5 1·completion of F1 to be non-trivially true. Almost everyone would be
willing to admit that the following sentence schema is true.
(3) For any agent ! and any time !, it is the case at ! that !
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, it is the case at !
that ! ought morally to VPl'
Moreover, (3) is obviously a completion of F1 with respect to "5,". (We form
(3) by replacing the occurrence of "S," in F1 with "n occurrence of "it is the
case at ! that! ought morally to VP 1".) Consequently, almost everyone would
be willing to say that there is at least one 51-completion of F1 that is true.
But Feldman claims that (3) is only trivially true. 28 And this claim seems
to be right. Thus, if moral absolutism is identical with MAs and (3) is the
27 1 will often use the phrase, "51-completion of F1", as an abbreviation for
'completion of F1 with respect to "S1 "',
28/dem•
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only· completion of F 1 with respect to "S1" that is true, moral absolutism is
false. More generally, even if there turn out to be many true 5 1-completions
of F 1 and, in addition, each of those 5 1-completions is eternal, if atl such
partial completions of Flare only trivially true, then absolutism will be false
if it is identical with MAs.
As it turns out, however, we can quite easily show that
(4) If there are any completions of F1 with respect to "5 1"
that are both true and eternal, some of these
5 1-completions of Flare non-trivially true.
Furthermore, the following statement is a logical consequence of (4) and the
fact that MAs is true just in case some true, eternal 5 1-completions of Flare
non-trivially true :
(5) If there are any completions of F1 with respect to "5 1"
that are both true and eternal, then moral absolutism is
true if it is identical with MAe-
I shall shortly set out a proof of (5). But before doing so, I want to
explain why this proof is significant. Contrary' to what one might think, its
significance does not lie in the fact that its conclusion is important. By
itself, the truth of (5) does not really have much importance. What is
significant for our purposes is the reason why (5) is true_ More explicitly, the
particular proof of (5) that I will present is significant because it obviously
fai Is to resolve any of the issues that separate moral absolutists from their
opponents. The fact that it obviously fails to do this undermines the view
that moral absolutism i~ identical with MAts-
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2. 1.2. Why MAS is not a satisfactory statement of moral absolutism
The identification of absolutism with MAs implies that, if one could show
that some 5 1-completions of Flare both true and eternal, all that one would
have to do in order to establish the truth of absolutism would be to
demonstrate that some of those true, eternal 5 1-completions are non-trivially
true. What is evident from my proof of (5) is that, if one could show th~t
some 5 1-completions of Flare true and eternal, one could also show that
some of those true, eternal 5 1-completions are non-trivially true without
thereby establishing the truth of morcl absolutism. Consequently, it is a
mistake to take absolutism to be identical with MAs-
To put the matter another way, my proof of (5) shows that, in identifying
moral absolutism with MAe' Feldman makes the same sort of mistake that a
philosopher of religion would make if he identified theism with the claim that
(6) There is a very powerful being who didn't prevent
Secretariat from winning the Triple Crown.
According to this proposal about theism, if one could show that there is a
very powerful being, all that one would have to do in order to prove the truth
of theism would be to demonstrate that some such being didn't prevent
Secretariat from winning the Triple Crown. But it is ludicrous to think that
there are any circumstances in which every demonstration of this sort would
be sufficient to establish the truth of theism.
Having now explained why my f.-roof of (5) undermines the identification of
moral absolutism with MAs' I shall present this proof without further delay.
The argument begins with the observation that the following argument-form is
valid:
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(A)
ii. r
(Here "r" stands for any closed sentence or sentence schema; "p" and "q"
stand for any sentences or sentence schemas which, if open, contain only "1"
as an unbound variable.) For our purposes it will be important to bear in mind
three facts about arguments of form (A). First, given that (A) is valid, any
argument of that form will have a true conclusion if its premises are true.
Second, if, in addition to having true premises, an argument of form (A) has a
second premise that is non-trivially true, the conclusion of that argument will
likewise be non-trivially true. Third, and last, if both the first and second
premises of an argument of form (A) are eternal sentences or sentence
schemas, the conclusion of that argument will also be eternal.
Now then, one can readily see that the following sequence of sentences
and sentence schemas is an argument of form (A):
(B)
(3) For any agent ! and any time !, it is the case at !
that! ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, it is the
case at ! that ! ought morally to VP 1.
ii. Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus.
iii. For any agent ! and any time 1, it is the case at !
that! ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, Hesperus
is identical to Phosphorus and it is the case that at
! that ! ought morally to VPl'
,
And, besides being an argument of form (,A.), (B) has a second premise
which is both eternal and non-trivially true. It therefore follows from what
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has been said about arguments of form (A) that if (3) is true and eternal, (B.iii)
will be eternal and non-trivially true. Furthermore, (B.iiD is a completion of F1
with respect to "5 1". (We form (B.iiU by replacing the occurrence VI~ "5," in
F1 with the clause, "Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus and it is the case at t
that! ought morally to VP 1.") Consequently, if (3) is true and eternal, there is
an eternal, non-trivially true 5 1-completion of F,. But (3) is itself an
5 1-completion of F1; and surely (3) is true and eternal if any 5 1-completion of
F1 is true and eternal, We may therefore conclude that
(4) If there are any completions of F, with respect to "5,"
that are both true and eternal, some of these
S,-completions of F1 are non-trivially true.
From (4) it is only a short step to (5) :
(5) If there are any completions of F1 with respect to "5 1"
that are both true and eternal., then moral absolutism is
true if it is identical with MAs'
As I pointed out above, (5) is a consequence of (4) and the fact that MAs is
true just in case some true, eternal S,-completions of Flare non-trivially true,
This, then, is my proof of (5). And, to reiterate what I said just a few
pages ago, the proof clearly does not resolve any issue that could possibly
divide moral absolutists from their opponents. Anyone who denies absolutism
is making an important claim about the nature of morality. But I have
established the truth of (5) by appealing to facts that have no more to do with
the nature of morality than Secretariat's Triple Crown victory has to do with
the truth of theism" It is absurd to suppose that someone who doubts or
denies the truth of theism might become convinced of its truth simply by
being shown that if a very powerful being exists, that being didn't prevent
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Secretariat from winning the Triple Crown. And it is likewise ridiculous to
suggest that someone who either doubts or denies the truth of moral
absolutism might become convinced that this doctrine is true just by being
shown that
(7) If (3) is both true and eternal, one can formulatH an
eternal, non-trivially true 5 1-completion of F1 by conjoining
(B.in Hesperus is ident~cal to Phosphorus
with the right-hand side of the biconditional !n (3).
HOYJ8Ver, if moral absolutism and MAe were ol"'e and the same, this
suggestion wouldn't be ridiculous at all. On the view that absolutism is
identical with MAe' it is not sufficient for the truth of absolutism that some
S1-completion of F1 (such as (3)) be both true and eternal. In addition, some
true, eternal S1-completion of F1 must be non-trivially true. Hence, on the
assumption that absolutism is identical with MAe ' it makes perfect sense for
an individual to doubt or deny !lbsolutism if he believes (3) to be true and
eternal but doubts or denies that there is an eternal, non-trivially true
S,-completion of F1. And, since such an individual, believing (3) to be true
and eternal, doubts or denies absolutism only because he doubts or denies that
there is an eternal, non-trivially true 5 1-completion of F1 ' we would expect
him to admit that absolutism is true once he is shown that (7) is true.
Consequently, if moral absolutism and MAe were one and the same, it would
make perfect sense to sugsest that someone might become convinced of
absolutism's truth simpty by being shown that (7) is true. Yet we know that
this suggftstJon is utterly absurd. Therefore, we must reject Feldman's
proposal that moral absolutism is identical with the statement that
(I\~A6) Some sentence schema that is a completion of F1 with
respect to "S, " is both eternal and non-trivially true.
On the other hand, it might be possible to make only minor changes in
MAe which transform that staterrtent into a proposition that can be identified
with moral absolutism without ~·alling prey to the objections that have just
been made to the identification of absolutism with MAs- I ~m sure that
Feldman would want to pursue this possibility~· Indeed it is not difficult to
imagine what sorts of changes he might want to m~t,e in MAs-
In order to explain and to concisely state the fEvised version of MAs that
think Feldman would wa.t to identify with moral absolutism, it is ne~essary
to pick out and give a name to a certain relation which holds between
sentence schemas such as
(B.iii) For any agent ! and an'l time 1, it is the case at ! that ~.
ought morally to VP .. if, and only if, Hesperus is identical
.
to Phosphorus and it is the case at ! that! ought morally
to VP,
and
(3) For any any agent ! and any time !, it is the case at !
that! ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, it is the case
at ! that! ought morally to VP,.
(B.iii) is what I shall call a superfluous aug.'T'Jentation of (3). In general,
Of,: For any sentence schemes !, and §.2 ' if ~1 has the f'JrlT'
then !2 is a superfluous augmentation of !1 if, and only if,
!2 is not logically equivalent to !1 ' and !2 is eitiler
formed by or I·)gically equivalent to a sentence schema
that is formed by ccnjoining a true sentence or sentence
schema with the right-hand side of the biconditional in §.,.
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The name "superfluous augmentation" is intended to reflect two facts about
any sentenr:e schema !2 which is a superfluous augmentation of a sentence
schema!l of the form
First, if !2 is a superfluous augmentation of .§., , it is an augmentation of .§.1 in
the following sense: !1 implies that if we instantiate I'!" and "1" in any
completion of 1" the truth of the right-hand side of the resulting
biconditional is sufficient for the truth of the left-hand side; but §,2 implies
that some further substantial claim must be true if the left-hand side is to be
true. To take an example, consider the following sentence schemas :
(8) For any agent ! and any time !, it is the case at ! that !
ought morally tc? VP 1 if, and only if, it is the case at !
that! would produce more utility by VP1-in9 than by doing
anything that would be incompatible with VP 1-in9
(9) For any agent ! and any time 1, it is the case at ! that !
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, Hesperus is identical
with Phosphorus and it is the case at ! that ~ would
produce more utility by VP 1-lng than by doing anything
that would be incompatible with VP 1-ing.
(9) is obviously a superfluous augmentation of (8). Now it follows from (8)
that
(10) It i~ the case at present that Pavarotti ought morally to
become a vegetarian if, and only if, it is the case at
present that Pavarotti would produce more utility by
becoming a vegetarian than he would by doing anything
that would be incompatible with becoming a vegetarian.
And (10) implies that the truth of its own right-hand side is sufficient for the
truth of its left-hand side. Consequently, (8) implies that the truth of
73
(11) It is the case at present that Pavarotti would produce more
utility by becoming a vegetarian than he would be doing
anything that would be incompatible with becoming a
vegetarian
is sufficient for the truth of
(12) It is the case at present that Pavarotti ought morally to
become a vegetarian
But (9) implies that something further must be true if (12) is to be true.
According to (9), (12) is true only if (11) is true and, in addition,
(B.ii) HesfJerus is identical to Phosphorus.
In this example, then, (and in infinitely many others) (8) implies that the truth
of a statement a is sufficient for the truth of a statement P; and (9) augments
this sufficiency condition by requiring not only that a be true, but also that
(B.in be true. It is for this reason that I call (9) an augmentation of (8).
Having now mentioned one of the two facts that the term "superfluous
augmentation" is intended to reflect, let me turn briefly to the second fact.
According to Of 1 ' if a sentence schema ! has the form (A.i), we can
construct a superfluous augmentation of ~ by conjoining a true sentence or
sentence schema with the right-hand side of the biconditivnal in!. But
whenever we augment ! in this way, we always form a sentence schema tt.at
has the very same truth-value as ! itself. So, if ~ is false, we never correct
its deficiencies by conjoining a true sentence or sentenco schema with the
right-hand side of the biconditional in!. And, conversely, if .§. is true, such an
augmentation of .! never introduces any deficiencies. My use of the adjective
"superfluous" to refer to the result of such an augmentation of ! is intended
to reflect the fact that we never correct or create any deficiencies by
augmenting! in this way.
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By appealing to the notion of superfluous augmentation, we can generalize
upon the specific problem that led to the rejection of MAs as a
characterizetion of moral absolutism. That problem arose because the
following fact is relevant to the truth of MAs even though it has no bearing
at all on the truth of moral absolutism:
(7) If (3) is both true and eternal, one can f<)rmulate an
eternal, non-trivially true 5 1-completion of F, by conjoining
(B.ii) Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus
with the right-hand side of the biconditional in (3).
(For the reader's convenience, I now restate F 1 ' MAs ' and (3).)
(F 1) For any agent ! and any time !, it is :he case at ! that !
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, 51.
(MAe) Some sentence schema that is a completion of F, with
respect to ItS " is both eternal and non-trivia~Iy true.1
(3) For any agent ! and any time 1, it is the case at ! that !
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, it is the case at t
that ! ought morally to VP 1.
One can readily see that the reason why (7) has no bearing on the truth or
falsity of moral absolutism is that, by conjoining (B.in to the right-hand side
of the biconditional in (3), we are merely forming an 5 1-completion of F1
which is a superfluous augmentation of another 5 1-completion of F,.
Generally speaking, it is irrelevant to the truth of absolutism that
(13) For any sentence schema !, if ! is a completion of F,
with respect to "5 1" and ! is both eternal and true, some
superfluous augmentation of §. is an eternal, non-trivially
true completion of F, with respect to "5 1".
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Because (13) has absolutely no bearing on the truth or falsity of moral
absolutism, the truth of (13) could not possibly settle any issue that rnight
divide moral absolutists from their opponents. However, if moral absolutism
were identical with MAs' the truth of (13) would settle such an issue. For if
absolutism and MAs were identical, one could not show absolutism to be true
merely by showing that there are true, eternal 5 1-completions "1 F" Even if
one established that there are such S1-completions, the truth or falsity of
absolutism would hinge on the further issue of whether or not any of these
5 1-completions are non-trivially true. So, if moral absolutism were identical
with MAe' this iSSU6 would be one that might very well divide absolutists
from their opponents. But it is an issue that is definitively settled by the
truth of (13): if it has been shown that some completions of F1 with respect
to "S," are both eternal and true, it follows from (13) that there are eternal,
non-trivially true completions of F1 with respect to "5,". Consequently, moral
absolutism cannot be identified with MAs-
Stated in the most general terms, MAs cannot be regarded as an adequate
statement of moral absolutism because, although (13)'5 truth is relevant to the
truth of MAe' it has no bearing whatever on the truth of absolutism.
2.2. Alternatives to MAe
This general objection to the identification of moral absolutism with MAe
could be side-stepped simply by deleting one werd in MAs: "non-trivially".
What remains after this excision is
(MA7) Some sentence schema that is a completion of F1 with
respect to "s " is both eternal and true.1
Unlike MAe' MA7 does not claim that there are any non-trivially true
instances of F1" This being the case, whereas (13)'5 truth has some bearing
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on the truth of MAs ' it is not relevant to the truth of MA7 • Thus, our
reason for rejecting the identification of moral absolutism with MAs does not
undermine the view that absolutism is identical ,:"ith MA7 • Nevertheless, I do
not think that Feldman would be very anxious to replace MAs with MA7 .
2.2.1. The failure of MA7 as an interpretation of MAs
It will be recalled that Feldman takes the following claim to be a
somewhat vague, though basically sound, characterization of moral absolutism.
(MAS) There is a single moral standard which is equally
applicable to all men at all times.
When he sets out MAe ' he sees himself as only providing an interpretation of
MAs' not as presenting an entirely new characterization of absolutism.
Indeed, because he thinks that MAs does capture the essence of moral
absolutism, it is reasonable to supp~se that he V\'Quld reject any view which
identifies absolutism with a statement that cannot be considered a satisfacto(y
interpretation of MAs. But the position that moral absolutism is identical
with MA7 is a view which identh·ies absolutism with just such a statement.
To see why this is so, let us first look at another statement that might be
put forward as an interpretation of MAs:
(MAS) Some sentence schema that is a completion o~ F, with
respect to "51" is a formulation of the single standard for
determining which completions (simpliciter) of
F2 It is the case at ! that ! ought morally to
VP 1 •
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are true.29
(Once again, F 1 runs as follows
(F,) For any agent! and any time !, it is the case at t that a
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, 51.)
Unless MAs is itself a reasonable interpretation of MAs ' it is difficult to see
how any satisfactory interpretation of MAs could begin with ~he following
phrase:
Some sentence that is a completion of F1 with respect to "5,"
Indeed, it would seem that a statement which does begin in this way could
only be considered a satisfactory interpretation of MAs in virtue of being a
satisfactory interpretation of MAs. So, if MA7 were a satisfactory
interpretation of MAs ' it first would have to be a satisfactory interpretation
of MAs.
But MA7 will be an adequate interpretation of MAs only if the following
condition is satisfied:
(14) Under rome conception of what it is for an 5 1-completion
of F1 to state the single standard for determining which
completions of F2 are true, being an 5 1-completion of F1
tt:at is both eternal and true is the same as heing an
5 1-completion of F1 that states the single standard for
determining which completions of F2 are true.
Furthermore, because F1 has the form,
29 11 a string ~ contains free occurrences of the variables "!" and "!", one
completes ~ by (j) replacing the free occurrences of "!" in .!! with occurrences
of an expression that designates and agent, (ii) replacing the free occurrences
of "!" in .!. with occurrences of an expression that designates a time, and (iii)
making an appropriate substitution for each schematic term occurrence in !!.
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if (14) is satisfied, it should quite generally be the case that,
(15) For any name N of a schema of form (A.;) and any name L
of the left-hand side of the biconditional named by N, the
following is true :
rUnder some conception of what it is for an
5 1-completion of N to state the single
standard for determining which completions
of L are true, being an 5 1-completion of N
that is both eternal and true is the same as
being 3" S1-completion of N that states the
single standard for determining which
completions of L are true.'
However, it is not difficult to construct counter-examples to (15). The
following is a schema of form (A.i) :
(16) For any atom ! and any time 1, it is the case at ! that !
is a plutonium ion if, and only if, S1.
And,
(17) It is the case at ! that! is a plutonium ion.
is the left-hand siae of the biconditional in (16). But the following claim will
be false under any conception of what it is for an 5 1-completion of (16) to
state the single standard for determining which completions of (17) are true:
(18) Being an 5 1-completion of (16) that is both eternal and true
is the same as being an 5 1-completion of (16) that states
the single standard for determining which S1·completicns
of (17) are true.
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To verify that (18) is false under any conception of what it is for an
5 1-completion of (16) to state the single standard for determining which
completions of (17) are true, we need only satisfy ourselves that some
5 1-completion of (16) is both eternal and true even though it can in no sense
be said to state a standard for determining which completions of ('7) are true.
But surely the following is just such an S1~completion of (16) :
(19) For any atom ! and any time !, it is the case at ! that !
is a plutonium ion if, and only if, it is the case at ! that!
is a plutonium ion.
(19) states the very same proposition in all contexts of utterance, and that
proposition is a simple tautology. However, simple tautologies never
constitute standards for determining the truth of anything.
Because (18) is false under any conception of \'vhat it is for an
S1-completion of (16) to state the single standard for determining which
completions of (17) are true, (15) is also false. Furthermore, since (14) is true
only if (15) is and MA7 is a satisfactory interpretation of MAe only if (14) is
true, the fact that (15) is false means that MA7 is not a satisfactory
interpretation of MAs' But it has already been pointed out that MA7 does
not qualify a:: an acceptable interpretation of MAs un'ess it is a satisfactory'
interpretation of MAe' Hence, MA7 does not constitute an acceptable
interpretation of MAs' '/lIe thus see that the position that moral absolutism
is identical with MA, is a view which identifies absolutism with a statement
that cannot be considered acceptable as an interpretation of MAs' It is
therefore reasonable to assume that Feldman would reject the claim that MA7
is a correct characterization of moral absolutism.
•
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2.2.2. The failure of MAs as an interpretation of MAs
Interestingly enough, an argument which parallels the one that I have just
presented shows that MAe fares no better than MA7 as an interpretation of
MAs' Just as (19) is both eternal and true even though it fails to state a
standard for determining which sentences of form (17) are true, the following
superfluous augmentation of (19) is eternal and non-trivially true even though
it also fails to state such a standard:
(20) For any atom ! and any time !, it is the case at ! that !
is a plutonium ion if, and only if, Hesperus is identical to
Phosphorus and it is the case at ! that ! is a plutonium
ion.
Because (20) is eternal and non-trivially true even though it does not state a
standard for determining which completions of (17) are tr'JC, being an eternal,
non--trivially true 5 1-completion of (20) is not the same as being art
S1-completiofJ of (20) that states the single standard for determining which
completions of (17) are true. And if these two properties are not the same,
then the property of being an eternal, non-trivially true 5 1-completion of F, is
also not identical with the property of being an 5 1-completion of F1 that
states the single standard for determining which completions of F2 are true.
But these latter properties would hav"e to be identical if MAs were to be a
satisfactory interpretation of MAs. Consequently, and contrary to what
Feldman thinks, in identifying moral absolutism with MAe' one equates
absolutism with a statement that cannot be considered acceptable as an
interpretation of MA5 .
What is particularly noteworthy about MAe's failure to constitute a
satisfactory interpretation of MAs is that this failure can be linked to the
same general fact that motivated my earlier objection to MAs as a
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characterization of moral absolutism: whenever a sentence or sentence-
schema ! is both eternal and true, if ~ has the form,
we can construct a superfluous augmentation of s that is eternal and non-
trivially true simply by conjoining any eternal, non-trivially true sentence with
the right-hand side of the biconditional in~. Given this fact, even where !
does not state any sort of standard, so long as it is both an eternal and a
true instance of (A. i), we can transform it into an instance of (A.i) that is
eternal and non-trivially true just by conjoining an eternal, non-trivially true
sentence with the right-hand side of the biconditional in!. However, if !
does not state any sort of standard· to begin with, such a transformation will
not in general produce a standard-stating instance of (A.i). Thus, the fact that
some sentence or sentence-schema ! is an eternal, non-trivially true instance
of (A.i) does not guarantee that ! states a standard of any sort. This being
the case, since any S1-completion of
(F,) For any agent ! and any time 1, it is the case at ! that a
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, 51 ·
is an instance of (A.O, it is utterly implausible that
(21) being an eternal, non-trivially true 5 1-completion of F1
is the same as
(22) being an 5 1-completion of F1 that states the single
standard for determining ·vhich completions of
(F2) It is the case at ! that ! ought morally to
VP1
are true.
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But if (21) is not identical with (22), MAo (the claim that some 5 1-completion
of F1 is eternal and non-trivially true) does not qualify as a reasonable
interpretation of MAs (the claim that there is a single, universally applicable
moral standard).
2.2.3. MAg: a new interpretation of MAs
Although there are eternal, non-trivially true instances of (A.I) that do not
state standards of any sort, it might be proposed that all such sentences or
sentence-schemas are merely superfluous augmentations of eternal trivially
true instances of (A.U. This suggestion is certainly compatible with the fact
that (20) does not state any sort of standard, even though it is an eternal,
non-trivially true sentence of form (A.i). For (20) is a superfluous
augmentation of (19) ; and (19) is an eternal, trivially true instance of (A.i).
Furthermore, if it is indeed the case that eternal, non-trivially true instances of
(A.i) fail to state standards only when they are superfluous augmentations of
eternal, trivially true instances of IA.i), then no objection analogous to the one
that I raised against the use of MAs as an interpretation of MAs would apply
to the use of the following statement as an interpretation of MAs
(MAg) Some sentence schema that is a completion of F1 with
respect to "5," is eternal and non-trivially true, but is not
a superfluous augmentation of any true completion of F 1
with respect to ItS1" •
I argued thC't MAe is not acceptable as an interpretation of MAs because
(21) being an eternal, non-trivially true 5 1-completion of F 1
is not identical with
(22) being an 5 1-completion of F 1 that states the single
standard for determining which completions of
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(F2) It is the case at t that a ought morally to
VP1
are true.
And I claimed that (22) is distinct from (21) because
(a) these two properties are the same only if it is quite
generally true that instances (A.i) state standards of some
sort if they are eternal and non-trivially true,
and
(b) it is not in general the case that instances (A.j) state
standards if they are eternal and non-trivially true.
If we were to argue in a parallel fashion against the adequacy of MAg as
an interpretation of MAs' we would say that MAg does not qualify as a
satisfactory interpretation of MAs unless
(23) being an eternal, non-trivially true 5 1-completion of F 1 -that
is not a superfluous augmentation of any true instance of
F,
is the same as
(22) being an 5 1-completion of F1 that states the single
standard for determining which completions of
(F 2) It is the case at ! that ! ought morally to
VP,
,
are true.
We would then claim that
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(a) (23) and (22) are identic31 only if every eternal, non-trivially
true instance ~ of (A.I) states some sort of standard if §.
is not a superfluous augmentation of any true instance of
(A. i);
and
(b) some eternal, non-trivially true instances of (A.i) fail to
state a standard of any sort even '~hough they are not
superfluous augmentations of any true instances of (A.i).
However, (b) clearly contradicts the proposal that an eternal, non-trivially true
instance ! of (A.O fails to state any sort of standard only if ! is a
superfluous augmentation of eternal, trivially true instances of (A. i). So, if
this proposal is correct, we cannot show that MAg is unsatisfactory as an
interpretation of MAs by means of an argument which parallels my objection
to the use of MAe as an interpretation of MAs .
In addition to the fact that MAg has more promise than MAs as an
interpretation of MAs' MAg is immune to the- or~9inal criticism that I voiced
against the use of MAs as a characterization of moral absolutism. As I
earlier argued, absolutism cannot properly be idl!ntified with MAe because the
following fact is relevant to the issue of whether or not MAs is true even
though it hns no bearing whatever on any issue that divides mor31 absolutists
from their opponents :
(13) For any sentence schema !, if ! is a completion of F1
with respect to "5 1" and ! is both eternal and true, some
superfluous augmentation of ! is an eternal, non-trivially
true completion of F1 Vv'ith respect to "S1".
But MAg is like moral absolutism in that (13) has no more bearing on th~ truth
or falsity of MAg than it has on the truth or falsity of abtolutism. Although
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(13) guaranteet; that there is an ~ternal, non-trivially true S,t-completion of F1
if any completion of F1 with respect to "s 1" is both eternal and true, it
neither tends to confirm rlor to dL. ~onfirm the claim that, if there are eternal,
nnn-trivially true 5 1-completions of F1 ' some of those 5 1-completions will
not be superfluous augrnentations of any true completions of F1 with respect
to "S1". And, since ('3) must tend to confirm or disconfirm this claim if it is
to be relevant to th~ truth or faJsit)' of MAg, (13) is nOt relevant to the truth
or falsity of MAc--.
~,
2.2.4. When is a true S l-cOIi~pletion of F1 non-triviaUv true ?
In spite of the fact that MAg escapes some of the problems that plague
MAe as a characterization of moral absolutism, the real import of MAg is
somewhat obscure. If MAg is true, the,-"', f,:>r some sentenr;8 schema §., ! is a
completion of F1 with respect to "5,", ";!1d
(a) ! is eternQI,
(b) ! is true, and
(c) ! is not a sLiperfluous augmentation of any true completion
of F1 with respect to "S,".
However, the discovery that (a), (b), and (c) are satisfied by ~,ome
S1-cornpletion of F1 is, by itself not sufficient to establish the truth of MAg .
For it may be that onlY trivially true 5 1-completions of F1 satisfy (a) - (c)
~"d rvlA g is true on~y if (a) - (c) are satisfied by an S1-completior of F1 that
i~ non-trivially true. But, supposing that we have some 5 1-completion 01 F,
thut satisfies (8) - (c), how do we tell whPther the S ,-completion is non-
trivially, as opposed to trivially, true? The ans':Jer to this question is by no
nleana obvious. And, until \ve can come up with some reasonably clear
answer, the proposal that moral absolutism is identical with MAg still leaves
us somt!'JVhat in the dark as to just W.liJt mo~al absolutism is supposed to be
86
A claim that Feldman make~ when he introduces MA", as a statement of
\:)
moral absolutism suggests a possible solution to the problem I have just
raised. Accordiny to Feldman,
(24) For any sentence schema ~, if ~ is a completion of F1
with respect to "5 1" and §. is true, then ~ is non-trivially
true if, and only if, ! can be formed by replacing the
occurrence of "51" in F 1 with a clause that does not
contain any moral expressions.
Ar it stands, this proposal is very questionable. Nevertheless, a relatively
rrinor revision will corre~t its most obvious shortcoming. To see what this
shortcoming is, let us assume that (24) is true. Given this assumption, we
could never form a non-trivially true 5 1-completion of F1 by replacing the
occurrence of "s1" in F1 with any clause containing the words, "ought
morally". For "ought morally" is certainly a moral expression. Thus, if (24) is
true, the following compietior; of ~ 1 with respect to "5 1" is either tr!vially
true or not true at all :
(B.iii) For any agent ! and any tirne 1, it is the case at ! that !
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, Hesperus is identical
to Phosphorus and it is the case at ! that ! ought morally
to VP 1 I·
However, have already shown that if (B.iii) is true, it is non-trivially so (in
virtue of the fact that "Hesperus is identical to Phosphcrus" is non-trivially
true).30 Therefore, if (24) is true, (B.iii) is not true. Yet (8.iiO is surely true if
there are any moral truths at all. Consequently, if (24) is true, there are no
moral truths. This means that it is llntenable to accept (24) and also to
believe in the existence of moral truths. But, in advance of being presented
30V1de pp. 67 - 69 supra.
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with any compelling argument against the existence of moral truths, it is much
more reasonable to believe that there are such truths than to accept (24)~
Hence, (24) is a highly suspect proposition.
Although (24) is clearly in conflict with the claim that there are moral
truths, there is no apparent conflict between this claim and the following
revision of (24) :
(25) For any sentence schema !, if ! is a completion of F,
with respect to "5 1" and! is true but is not a superfluous
augmentation of any true instance of F" then ! is non-
trivially true if, and only if, ! can be formed by' replacing
the occurrence of "S," in F 1 with a clause that does not
contain any moral expressions.
It is perfectly consistent with (25) that (B.iii) is a non-trivially true
5 1-completion of F" Even though (B.iiO cannot be formed by replacing the
occurrence of "5 ", in F1 with a cl;;luse that does not contain any moral
expressions, if (S.iii) is a non-trivially true 5 1-completion of F, , it is also a
superfluous augmentation of a true 5 1-completion of F 1 (viz. (3)). And, unlike
(24), (25) has nothing to say about any sentence-schema that is a superfluous
augmentation of a true 5 1-completion of Fl. Therefore, the plausibility of
(25) is not undermined by any argument that parallels the reasoning I just
presented to illustrate the questionable nature of (24).
On the assumption that (25) is true, the import of MAg becomes
reasonably clear. Given (25), MAg will be true if, and only if,
(26) there is a sentence schema ! such that ~ is a completion
of F1 with respect to "5,", and
(a) ! is eternal,
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(b) §. is true,
(c) s is not a superfluous augmentation of any
true completion of F, with respect to "5 1",
and
(d) ! can be formed by replacing the occurrence
of "5," in F1 with a clause that does not
contain any moral expressions"
Thus, if we suppose that the follov\ling statement of act utilitarianism is both
eternal and true, MAg will also be true:
(8) For any agent ! and any time !, it is the case at ! that !
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, it is the case at !
that! would produce more utility by VP ,-ing than by doing
anything that would be incompatible with VP ,-ing.
If (8) is eternal and true, then (8) obviously satisfies conditions (a) and (b).
Furthermore, it is plain both that (8) is not 3 superfluous augmentation of any
true 5 1-completion of F, and that (8) can be formed by replacing the
occurrence of "s " in F, with a clause that does not contain any moral1
expressions (there is no moral expression in "it is the case at ! that ! would
produce more utility by VP ,-Ing than by doing anything that would be
incompatible with VP 1-ing"). Thus (8) also satisfies conditions (c) and (d).
On the other hand, even if each of the following two 5 1-completions of F1
is both eternal and true, the fact that they are eternal and true does not
guarantee the truth of MAg
(3) For any agent ! and any tinle 1, it is the case at ! that a
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, it is the case at t
that ! ought morally to VP 1.
(27) For any agent ! and any t:me 1, it is the case at t that a
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ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, it is the case at t
that it is morally impermissible for a not to VP,.
Like (B), (3) and (27) are not superfluous augmentations of any true completion
of F, with respect to "s1". However, when we form (3), we replace the
occurrence of "5," in F1 with a clause that contains the expression, "ought
morally" ; and, when we form (27), we replace the occurrence of ."S," in F 1
with a clause that contains the expression, "morally impermissible". But
"ought morally" and "morally impermissible" are obviously moral expressions.
So, even if (3) and (27) are each eternal and true, neither can be formed by
replacing the occurrence of "s 1 II in F1 with a clause that does not contain any
moral expressions. Thus, they each fail to satisfy a condition whose
satisfaction is necessary for the truth of MAg •
2.3. The Inadequacy of MAg as a Statement of Moral Absolutism
Although (25) clarifies the import of MAg, it also undermines the
identification of moral absolutism with MAg. For several philosophers who
are standardly taken to be proponents of moral absolutism are com,nitted to
the denial of (26). And, as I have already pointed out. (26) and MAg are
equivalent if (25) is true.' So, on the assumption that (25) is true, if moral
absolutism were identical with MAg, several philosophers who are standardly
labelled moral absolutists would turn v~lt to be cornmitted to the denial of
absolutism. This constitutes a strong case for either rejecting (25) or
abandoning the identification of absolutism with MAg. But if we reject (25)
in order to save the view that MAg is identical with moral absolutism, we are
left with only an obscure characterization of absolutism.
W.O. Ross is one of the most prominent philosophers who is committed to
the denial of (26) even though he is almost universally- considered to be an
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advocate of moral ab~olutism. In the discussion that follows I shall give a
brief sketch of Ross's moral theory and then explain why this theory fails to
commit Ross to the truth of (26). I shall then go on to argue that Ross is not
merely not committed to the truth of (26), he is actually opposed to its truth.
2.3.1. An outline of Ross·s Theory
In The Right and The Good, Ross proposes that what an agent ought
morally to do is a function of the relative stringency of his prima facie moral
duties. 31 Roughly speaking, to .. say that an agent has a prima facie moral duty
to VP 1 is to say that there is some moral consideration which favors his VP,-
in9. And Ross thinks that a given fact constitutes a moral consideration in
. favor of an agt.'nt's VP 1-in9 if that fact implies that the agent would do one
of the follOWing things by VP 1-i09 :
(a) fUlfill one of his explicit or implicit promises;
(b) repay a past kindness that someone has shown him;
(c) make up for a past wrong that he has done;
(d) help to bring about a more just distribution of pleasure
and pain;
(e) improve his own character;
(1) improve someone else's character or further someone
else's interests;
(g) avoid injuring someone else's interests.
Thus, let us take it to be a fact that Dr. Sinith has promised h~r husband that
she will pick up a roll of stamps from 'the post office on her way home from
31 W.D• Ross, The Right and The Good, pp. 19 - 20 and p. 41.
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work. Since this fact implies that Smith would fulfill one of her promises by
picking up a roll of stamps on her way home, it cunstitutes a moral
consideration in favor of her picking up a roll of stamps on her way home.
And because there is a moral consideration in favor of her doing (his, she has
a prima facie moral duty to do it.
But even though Dr. Smith has a prima facie moral duty to buy a roll of
stamps on her way home, it does not follow that she ought morally to do
this. For it may be that she has another prima facie moral duty that conflicts
with and is more stringent than her prima facie moral duty to buy the stamps.
Imagine, for example, that one of Smith's patients needs an emergency
operation, that Smith is the only available doctor who has rnastered all of the
surgical techniques that the operation requires, and, finally, that she will not
have an opportunity to get to the post office before it closes if she operates
on her patient. In this situation tnere cl9arly are moral consideratIons in favor
of her performing the operation. Hence, she has a prima facie moral duty to
do this. Furtherm(\re, since she win be unable to get to the post office
before it closes if she operates on her patient, her prima facie duty to
perform the operation conflicts with her prima facie duty to pick up a roll of
stamps on her way home. But it also seems clear that the former prima facie
duty is more important, more stringent, than the latter prima facie duty. And
Ross believes that it ;5 never the case that an agent ought morally to do the
less stringent of two conflicting moral duties. Thus, in the situation now
under consideration, it is not the case that Smith ought morally to buy stamps
at the post office on her way home.
Generally speaking, Ross may be characterized as someone who maintains
that
(R) The following sentence-schema is true:
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(28) For any agent ! and any time 1, it is the
case at ! that ~ ought morally to VP 1 if, and
only if, it is the case at ! that ~'s prima
facie moral duty to VP 1 is more stringent
than any of ~'s prima facie moral duties that
conflict with a's prima facie moral duty to
VP l'32
Given (R), Dr. Smith ought morally to operate on her patient just in casE' her
prima facie duty to do this is more stringent than any of her prima facie
duties that are in conflict with it. We have aiready seen that Smith has at
least one prima facie duty (viz. her prima facie duty to buy a roll of postage
stamps) that is in conflict with her prima facie duty to operate. But Smith's
prima facie duty to buy stamps is less stringent than her prima facie duty to
operate. So, if all of her other prima facle dutie: that conflict with her prirna
facie duty to operate are likewise less stringent than this duty, Smith ou~ht
morally to operate on her patient.
Having now looked at some basic elements of Ross's ethical theory, let us
see why this theory does not seem to commit Ross to th& view that
(26) there is a ~entence schema ! such that ! is a completion
of F1 w;t~ respect to "s 1'" and
(a) ! is eternal,
(b) ! is true,
(c) §. is not a superfluous augmentation of any
true completion of F1 with respect to "5 1",
and
32An agent's prima facie moral duty to VP 1 conflicts with his prima facie
moral duty to VP2 if, and only If, he could not carry out his prima facie moral
duty to VP 1 without thereby preventing himself from carrying out his prima
facie moral duty to VP2.
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(d) ! can be formed by replacing the occurrence
of "5," in F1 with a clause that does not
contain any moral expressions.
2.3.2. Ross's lack of commitment to MAg
It is not difficult to see that Ross is committed to the view that some
completion of F1 with respect to "51" satisfies at least conditions (b) and (c).
For he believes that (28) is true, and it is evident that (28) is an S,-complec:ion
of F1 that is not a superfluous augnlentation of any true 5 1-completion of Fl'
Furthermore, since Ross quite clearly uses the terms "ought morally", "prima
facie moral duty", and "more stringent than" as if context plays no role in
determining the properties or relations that they represent, it is rAasonable to
claim that he is committed to the view that (28) is an instance of F1 that
satisfies (a) as well as (b) and (c). This claim is reasonable simply because it
is difficult to see how (28) could fail to be eternal unless one or more of
these terms stands for a different property or relation in some contexts than
it stands for in others.
But what of condition (d)? Well, given that
(i) (28) is a completion of F1 with respect to "5,", and
(ij) Ross is committed to the view that (28) satisfies (a) - {c),
if we could show that (28) satisfies (d), we could conclude that Ross is
committed to the view that some completion of F, with respect to ItS "1
satisfies (a) - (c) and fdJ. However, there is no hope of showing that (28)
satisfies (d). In fact, it is plain that (d) is not satisfied by (28). If it were,
(28) could be formed by replacing the occurrence of "51" in F1 with a clause
that does not rentain any moral expressions. But the clause in (28) that
corresponds to the occurrence of "51" in F1 contains three occurrences of the
term "prima facie moral duty".
expression.
94
And this term is undoubtedly a moral
In virtue of the fact that (28) fails to satisfy (d), Ross's commitment to
the view that (28) satisfies (a) - (c) does not indicate any commitment on his
part to the position that some completion of F1 with respect to "5," satisfies
(a) - (c) and fdJ. And, if no commitment to the latter position ;s indicated by
Ross's commitment to the former view, I can think of no reason whatever for
maintaining that Ross is committed to the truth of (26). However, I have
already noted that (26) is equivalent to MAg if the following statement is
true:
(25) For any sentence schem, !, if ! is a completion of F,
with respect to "51" and! is true but is not a superfluous
augmentation of any true instance of F1 ' then ~ is non-
trivially true if, and only if, ! can be formed by replacing
the occurrence of "5," in F1 with a clause that does not
contain any moral expressions.
So, if (25) is true, Ross'.s lack of commitment to the truth of (26) implies a
similar lack of commitment to the truth of MAg •
2.3.3. Ross's commitment to the denial of MAg
It might be claimed, of course, that I have given only an incomplete
description of Aass'$ theory, and that a more complete account of his position
would show that he is really committed to the truth of (26). But I can see no
reason for thinking that a further investigation of Ross's theory will reveal any
such commitme:1t. On the contrarYr when we delve more deeply into the
theory, V'Je unearth statements which suggest that Ross is actually committed
to the view that (26) i3 faisew For exanple, Ross maintains that there is no
perfectly general and exceptionJess criterion for determining whether vr not a
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given prima facie moral duty is more stringent than the prima facie moral
duties that conflict with it.33 But such a criterion would exist if
(29) For some sentence schema 5 such that s is c, completion
with respect to '''s 1" of
(F 3) For any agent ! and any time 1, it is
the case at ! that !'S prima facie moral
duty to VP, is more stringent than any
of ~'s prima facie moral duties that
conflict with !'S prima facie moral
duty to VP" if, and only if, S, ,
(a) ! is true,
(b) ! is not a superfluous augmentation of any
true completion of F3 with respect to "5,",
and
(c) ! can be formed by replacing the occurrence
of "$1" in F3 with a clause that does not
contain any moral expressions.
So, Ross is committed to the view that (29) is false. Furthermore, we have
already seen that Ross bCJlieves that
(R) The followir;g sentence-schema is true:
(28) For any agent ! and any time 1, it is the
case at ! that ! ought morally to VP 1 if, and
<'nly if, it is the case at ! that !'S prima
facie moral duty to VP, is more stringent
than any of !'S prima facie moral duties that
conflict with !'S prima faciE moral duty to
VP 1.
And it is a consequence of (R) that
33 I bid., p. 41
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(30) if (26) is true, then (29) is true.
Ross is therefore committed to (30). But from (30) and the statement that (29)
is false, it follows that (26) is also false. Hence, given that Ross is
committed both to (30) and to the claim that (29) is false, he is committed to
the further claim that (26) is false.
To sum up where matters stand at this point, Ross is not merely someone
who has no commitment to the truth of (26), he is committed to the denial of
this statement. The fact that he is not committed to (26) shows that, if (25)
is true, he is also not committed to the claim that
(MAg) Some sentence scherr1a that is a completion of F1 with
respect to "5 1" is eternal and f"\on-trivially truo, but is not
a superfluous augmentation of any true completion of F1
with respect to "s1" •
But if MAg is identical with moral absolutism, we would expect Ross to be
committed to the truth of MAg. For, as was earlier remarked, Ross regards
himself as, and is standardly acknowledged to be, a proponent of moral
absolutism. We thus reach the conclusion that, if (25) is true and MAg is
identical with moral absolutism, a philosopher who is generally thought of as a
moral absolutist really has no commitment at all to the truth of absolutism.
Worse still, because Ross is actually committed to the denial of (26), he turns
out to be opposed to absolutism if (25) is true and moral absolutism is
identical with MAg- Yet, to say the very least, it is extremel'y' difficult to
believe that someone who regards himself as, and is standardly acknowledged
to be, a proponent of absolutism is really opposed to that doctrine. We must
therefore conclude either that (25) is false or that moral absolutism cannot be
identified with MAg.
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If we reject the identification of moral absolutism with MAg, we also call
into question the view that absolutism is identical with MAs
(MAS) There is a single standard of morality that is equally
applicable to all men at all times.
For, at the moment, MAg is the best interpretation of MAs that we have. If
anyone still wants to identify moral absolutism with MAs ' he must show
either that
(0 it is a mistake to categorize Ross as a proponent of moral
absolutism,
or that
(ij) although Ross cannot accept MAg , he is committed to the
truth of some other interpretation of MAs .
However, I do not see any real prospect for making a convincing case in
favor of either 0) or (i U.
The alternative to rejecting the identification of moral absolutism with
MAg is to deny
(25) For any sentence schema ~.' if ! is a completion of F1
with respect to "5 1" and! is true but is not a superfluous
augmentation of any true instance of F1 ' then ! is non-
trivially true if, and only if, §. can be formed by replacing
the occurrence of "s 1" in F, with a clause that does not
contain any mar,,1 expressions.
(25), of course, was originally introduced to clarify MAg. Where a sentence-
schema ! is a true completion of F1 with respect to "s" but1 is not a
superfluous augmentation of any completion of F1 with respect to "S1", (25)
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tells us how to determine whether §. is trivially or non-trivially true. But if we
reject (25), we seem to be left with no reliable procedure for making this
determination. And, if we identify moral absolutism with MAg yet don't have
a reliable way of distinguishing trivial from non-trivial truth, the line between
absolutism and alternative views becomes rather difficult to discern.
It might be said that we can always rely on our intuitions when it comes
to making distinctions between trivially and non-trivially true S,-completions
of Fl' But our intuitions are clear only within a limited Jamain of cases,
They do indeed tell us that, if either of the following 5 1-completions of F1 is
true, it is only trivially true :
(3) For any agent ! and any time !, it is the case at ! that !
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, it is the case at !
that! ought morally to VP l'
(27) For any agent ! and any time 1, it is the case at ! that !
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, it is the case at t
that it is morally impermissible for! not to VP l'
But what of (28) ?
(28) For any agent ! and any time 1, it is the case at 1 that ~
ought morally to VP 1 if, and only if, it is the case at !
that !'S prima facie moral duty to VP 1 is more stringent
than any of !'S prima facie duties that conflict with a's
prima facie moral duty to VP 1.
I have no definite intuition about this sentence-schema: it is just not clear to
me whether, if (28) is true, its truth is trivial or non-trivial.
If our intuitions are all that 'NO have to rely on in distinguishing the
trivially true from the non-trivially true and they fail us when we consider (28),
then we simply can't tell whether Ross's theory is or isn't compatible with
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Furthermore, if MAg is identical with moral absolutism and the
compatibility of Ross's theory with MAg is questionable, this theory's
compatibility with absolutism is likewise uncertain. However, if it is really
uncertain whether the theory can be reconciled with moral absolutism, it is
difficult to understand the fact that
0) Ross is usually categorized as a proponent of absolutism,
and
(ii) no one (to my knowledge, at least) has ever suggested that
there is a real question as to whether he should be so
categorized.
Moreover, Ross is by no means an exceptional case. Many philosophers with
apparently unimpeachable absolutist credentials have subscribed to theories
that are at best questionably· compatible with MAg. Though I have appealed
only to Ross's views in formulating my objections to the identification of
moral absolutism with MAg, could just as well have appealed to any form
of moral intuitionism. Thus, would maintain that Moore's moral philosophy
can't bA reconciled with MAg when we interpret the notion of trivial truth in
accordance with (25). And if we simply rely on our intuitions in distinguishing
the trivially true from the non-trivially true, it will be unclear whether Moore's
theory is compatible with MAg.
Insofar as there are real questions about the possibility of reconciling
MAg with numerous moral theories that are standardly thought to belong to
the absolutist tradition, we should be highly suspicious of the suggestion that
absolutism and MAg are one and the same doctrine. Furthermore, this
suspicion should extend to the identification of moral absolutism with MAs .
For at present, MAg is the best interpretation that we have of MAs' And
though we could go on to formulate new interpretations, I think that our
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energies would be best spent by turning our attention to an entirely different
approach to the characterization of moral absolutism.
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CH,t\PTER 3
MORAL ABSOLUTISM AND CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES
In his recent book, Ethics: inventing right and wrong, J. L. Mackie
identifies moral absolutism with the doctrine that
(MA 10)AII agents have categorical moral reasons.34
Insofar as Mackie equates absolutism with MA 10' he conceives of absolutism
as a thesis about the source of people's moral reasons. Loosely speaking,
when an agent has a reason for doing something, his reason is categorical just
in case it is not founded on his present des:res. Stated in a more precise
fashion,
(Of,) If the fact that N1 would VP2 by VP1-ing is a reason for
N1 (not) to VP 1 ' then that fact is a categorical reason for
N1 (not) to VP 1 if, and only if, its being a reason for N1
(not) to VP 1 is not contingent upon N1's already having a
desire, intention, or plan whose fulfillment would be
promoted by N,'s (nod VP2-ing.35
Kant's name immediately comes to mind when one thinks about categorical
reasons. When Kant discusses the motive of duty, he gives several
34J. L. Mackie, Ethics: inventing right and wrong, pp. 27-29.
35 ·I bid., p. 29.
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illustrations of reasons that he takes to be categorical. 36 He suggests, for
example, that if a person would help to relieve the distress of others by
donating money to a particular cause, the fact that he would help to ~elieve
their distress by making such a donation is a reason for him to do so.
Moreover, it is a reason for him to do so even if he has no philanthropic
inclinations and no self-interested desires whose satisfaction would be
promoted by his helping to relieve the distress of others.
The facts that Kant cites as categorical reasons are facts that seem
intuitively to be moral reasons as well. However, Mackie points out that a
reason could be categorical without being moral.37 Suppose, for instance, that
it will be in Zelda's interest in a year's time to know how to program
computers. It might be maintained that the mere fact that it will then be in
her interest to know how to do this gives her a reason to do things that will
lead to her having this knowledge a year from now. On this view Zelda has a
reason to, say, enroll in a programming course next semester whether or not
she presently has any desire, intention, or plan whose fulfi IIment would be
promoted by her taking such a course. Thus, according to the view under
consideration, the fact that Zelda has a reason to enroll in a programming
course is not contingent on her wanting her future interests to be furthered or
on her wanting to be able to program computers. In short, if Zelda has a
reason to enroll in a course that will teach her programming skills merely in
virtue of the fact that it wi II be in her interest to have those ski lis, she has a
categorical reason to enroll in such a course. However, insofar as her reason
361mmanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 65 - 67.
37Mackie, op. cit., p. 28. See also Thomas Naga., rl7e Possibility of
Altruism, pp. 33 - 46 ; Philippa Foot, "Reasons for Action and Desires", in
Virtues and Vices, pp. 148 - 156.
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for enrolling in the class is just that, by taking it, she can acquire the
programming ability that it wi" be in her interest to have, her reason for
enrolling is not a moral one.
We can see this by noting that, were Zelda motivated to take the course
simply because she realizes that doing this will enable her to acquire certain
skills that it will be in her interest to have, we would not say that her taking
the course was an action that had moral worth. We would only say that, in
taking the class for this reason, she was being prudent. Thus, the fact that
Zelda's taking the course will help her to acquire an ability that, in a year's
time, it will be in her interest to have is a prudential, not a moral, reason.
And it seems perfectly compatible with the existence of categorical reasons
that all such reasons be prudential rather than moral. Therefore, the existence
of moral categorical reasons does not appear to follow from the existence of
categorical reasons.
If this is indeed the case, the following question arises: what
differentiates moral categorical reasons from categorical reasons that are not
moral? Or, to put the matter more generally, what is it to be a moral, as
opposed to a non-moral reason?
I consider this question in the final section of the present chapter. In that
section, I evaluate the suggestion that the distinction between moral and non-
moral reasons is captured by the distinction that Thomas Nagel has drawn
between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons.38 I argue that the moral/non-
moral distinction is not identical with the agent-neutral/agent-relative
38Thomas. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, pp. 79 - 98; Nagel, "The
Objectivity of Ethics" (an unpublished paper presented at Tufts University in
1980).
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distinction. Indeed, I contend that the latter distinction is not even coherent.
Furthermore, I try to show that there are serious flaws in the general theory
of reasons within which Nagel has tried to define the agent-neutral'agent-
relative dichotomy.
At any rate, it seems to me that we can evaluate the adequacy of
Mackie's characterization of moral absolutism even if we lack a precise
account of the difference between moral and non-moral reasons. In the next
section of this chapter, I try to show that Mackie makes a mistake when he
identifies moral absolutism with the proposition that
(MA lo)AII agents have categorical moral reasons.
In particular, I argue that MA 10 is entirely consistent with a theory that is
unquestionably relativistic. Although I reject MA 10 as a statement of moral
absolutism, I formulate a new definition of absolutism (in section (3.2)) which
implies that there are categorical moral reasons. I then proceed to show that
this definition identifies absolutism with a statement that is genuinely
incompatible with moral nihilism and 'Nith each of the relativistic theories that
I have considered. And, since it gives every appearance of being compatible
with. the views of moral phi losophers who are standardly categorized as
absolutists, I suggest that we adopt it as a statement of moral absolutism.
3.1. The Inadequacy of MA 10 as a Statement of Moral Absolutism
Although I think it is reasonable to maintain that moral absolutism would
be false if there were no categorical moral reasons, I don't believe that
anyone commits himself to the truth of moral absolutism simply by accepting
MA 1o· Hence, I don't think that moral absolutism is identical to MA 10. One
reason why I don't believe that the mere acceptance of MA 10 commits one to
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the truth of absolutism is that I don't see any incompatibility between MAlO
the doctrine that I have called "cultural relativism"--"CR", for short. According
to CR, the following sentence schema is true ~
(f 6) If N2 says that N, ought morally to VP, , what N2 is
saying is that N, would violate the norms of N2 's soci~ty
by not VP ,-ing.
It is clear that moral absolutism would be false if CR were correct. Thus, if I
arn right in saying that CR and MA 10 are perfectly compatible with each other,
it won't do to identify absolutism with MA 10'
Let me now try to explain why I take CR and MA, a to be compatible
propositions. In recent years, man'l philosophers have proposed that "ought"-
statements are analyzable into statements about reasons. According to this
view, when N1 says that N2 ought morally to VP, , N, implies that N2 has a
moral reason to VP1. So far as I can tell, there is no conflict whatever
between CR and this conception of "ought"-statements. Of course, since CR
maintains that moral "ought"-statements are statements about social norms, an
advocate of CR who accepts the view that these "ought"-statements can be
analyzed into statements about moral reasons will no doubt want to reduce
statements about these reasons to statements about social norms. And it is
reasonable to suggest that any proponent of CR who advocates such a
reduction would look favorably upon some principle very similar to CR,
(CR 1) Whenever a speaker asserts a completion of sentence
schema (s,) , the proposition that he states is the same as
the one he would state by asserting the corresponding
completion of sentence schema (52) :
(s,) The fact that N1 would VP2 by VP,-ing is a
moral reason for N, not to VPl'
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(52) Given that N1 would VP2 by VP 1-ing, N,
would be promoting N1's compliance with
some of my society's norms by not VP ,-ing.
It will be noted that the first of the following two ~entences is a completion
of (s,) , while the second is the corresponding completion of (s2)
(1) The fact that Muammar al-Qaddafi would kill innocent
people by detonating an atomic bomb in Times Square is a
moral reason for him not to do this.
(2) Given that Muammar al-Qaddafi would kill innocent people
by detonating an atomic bomb in Times Square, he would
be promoting his compliance with some of my society's
norms by not doing this.
Therefore, it is a consequence of CR 1 that the propositi"n I would state by
asserting (1) is the same as the proposition I would state by asserting (2).
Furthermore, I take it to be necessary that I would state a true proposition by
asserting (2) just in case I would be stating true propositions by asserting
sentences (3) and (4) :
(3) Muammar al-Qaddafi would kill innocent people by
detonating an atomic bomb in Times Square.
(4) Muammar aj-Qaddafi would promote his compliance with
some of my society's norms by not killing innocent
people.
Thus, if we assume CR, to be correct, I would be stating a true proposition
by asserting (1) if, and only if, I would be stating true propositions by
asserting (3) and (4). But it sae,ns quite clear that I would be stating true
propositions if I asserted this pair of sentences. (After all, it would be well
nigh impossible for anyone to set off an atomic bomb in the middle of
Manhattan without killing innocent people. And, given that certain norms of
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my society prohibit the killing of innocent people, Qaddafi would obviously be
promoting his compliance with some of my society's norms -by not killing
innocent people.) This being the case, if CR 1 were correct, I would be stating
a true proposition by asserting sentence (1).
Indeed, not only would I be stating a true proposition by asserting (1), the
truth of the proposition that I would state by asserting that sentence is not
contingent upon the truth of the following statement:
(5) Muammar al-Qaddafi has some desire, int~ntion, or plan
whose fulfillment would be promoted by his not killing
innocent people.
On the assumption that CR 1 is correct, the truth of the proposition that I
would state by asserting (1) is guaranteed by the truth of the propositions that
I would be stating by asserting sentences (3) and (4). Consequently, if CR,
were correct, the truth of the proposition that I would state by asserting (1) is
contingent upon the truth of (5) only if the truth of the propositions I would
state by asserting (3) and (4) depends on the truth of (5). But it is quite plain
that I would state true propositions by asserting (3) and (4) regardless of
whether Muammar al-Qaddafi has any desire, intention, or plan whose
fulfillment would be furthered by his not killing innocent people. Even if we
were to discover that he has no such desire, intention, or plan, the fact would
remain that Qaddafi couldn't fail to kill innocent people by detonating an
atomic bomb in Times Square. Similarly, no matter what Qaddafi's desires,
intentions, and plans happen to be, he would promote his compliance with at
least some of my society's norms by not killing innocent people. Thus, it is
not merely the case that I would state true propositions by assertin')
sentences (3) and (4); the truth of the propositions that I would state by
asserting those sentences does not depend on the truth of (5). From this we
may conclude that if CR 1 were correct,
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(6) I would state a true proposition by asserting sentence (1),
and the truth of the proposition that I would state by
asserting that sentence is not contingent upon (5)'s being
true.
Now then, to say that the truth of a proposition isn't contingent upon (5)'s
being true is just to say that its truth isn't contingent upon Muammar at-
Qaddafi's having some desire, intention, or plan whose fulfillment would be
promoted by his not killing innocent people. Thus, on the assumption that
CR, is correct,
(7} I would state a true proposition by asserting sentence (1)
and ·the truth of the proposition that I would state by
asserting that sentence is not contingent upon Qaddafi's
having some desire, intention, or plan whose fulfillment
would be promoted by his not killing innocent people.
Furthermore, by asserting (1) I would be stating the following proposition :
the fact that Oaddafi would kill innocent people by detonating an atomic bomb
in Times Square is a moral reason for him not to do this. So, given that (7)
would be true if CR, were correct, if CR l were correct, I would make a true
statement by asserting (8) :
(8) The fact that Qaddafi would kill innocent people by
detonating an atomic bomb in Times Square is a moral
reason for him not to do this, and its being a moral
reason for him not to do this Is not contingent upon
Qaddafi's having some desire, intention, or plan whose
fulfillment would by promoted by his not killing innocent
people.
Of course, "'..>thing is a moral reason unless it's a reason. Consequently,
would make a true statement by asserting (8) only if I would make such a
statement by asserting (9) :
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(9) The fact that Qaddafi would kill innocent people by
detonating an atomic bomb in Times Square is a reason
for him not to do this, and its being a reason for him not
t.o do this is not contingent upon Qaddafi's having some
desire, intention, or plan whose fulfillment would by
promoted by his not killing innocent people.
Since
(a) I would make a true statement by asserting (8) only if I
would make such a statement by asserting (9)
and
(b) I would make a true statement by asserting (8) if CR 1 were
true,
it follows that I would make a true statement by asserting (9) if CR 1 were
true.
From here it is only a short step to the result that if CR, were true,
Qaddafi would have at least one categorical moral reason~ As I noted at the
start of this chapter, Of, is a true sentence schema :
(Of,) If the fact that N, would VP2 by VP 1-!ng is a reason for
N1 (not) to VP, , then that fact is a categorical reason for
N, (not) to VP 1 if, and only if, its being a reason for N,
(not) to VP 1 is not contingent upon N,'s already having a
desire, intention, or plan whose fulfillment would be
promoted by N1's (not) VP2-ing.
Because Of, is true, I would state a true proposition by asserting the
following completion of Of 1 :
(10) If the fact t.hat Oaddafi would kjll innocent people by
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detonating an atomic bomb in Times Square is a reason
for him not to do this, then that fact is a categorical
reason for Qaddafi not to detonate an atomic bomb in
Times Square it, and only it, its being a reason for him
not to do this is not contingent upon his having a desire,
intention, or plan whose fulfillment would be promoted by
his not killing innocent people.
Given that I would state a true proposition by asserting (10), it follows that I
would state a true proposition by asserting (11) if I would state true
propositions by asserting (8) and (9) :
(1 1) The fact that Qaddafi would kill innocent people by
detonating an atomic bomb in Times Square is a
categorical moral reason for him not to do this•
.Moreover, we have already established that I would state true propositions by
asserting (8) and (9) if CR 1 were true. So, on the assumption that CR 1 is true,
I would state a true proposition by asserting (1 1). But if I would state a true
proposition by asserting (1 1), it is clear that I would be making a true
statement if I said that Qaddafi has 8 categorical reason not to detonate an
atomic bomb in Times Square. Thus, on the assumption that CR, is true,
Qaddafi has at least one categorical moral reason.
The argument that thas brought us to this conclusion about Muammar al-
Qaddafi can easily be modified to yield a parallel conclusion about William
F. Buckley. If we replace the occurrences in the preceding argument of
"Muammar al-" and "Qaddafi" with occurrences of "William F." and "Buckley",
respectively, we formulate an argument for the following statement :
On the assumption that CR 1 is true, Buckley has at least
one categorical moral reason.
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Our new argument about Buckley is just as sound as the original one about
Qaddafi. Moreover, once we see how to transform the original argument into
a parallel one about Buckley, we can easily go on to transform the original
into a parallel argument about about any agent whatever. Each of these
derived arguments will be as sound as the one about Qaddafi. This being the
case, we may assert the following conclusion: on the assumption that CR 1 is
true, all agents have categorical moral reasons. In other words, on the
assumption that CR 1 is true, MA lois true. However, I have already pointed
out that CR 1 is entirely compatible with cultural relativism (CR). Thus, there is
no conflict between MA 10 and a doctrin~ that is unquestionably incompatible
with moral absolutism. This suffices to show that moral absolutism cannot be
identified with MA 1O.
3.2. A New Definition of Absolutism
Although it won't do to identify moral absolutism with MA 10 ' I believe
that a strong case can be made for identifying this doctrine with a statement
that implies the existence of categorical moral reasons. In particular, I think
that it is reasonable to identify moral absolutism with the following
statement:
1'2
(MA, ,)MORAL ABSOLUTISM
I. Sentence schema (F-1) is true:
(F-1) If N2 were to say that N 1 ought
morally to VP, , the propos~tions that
N2 would be stating and presupposing
are identical to the propositions that
N3 would be stating and presupposing
if Na were to say that N, ought
morally to VP 1 ;
II. Sentence schema (F-2) is true :
(F-2) If N2 were to say .that N, ought
morally to VPl' what N2 would be
saying would be correct only if N, had
a categorical moral reason to VP, ; and
I II. Some completions of sentence schema (F-3)
are true :
(F-3) If N2 were to say that N, ought
morally to VP 1 ' what N2 would be
saying would be correct.
It is not difficult to show that MA, 1 is incompatible with moral
subjectivism (MS), cultural relativism (CR), and Harman's relativism (HR).
Indeed. all of these theories conflict with c'Jause (I) in MA '" Consider MS.
for example. It follows from this doctrine that sentence schema (f 3) is true:
(f3) If N2 said that N, ought morally to VP, , what N2 would
be saying is that the thought of N1's not VP 1-ln9 arouses a
feeling of disapproval in Nz .
Now, if (13) is true, then each of the following completions of that schema is
also true:
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(12) If Ayatollah Khomeini said that Jane Fonda ought morally
to wear a chador when she appears in public, what
Khomeini would be saying is that the thought of Fonda's
not wearing a chador when she appears in public arouses a
feeling of disapp~oval in him.
(13) If Tom Hayden said that Jane Fonda ought morally to wear
a chador when she appears in public, what Hayden would
be saying is that the thought of Fonda's not wearing a
chador when she appears in public arouses a feeling of
disapproval in him.
Given that (12) and (13) are both true if MS is true, if follows that the
following completion of (F-1) is false if MS is true :
(14) If Khomeini were to say that Fonda ought morally to wear
a chador when she appears in public, the propositions that
Khomeini would be stating and presupposing are identical
to the propositions that Hayden would be stating and
presupposing if he were to say that Fonda ought morally
to wear a chador when she appears in public.
Briefly put, (14) will be false if MS is true because, if that doctrine is true,
(a) Khomeini would be stating a proposition about himself, but
wouldn't be stating one about Hayden, if he said that
Fonda ought morally to wear a chador in pUblic; and
(b) Hayden would be stating a proposition about himself, but
wouldn't be stating one about Khomeini, if he said that
Fonda ought morally to wear a chador in public .
Although (14) will be false if MS is true, (14) will be true if MA" is true; for
(14; is a. completion of (F-1), and, given MA,l ' (F-1) is a true sentence
schema. We thus reach the conclusion that moral sUbjectivism conflicts with
MAll •
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Fur~hermore, it is clear that arguments which are almost identical to the
one that has just led us to this conclusion will establish that both cultural
relativism and Harman's relativism are incompatible with MA 11. Stated in the
most general way, the reason why MS, CR, and HR all conflict with MA 11 is
that
(;) each of these three theories impl ies that people are either
stating or presupposing propositions about themselves
whenever thay say that N, ought morally to VP, , and
(ii) under none of the three theories is it the case that when
two people say that N1 ought morally to VP, , each is
stating or presupposing about ~he other what he is stating
or presupposing about himself.
Thus, if HR were true and both N2 and N3 said that N, ought morally to VP, ,
N2 would be presupposing that N1 accepts the same conventions that N2
accepts, and N3 would be presupposing that N1 accepts the same conventions
that N3 accepts. However, neither N2 nor N3 would be presupposing what the
other presupposes.
Let us now turn our attention to clause (II) of MA 11
II. Sentence schema (F-2) is true :
(F-2) If N2 were to say that N1 ought morally to
VP 1 ' what Nz would be saying would be
correct only if N, had a categorical moral
reason to VP 1 •.
We have just seen that HR is incompatible with clause (I) of MA 11 But HR
also conflicts with clause (II). Harman maintains that all of an individual's
moral reasons stem from his intentions. In particular, the intentions that
generate an individual's moral reasons are intentions to adhere to moral
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conventions. Thus, according to Harman, N, has a moral reason to VP, if, and
only if, by VP ,-ing, N, would promote N,'s compliance with some convention
that he intends to adhere to. But if moral reasons are hooked up with
intentions in this way, it is evident that they aren't categorical. Harman, then,
is committed to the proposition that there are no categorical moral reasons.
Nevertheless, he does think that people often would be saying something
correct if they asserted that a particular agent. ought morally to act in a
certain way. This being the case, Harman is committed to the proposition that
sentence schema (F-2) is not true. In short, his views about the nature of
moral reasons commit him to the denial of clause (II) in MA 11 •
As Harman himself has noted, the brand of n10ral relativism that he
advocates is closely related to Hare's prescriptivism.39 Like Harman, Hare
maintains that an individual's moral reasons have their source in the ethical
principles that he intends to abide by. Thus, Hare would say that if an
individual 1 sincerely intends to live his life in accordance with general
principles that never req.uire any person to come to the aid of another, 1 has
no moral reason to help others when they are in need.40 Insofar as Hare
regards moral reasons as stemming from intentions, he too will be committed
to the denial of clause (II) in MA 11 •
It will be noted that although Harman's relativistic theory conflicts with
both clause (I) and clause (II) of MA 1 1 ' we can easi Iy modify his brand of
relativism to make it compatible with (I), but still in conflict with (11). As it
stands, HR claims (in part) that the following sentence schema is true:
39Harman, "Moral Relativism Defended", The Philosophical Review, Vol. 84
(1975), p. 10.
40Hare, Freedom and Reason, chp. 6, asp. pp. 104 - 105.
116
(f9) If Nz says that N, ought morally to VP 1 ' then, in saying
this, N2 is
(a) presupposing that the moral conventions that
N1 intends to adhere to are the same as
those that N2 intends to adhere to, and
(b) stating that, given the moral conventions
that N1 intends to adhere to, it would be
unreasonable for N, not to VP, .
Clearly, it is the presence of (a) in (fg) that brings HR into conflict with clause
(I) of MA 11. So, if we delete (a) in (f9) (and, for the sake of parity, from (f 7)
and (fa) as well)41, we get a theory that is compatible with (I). However, this
revision does not involve any modification of HR's position on the source of
moral reasons. Therefore, if we remove (a) from (f 7) - (f9) but make no
further changes in HR, we formulate a doctrine (call it "HR*") that is
incompatible with (II). This incompatibility with (II) is quite important. For 0)
it is intuitively clear that HR* is a relativistic theory, and (ii) HR* is just as
compatible with clause (III) of MA 11 as it is with clause (I). Thus, there is at
least one form of moral relativism that conflicts with MA 11 only because it is
incompatible with (II). From this it follows that the mere conjunction of (I)
and (II J) does not constitute an adequate formulation of moral absolutism.
Now thet we have seen the importance of the role that (J I) plays in
MA 11 ' it is time to turn our attention to (III) :
41(f 7) is the part of HR that is concerned with what a person is saying when
he claims that it would be morally right of N1 to VP,. (f8) is the part of HR
that is concerned with what a person is saying when he claims that it would
be morally wrong of N, to VPl' If one wants to maintain that no
presupposition about shared conventions is implicit in saying that N, ought
morally to VP, , one presumably will also want to maintain tl1at no such
presupposition is implicit either In saying that it would be morally right of N1
to VP 1 or in saying that it would be morally wrong of N1 to VP, .
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III. Some completions of sentence schema (F-3) are true :
(F-3) If N
z
were to say that N1 ought morally to
VP 1 ' what N2 would be saying would be
correct.
The presence of this statement in MA 11 is merely intended to ensure that
MAll is incompatible with moral nihilism. Since it follows from (III) that
some positive moral appraisals are correct, both radical and simple moral
nihilism are ruled out. And, as the latter version of nihilism is plainly
consistent with clauses (I) and (II), it is obvious that we must not identify
moral absolutism with- the mere conjunction of (I) and (11).
Given that MA 11 is genuinely incompatible both with moral nihilism and
with each of the various forms of moral relativism that have mentioned in
this dissertation, it seems to me that a reasonably strong case has been made
for identifying moral absolutism with MA 11. Of course, I have not shown
that MA,1 is compatible with the views of philosophers such as Plato, Kant,
Sidgwick, Moore, Prichard, and Ross. But I don't see any obvious reason why
any of these moral theorists would object to the three propositions in MA 1 1 •
Indeed, I am tempted to say that their writings indicate that they tacitly
accepted these ~ropositions. Be that as it may, the burden of proof seems
clearly to lie with those who would object to the identification of absolutism
with MA
'1 •
Before we move on to other matters, it will be useful to employ the
clauses in MA 11 in making some general comments on moral facts. Let us
begin by giving a definite interpretation to the following sentence schema :
(17) There's an absolute fact of the matter as to whether N1
ought morally to VP 1 •
In particular, let us say that
'18
(Of 2) There's an absolute fact of the matter as to whether N,
ought morally to VP, if, and only if, (a) clauses (I) and (II)
of MA 11 are true, and (b) one, and only one, of the
following is correct:
(a) N, ought morally to VP, ,
(b) It is not the case that N, ought morally to
VP, .
Armed with this definition, we can make some clear substantive claims about
ethics. First, since we have already seen that the conjuction of (I) and (II) will
not be true if any of the following relativistic doctrines are, true,
moral sUbjectivism
cultural relativism
Harman's relativism
Hare's prescriptivism,
it follows that if any of these forms of relativism are true, no completion of
(17) will be true. Or, putting the matter loosely, if any version of moral
relativism is true, there is never any absolute fact of the matter in ethics. Of
course, if there's never any absolute fact of the matter in ethics, two
possibilities remain either there are are no moral facts at all, or there are
such facts, but all of them are relative. The first possibility is jUs~ a
characterization of moral nihilism which is ambiguous between radical and
simple nihilism. The second alternative will be realized if either (I) or (I J) is
false but some completions of (F-3) are true :
(F-3) If N2 were to say that N, ought morally to VP, , what N2
would be saying would be correct.
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Whether one is a relativist or an absolutist, one may hold either that there
is always a moral fact of the matter or that there is sometimes a moral fact
of the matter. It is important to bear in mind that an absolutist need not be
committed to the former view. Thus, a proponent of absolutism can admit
that in many, perhaps even in most, cases, there is no fact of the matter.
Thus, when someone trots out Sartre's tired example about the young
Frenchman who has to choose between supporting his mother and taking up
arms against the Germans,42 we should realiz.e that this case is quite irrelevant
to the truth or falsity of absolutism. The absolutist can agree with Sartre that
there is no principle t-hat is capable of deciding th~ issue. Indeed, intuitionists
such as Prichard and Ross would be happy to go along with Sartre on this
point. However, to say that there are some instances in which morality is
indeterminate is quite different from saying that there are never any facts of
the matter about moral issues.
3.3. When Is a Reason a Moral Reason 7
In MA, 1 ' I have used the e~pression "moral reason" without attempting
to explain what distinguishes moral reasons from non-moral ones. At one
time, I thought 1hat Nagel had provided precisely the explanation that wanted.
In his book, The Possibility of Altruism, Nagel defined a purely formal
distinction between objective reasons and sUbjective reasons. 43 More recently,
he has called objective reasons "agent-neutral" reasons and subjective reasons
"agent-relative" reasons.44 Although Nagel never explicitly says that his
distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons is the &ame as the
42Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, pp. 24 - 26.
43Nzgel, The Possibility of Altruism, pp. 79 - 98.
44Nagel, "The Objectivity of Ethics", pp. 7 - 9.
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distinction between moral and non.-moral reasons, the examples that he uses to
illustrate the former distinction strongly suggest something very much like
identity. Moreover, if there is no very close connection between the two
distinctions, then one can only wonder what prompted Nagel to bother with
the agent-neutral/agent-relative dichotomy. am now convinced that there
really is no connection whatever between Nagel's distinction and the difference
between moral and non-moral reasons. However, I think that it is interesting
to see how a distinction which at first seemed to yi~ld insight ended up
yielding nothing at all.
3.3. 1. Nagel's conception of reasons
In order to fully understand Nagel's interpretation of the basic distinction
between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons, it is necessary to have some
acquaintance with the central thesis of Nagel's general theory of reasons. This
thesis may be formulated as follows:
(P 1) Where 2 is a proposition and .!!. is a sentence that states
Q, !! states a r.eason when it states.Q if, and only if, Q is
true and there is a sentence J. such that
(a) A.. states Q,
(b) the subject of Il. refers to a .possible event,
and
(c) a true sentence is formed
substitute the predicate of
occurrence of "Pred1" in
when
11 for
we
the
(F) Everyone has reason to promote any
event that Pred,,45
45Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, pp. 47 - 56.
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The basic import of P1 is most easily grasped by looking at a few
examples of its application. To begin, let us suppose that General Pinochet,
head of Chile's military government, is attending a reception at an embassy in
Santiago when the embassy is attacked by guerillas who oppose his regime.
The guerillas subdue the forces guarding the embassy and capture everyone at
the reception. They then present Pinochet with a list of prisoners in Chilean
jails and demand that he secure the release of all prisoners on the list. If
Pinochet fails to do this, the guerillas will execute him and all their other
captives. On the other hand, if he does what the guerillas demand, they will
release him and the others captured at the embassy.
Given the situation just described, the following sentence surely seems to
state a reason for Pinochet to secure the release of the prisoners on the list
presented to him by his captors:
(18) General Pinochet's securing the release of the prisoners on
the guerillas' list would prolong his life.
And it might be argued that our intuition that this sentence states a reason is
supported by P 1 ' Nagel's general thesis concerning the conditions under which
sentences state reasons. For (18) clearly states a proposition (let us call it
"" , a") which is true in the scenario I set out in the preceding paragraph.
Furthermore, one might well hold that there is a sentence 11 such that
(a) 11 states "18 '
(b) the subject of A. refers to a possible event, and
(c) a true sentence is formed when we substitute the predicate
of I!. for the occurrence of "Pred 1" in
(F) Everyone has reason to promote any event
that Pred,.
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For, in the first place, (18) itself states ",8. Secondly, (18)'5 subject ("General
Pinochet's securing the release of the prisoners on the guerillas' list") clearly
refers to a possible event. Thirdly, on the face of it, the following sentence
is quite plausible.
(19) Everyone has reason to promote any event that would
prolong his life.46
And (19) results from substituting (18)'5 predicate for the occurrence of "Pred 1"
in
(F) Everyone has reason to promote any event that Pred 1,
So, according to Nagel's account of when a sentence states a reason, (18)
appears to be a reason-stating sentence in the hypothetical situation where
Pinochet is being held captive by guerillas who will kill him and all others
who attended the embassy reception, unless he secures the release of the
prisoners on the list presented to him by his captors.
Moreover, it might be maintained that, in the same situation, Nagel's
theory of reasons supports the claim that the following sentence also states a
reason:
460ne can, of course, have a reason to do something and still have an
equally strong, or even a stronger, reason not to do it. This being the case,
it does not follow from the fact that someone has a reason to do what will
prolong his life that he does not have a good reason not to do what will
prolong his life. Thus, even if everyone has a reason to promote events that
will prolong his life, it may be perfectly rational for some persons to
k'nowingly refrain from doing what is necessary to prolong their own lives.
For a brief discussion of the question of whether everyone really does have
reason to promote events that vJili prolong his life, see section (3.1.4).
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(20) General Pinochet's securing the release of the prisoners on
the guerillas' list would prolong someone's life.
For if we suppose that the hypothetical circumstances I have described
actually obtain, then "20 ' the proposition stated by (20), is true. In addition,
since the subject of (18) refers to a possible event, and (18)'5 subject is
identical to the subject of (20), (20)'5 subject must also refer to a possible
event. Finally, it may seem to some that a true sentence is formed by using
(20)'s predicate to complete
(F) Everyone has reason to promote any event that Pred 1•
In other words, some may hold that everyone has reason to promote any
event that would prolong someone's life. And if this contention is correct,
then, according to P1 ' (20) states a reason in the hypothetical situation where
Pinochet and others have been captured by a group of guerillas who will
execute them just in case Pinochet fails to secure the release of all the
prisoners on the list the guerillas presented to him.
3.3.2. Agent-neutral reasons and agent-relative reasons
Having now set out some examples that illustrate the application of P 1
and, in so doing, elucidate this basic thesis of Nagel's theory of reasons, I
turn to that part of his theory which deals with the distinct;,.,n between agent-
neutral and agent-relative reasons.47 The essentials of Nagel's proposal
regarding this distinction are summarized by the following three principles:
(P2) A reason is agent-relative, if, and only if, it is stated by a
sentence
471 return to P1 in section (3.1.4).
mistaken.
There I argue that P 1 is radically
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(a) whose subject refers to a possible event,
and
(b) whose predicate contains a free agent-
variable.
(P3) A reason is agent-neutral if, and only if, it is stated by a
sentence
(a) whose sUbject refers to a possible event,
and
(b) whose predicate does not contain a free
agent-variable.
A reason is agent-neutral if, and only if, it is not agent-
relative.48
Clearly the critical concept used in P2 and P3 is that of a free agent-
variable. To illustrate the difference between sentences whose predicates
contain free agent-variables and sentences whose predicates do not contain
such variables, Nagel asks us to imagine that "G. E. Moore finds himself in
the path of an oncoming truck, and concludes that he has reason to remove
himself • • • • If he ;s asked what reason he has to get out of the way, he
may say (among other things) • • ." that
(21) the act will prolong G. E. Moore's life;
or that
(22) the act will prolong his life;
or that
48 I bid., p. 90-94.
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(23) the act wi II prolong someone's Iife.49
Nagel asserts that the predicate of (22) contains a free agent-variable, whi Ie
the predicates of (21) and (23) do not. He explains that (22)'5 predicate
contains a free agent-variable bec~use, when this predicate is substituted for
the occurrence of "Pred1" in
(F) Everyone has reason to promote any event that Pred 1,
the result,
(24) Everyone has reason to promote any event that will
prolong his life,
;s a sentence in which a term in (22)'5 predicate (namely "his") functions as a
variable that is bound by "everyone," a term that is not contained in the
predicate of (22).50 It is easily seen, however, that when the occurrence of
Pred, in F is replaced by the predicate of (21), the resulting sentence,
(25) Everyone has reason to promote any event that wi II
prolong G.E. Moore's life,
is not one in which a term in (21)'5 predicate is bound by the quantifier
"everyone". Similarly, in
49, bid., pp. 90-91.
501n50far as the quantifier "everyone" implicitly ranges over agents, if it
binds some term in a given prert!:ate, that predicate is said to contain an
agent-variable. Thus, since the pronoun "his" in (22)'s predicate in bound by
"everyone" when that predicate replaces the occurrence of Pred 1 in F, "his" is
an agent-variable in the predicate of (22). Furthermore, as the expression in
(24) that binds "his" is not itself contained in (22)'s predicate, "his" is said to
be free in that predicate. Hence, in "will prolong his life," the predicate ot
(22), "his" is a free agent-variable.
• •.•, . . • .; f
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(26) Everyone has reason to promote any event that will
prolong someone's life,
"everyone" binds no term in "will prolong someona's life" (i.e., in the
predicate of (23)). Therefore the predicates of (21) and (23) do not contain free
agent-variables.5 1
On the basis of this explanation of why the predicate of (22) contains a
free agent-variable while the predicates of (21) and (23) do not, it appears that
the basic distinction between predicates that do and predicates that do not
contain free agent-variables is captured by the following general principle:
(P5) In any sentence !!, the predicate G of !! contains a free
agent-variable if, and only if, when G is substituted for the
occurrence of "Pred1" in schema F, an expression in G, is
bound by the quantifier "everyone."
However, comments that Nagel makes after his initial discussion of free agent-
variables suggest that P5 is not quite accurate. He says that, In addition to
using sentences (21) - (23) to respond to a request for Moore's reason for
removing himself from the path of the oncoming truck, one might use the
following sentence:
(27) The act is one which will prolong the life of its agent.
And, according to Nagel, whether or not (27)'5 predicate contains a free agent-
variable depends on how one reads the sentence.52 If it is taken to say what
(22) says about Moore's getting out of the truck's way, its predicate contains a
51/bid., p. 91.
52 I bid., p. 92.
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free agent-variable. Under this interpretation, says Nagel, (27) states a agent-
relative reason. However, he goes on to say, there is a second reading of (27)
which is such that, if (27) states a reason under this reading, the reason it
states is agent-neutral. And, when (27) is given this reading, its predicate
does not contain a free agent-variable.
Since Nagel's notion of a free agent-variable is such that a sentence's
predicate may contain this type of variable under one reading of the sentence
though not under another, Ps is not a satisfactory statement of the conditions
in which predicates contain free agent-variables. The problem is that P5 does
not take different interpretations of sentences into account. Given this
principle there is no question of (27)'s having one reading under which its
predicate contains a free agent-variable and another reading under which its
predicate fails to contain such a variable. According to P5 ' (27)'s predicate
simply doesn't contain 21 free agent-variable. For when we use the predicate
of (27) to replace the occurrence of Pred, in F, we derive
(28) Everyone has reason to promote any event that is one
which will prolong the life of its agent.
And it is clear that in this sentence the quantifier "everyone" binds no term in
(27)'s predicate -- i.e., in "is one which will prolong the life of its agent."
The following principle seems as plausible a candidate as any to overcome
the shortcomings of P5.
(P6) For any sentence .!!. and any proposition Q stated by!!., the
predicate of .!. contains a free agent-variable when !! is
interpreted as stating Q if, and only if, there is a sentence
JJ.. such that
(a) A. states Q, and
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(b) when the predicate of /l is substituted for
the occurrence of "Pred," in schema F, an
expression in that ~redicate is bound by the
quantifier "everyone."
Given P6' the predicate of sentence (27), will, as Nagel claims, contain a free
agent-variable when it is interpreted to say what (22) says about Moore's
removing himself from the path of the truck that is heading towards him. For
when (27) is interpreted in this way, the proposition it states is identical with
the proposition stated by (22). And, as we have already seen, if the predicate
of (22) is used to complete schema F, the pronoun "his" in that predicate is
bound by the quantifier "everyone."
Moreover, it might be claimed that, when (27) is given the second
interpretation mentioned by Nagel, the proposition it then states is not stated
by any sentence whose predicate will contain a term bound b'{ "everyone"
when that predicate is substituted for the occurrence of Pred, in F. If this
claim is correct, then, consonant with what Nagel claims, there will be an
interpretation of (27) under which its predicate does not contain a free agent-
variable.
Nevertheless, P6 is unacceptable.
suggestion that there are readings of
(29) The act will help his family
The problem arises from Nagel's
under which its predicate fails to contain a free agent-variable as well as
readings under which its predicate contains such a variable. 53 To see why this
Is problematic, let us consider some arbitrary interpretation 1 of (29) under
53 I bid., p. 93.
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which (29)'5 predicate does not contain a free agent-variable. The proposition
(I'll call it "29) that (29) states under i is clearly one that is stated by a
sentence 11 whi':h is such that, when the predicate of /l is substituted for the
occurrence of "Pred," in schema F, an expression in that predicate is bound by
the quantifier "everyone." For (29) itself states "29 ; and when its predicate
is substituted for the the occurrence of "Pred 1" in F, the term "his" in (29)'5
predicate is bound by "everyone". This being the case, it follows
straightforwardly from P6 that (29)'5 predicate contains a free agent-variable
when (29) states "29- And, since (29) states "29 under 1, the predicate of (29)
contains a free agent-variable under 1. But this result contradicts our initial
assumption that (29) does not contain such a variable under 1.
The preceding argument demonstrates that P6 is incompatible with Nagel's
claims about the occurrence of free agent-variables in predicates. However, it
may be that, in trying to find a principle compatible with all that Nagel says
about free agent-variables, we are engaged in a Quixotic quest. In fact, I
suspect that this is the case. For there is a basic confusion in Nagel's
discussion of the conditions under which predicates contain free agent-
variables. When he attempts to distinguish a reading under which a sentence's
predicate doesn't contain a free agent-variable from a reading under which that
sentence's predicate does contain such a variable, he does so by referring to
the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. But this is
putting the cart before the horse. For Nagel is supposed to be defining the
agent"neutral/agent-relative distinction in terms of the distinction between
predicates that don't contain free agent-variables and predicates that do. It is,
among other things, the circularity in Nagel's attempt to set out the conditions
under which predicates contain free agent-variables which suggests that there
simply is no clear way to state these conditions.
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Though there seems to be no way to make sense of everything that Nagel
says about free agent-variables, his discussion of sentences (21) - (23) is quite
coherent. Moreover, Ps is a straightforward generalization of his reasons for
claiming that the predicate of (22) contains a free agent-variable, while the
predicates of (21) and (23) do not. Thus we will perhaps bet most charitable to
Nagel if we take P5 to state his basic position on the difference between
predicates that contain free agent-variables J.ld predicates that fail to contain
such variables. So let us ignore everything in Nagel that is incompatible with
p5 and assume that this principle provides an adequate account of the
conditions under which predicates .contain free agent-variables.
Now that we have a reasonably clear picture of what Nagel has in mind
when he talks about agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons, let us consider
how the distinction between these two types of reasons is related to the
distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. One possibility is that the
agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction is identical to the moral/non-moral
distinction. If this were so, we would have a positive account of what it is
for a reason to be moral. In short, we could say that a reason is moral just
in case it can be stated by a sentence with (a) a subject that refers to a
possible event and (b) a predicate that doesn't contain a free agent-variable.
However, in the discussion that follows I will argue that the distinction
between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons is not the same as the
distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. Moreover, if my arguments
are sound, they will not merely establish that the distinctions in question are
not identical. They will show that, to the extent that we can make sense of
Nagel's distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons, we can
conceive both of agent-neutral reasons that are non-moral and of moral
reasons that are agent-relative.
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Though I do not believe that the distinction between moral and non-moral
reasons is identical to the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative
reasons, our intuitions about some cases tend to confirm this identification.
For example, in normal circumstances we would intuitively say that Smith's
reason for giving blood is non-moral if he is motivated to give by his
recognition of the fact that he will impress his girlfriend by doing so. Thus
our intuitions support the claim that
(30) Smith's giving blood will impress his girlfriend
states a non-moral reason.
The same conclusion about (30) can be derived from the conjunction of
(a) principles P2 - P5
and
(b) the thesis that the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction is
identical to the moral/non-moral distinction.
(From this point on, I will refer to this identity thesis as the "Identity
Hypothesis". I will refer to P2 - P5 as "Nagel's principles".) According to
p 2 ' (30) states an 8gent-relative reason if its subject refers to a possible
event and its predicate contains a free agent-variable. Well, the subject of
(30) does refer to a possible event (namely, Smith's giving blood); and the
predicate of (30) does contain a free agent-variable. This latter fact is a
straightforward consequence of P5 :
(P 5) In any sentence !!., the predicate G of !. contains a free
agent-variable if, and only if, when G is substituted for the
occurrence of "Pred," in schema F, an expression in G is
bound by the quantifier "everyone,"
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For when we substitute (30)'s predicate for the occurrence of uPred," in
schema F, the pronoun in that predicate is bound by "everyone." We see,
then.. that whether we rely on our intuitions or on the conjunction of the
Identity Hypothesis with Nagel's principles, we arrive at the same result: (30)
states a non-moral reason.
Further cases that support Nagel's position are easily found. For instance,
we would naturally say that Smith is motivated by a moral reason if he gives
blood simply because he sees that doing so will help to save sameone's life.
So by appealing to our intuition we arrive at the conclusion that
(31) Smith's giving blood will help to save someone's life
states a moral reason.
This conclusion also foliow5 fr9m the conjunction of tne Identity
Hypothesis with Nagel's principles. If we substitute the predicate of (31) for
the occurrence of "Pred1" in
(F) Everyone has reason to promote any event that Pred 1 '
. we derive
(32) Everyone has reason to promote any event that will help
to save someone's life.
And in (32) the quantifier "everyone" binds no term in "will help to save
someone's life" - the predicate of (31), So, according to P5 I (31)'5 predicate
contains a free agent-variable. Furthermore, its sUbject refers to a possible
event: the same event designated by the subject of (30). Therefore, assuming
that (31) states a reason, it follows from P3 that it states an agent-neutral
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one. and, since the Identity Hypothesis implies that any agent-neutral reason is
a moral reason, we may conclude that (31) states a moral reason.
In spite of the confirmation that the Identity Hypothesis receives from the
cases ha"e just discussed, disconfirming considerations can also be
mustered. ImaJine that Sarah has given Abe $ 100 and that Abe has promised
her that he will ,Jay the money back. Imagine also that Abe has no particular
desire to pay her back, that he has little or nothing to gain by doing so, and
that his failure to do so will not cause him to suffer any significant adverse
consequences. (We might suppose that Abe has already left town and gone to
some distant space outpost where his failure to pay Sarah back will have no
noticeable effect on his life.) So at best any self-interested reason that Abe
has to pay Sarah $100 is extremely weak. Nevertheless, any moral absolutist
worth his salt would surely say that the following sentence states an
important reason for Abe to send $100 to Sarah:
(33) Abe's sending Sarah $100 would fulfill his promise to pay
back the money she gave him.
Now then, since there is no compelling non-moral reason for Abe to send
Sarah $ 100, if (33) states an important reason for him to do this, it must state
a moral reason. However, it follows from the conjunction 0 f the Identity
Hypothesis with Nagel's principles that (33) does not state such a reason.
When we substitute the predicate of (33) for the occurrence of "Pred 1" in F,
we get
(34) Everyone has reason to promote any event that would
fulfill his promise to pay her (Sarah) back the money she
gave him.
And in this sentence "everyone" binds two expreosions O.e., "his" and "him")
· . . .
_0'"
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in (33)'5 predicate. Thus, by appeal ing to P5 ' we discover that the predicate
of (33) contains a free agent-variable. More,- ver, (33)'5 subject refers to a
possible event -- namely, Abe's sending $ 100 to Sarah. So, assuming that (33)
states an important reason for Abe to send Sarah money, it follows from P2
that that reason is agent-relative. But it is a consequence of the Identity
Hypothesis that agent-relative reasons are not moral reasons. Hence, this
hypothesis generates the mistaken conclusion that (33) states a strong non-
moral reason for Abe to send Sarah $'00.
The case just discussed is by no means the only one that poses a
problem for the Identity Hypothesis.
sentence brings further difficulties to light.
A consideration of the following
(35) Reagan's publicly advocating passage of an anti-abortion
amendment will favorably impress Jerry r:alwell.
It is easy to conceive of a scenario in which (35) states a non-moral reason
for Reagan to advocate passage of an anti-abortion amendment. Suppose, for
example, that Reagan enjoys the power he wields as President and is set on
getting re-elected. Suppose also that his chances for re-election will be
enhanced significantly if he continues to have the support of Jerry Falwell and
his so-called "Moral Majority", In these circumstances it is clearly in Reagan's
own interest to do things that will please Falwell. Moreover, there is no doubt
that Falwell will be favorably impressed if Reagan openly supports an anti-
abortion amendment; for the institution of such an amendment is an important
goal of the Moral Majority. So, the fact that Reagan's publicly advocating
passage of an anti-abortion amendment will favorably impress Jerry Falwell is
an obviously self-interested reason for Reagan to do this. And, insofar as it
is a self-interested reason, it is a non-moral one.
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Though (35) clearly states a non-moral reason in the situation I have
described, the conjunction of the Identity Hypothesis with Nagel's principles
implies that (35) does not state SIJch a reason. When (35)'s predicate is
substituted for the occurrence of "Pred," in schema F, we get
(36) Everyone has reason to promote any event that will
favorably impress Jerry Falwell.
But in (36) the quantifier "everyone" obviously fails to bind any expression in
"will favorably impress Jerry Falwell", the predicate of (35). Thus P5 tells us
that (35)'8 predicate does not contain a free agent-variable. Furthermore, the
subject of (35) refers to a possible event - namely, Reagan's publicly
advocating adoption of an anti-abortion amendment. It therefore follows from
p3 that any reason stated by (35) is agent-neutral. And this fact, together with
p4 ' implies that no reason stated by (35) is agent-relative. However, if no
reason stated by (35) is agent-neutral, the Identity Hypothesis tells us that (35)
only states moral reasons- a result that directly contradicts what was
established in the preceding paragraph.
Given the case of Abe and Sarah and the case of Reagan and the anti-
abortion amendment, it seems clear that we cannot accept the conjunction of
(a) Nagel's principles o.e., p 2 - p5)
and
(b) the Identity riypothesis O.e., the view that the agent-
neutral/agent-relative distinction is the same as the
moral/non-moral distinction).
However, we can't reject P2 - P5 in order to save the Identity Hypothesis. For
P2 - Ps tell 'us what the agent-neutral/agent relative distinction is. If we give
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up P2 - P5' the Identity Hypothesis becomes a meaningless shell. Thus, we
have no choice but to jettison the proposal that the agent-neutral/agent-relative
distinction is identical to the moral/non-moral distinction.
3.3.3. Lack of significance and lack Ot sense
Of course, as I noted at the outset of this discussion, Nagel never
explicitly formulates the Identity Hypothesis. And, in the face of the
objections that I have raised against that Hypothesis, Nagel might simply reply
that the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction was never really supposed to
capture the moraJ/non-moral distinction. However, not only does the former
distinction not capture the latter, it seems to provide no insight at all into the
latter. This being the case, it is legitimate to ask whether the agent-
neutral/agent-relative distinction has any significance at all.
But a lack of significance is not the only problem that confronts the.
agent-neutral/agent-relative dichotomy. A consideration of the following two
sentences reveals that even the coherence of this distinction is highly
dubious:
(37) Susan's studying conscientiously will enable. her to pass
the exam.
(38) Her studying conscientiously will enable Susan to pass the
exam.
We can easily describe situations in which each of these sentences states a
reason for Susan to study conscientiously. Moreover, (37) and (38) can clearly
state the very same reason.
Yet, according to principles P2 - P5 ' (37) and (38) never state the same
reason. From P5 it follows that (37)'5 predicate contains a free agent-variable,
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while the predicate of (38) does not. However, this result, together with P2 -
P4 implies that , if (37) and (38) state the same reason, that reason can be
both agent-neutral and not agent-neutral. Thus, we cannot accept P2 - P5 and
also admit that (37) and (38) state the same reason.
The fact that principles P2 - P5 require us to deny that (37) and (38) state
the same reason seems to me to be ample proof that some of these
principles are unacceptable.
them is false.
suspect, moreover, that each and everyone of
3.3.4. Deep worries about Nagel's general theory of reasons
As we have already seen, it is very easy to conceive of circumstances in
which the following sentence states a reason for Reagan to publicly advocate
passage of an anti-abortion amendment:
(35) Reagan's publicly advocating passage of an anti-abortion
amendment will favorably impress Jerry Falwell.
However, the fact that (35) states such a reason in the circumstances outlined
on page 134 seems to raise insuperable problems for P1 ' a principle that
purports to set out certain conditions that must be met by an)' sentence that
states a reason.
(P,) Where Q is a proposition and !!. is a sentence that states
12., .!. states a reason when it states 2 if, and only if, Q is
true and there is a sentence A. such that
(a) A. states Q,
(b) the sUbject of A. refers to a possible event,
and
(c) a true sentence is formed when we
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substitute the predicate of 11 for the
occurrence of "Pred " in1
(F) Everyone has reason to promote any
event that Pred, .
If we suppose that the facts about Ronald Reagan and Jerry Falwell are as
described them above, there clearly is a proposition (let's call it "TI 35") such
that, in stating that proposition, (35) states a reason for Reagan to openly
support an anti-abortion amendment. So, according to P 1 there is a sentence
J.. such that
(i) A. states "35 '
(in the subject of I!. refers to a possible event, and
(iii) a true sentence is formed when we substitute the predicate
of I!. for the occurrence of "Pred1" in schema F.
Now (35) itself satisfies conditions (i) and (in. However, when we replace the
occurrence of Pred1 in schema F with (35)'3 predicate, we get
(36) Everyone has reason to promote any event that wi II
favorably impress Jerry Falwell.
And (36) is surely false. If we posit that everyone has reason to promote such
events, then even an opponent of Reagan's re-election who believes that
abortion should remain legal has reason to promote Reagan's publicly
advocating adoption of an anti-abortion amendment. But this is absurdl Why
should a person opposed to Reagan and to restrictive abortion laws have any
reason whatever for prom,'ting Reagan's open advocacy of an anti-abortion
amendment?
Since (36) is false, (35; does not satisfy condition (iii). Still, as (35) states
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a reason in stating "3~' it follows from P1 that some sentence satisfies
conditions 0) - (iii). But what sentence could this be? None, so far as I can
tell. If the result of replacing the occurrence of Pred 1 in F with (35)'5
predicate isn't true, neither is the reslJlt of replacing that occurrence of Pred,
with the predicate of any other sentence that meets conditions 0) and (;0.
Thus our intuitions conflict once again with Nagel's proposals. It is
intuitively 'clear that, in the situation I have described, (35) states a reason for
Reagan to publicly support an anti-abortion amendment. However, it follows
from one of Nagel's basic principles that (35) does not state such a reason.
Surprisingly, the shortcomings of P1 can be seen even in the examples
that Nagel uses to illustrate his theory of reasons. In the case of Moore and
the oncoming truck, Nagel suggested that the following sentence states a
reason for Moore to remove himself from the truck's path:
(23) The act will prolong someone's life.
So, assuming that Nagel's suggestion is correct, some proposition (I'll call it
"" 23") ;s such that, in stating it, (23) states a reason. And, given that (23)
states a reason when it asserts "23 ' it follows from P1 that "23 is stated by
a sentence IJ. which is such that a true sentence is formed by substituting the
predicate of A. for the occurrence of Pred, in F. Now one might think that (23)
itself is such that, when its predicate is substituted for the occurrence of
Pred1 in F, the resulting sentence is true. IndeEJd, at first blush
(26) Everyone has reason to promote any event that will
prolong someone's life.
seems plausible enough. However, a closer examination reveals that the
statement asserted by (26) is highly suspect.
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Suppose, for instance, that Fred has terminal cancer and is in constant,
severe pain. He sees no value in going on, for he recognizes that continued
life only means ever-increasing pain and the rapid deterioration of his mental
and physical faculties. Accordingly he decides to kill himself. At the first
opportunity he takes an overdose of morphine.
In the circumstances just described, it may well be that, even if we can
prolong Fred's life by pumping out his stomach, we have no reason to do this.
It is not that the reasons for letting him die outweigh the reasons for
prolonging his life. There simply is no reason to prolong Fred's life.
If tit·s is correct, then (26) is false. And if (26) is false, we do not get a
true sentence when we replace the occurrence of Pred, in F with the predicate
of (23). But what other sentence that states "23 has a predicate which, when
used to complete F, gives us a true sentence? Clearly none. 'rhus, on the
basis of P, we must conclude that (23) does not state a reason for Moore to
remove himself from the path of the truck that threatens his life. This
conclusion cannot be a welcome one for Nagel.
Furthermore, an argument essentially the same as the one I h:;ve just
presented suggests that Nagel's advocacy of P, commits him to the vie\v that
,'22) The act will prolong his Ilfft
also fails to state a reason for Moore to get out of the way of the oncoming
truck. This result is most unfortunate. For, in the scenario described by
Nagel, (22) most certainly does state such a reason.
The foregoing discussion exposes a fatal flaw in P,. This principle is
committed to the claim that an event's being ; constitutes a reason for a
parth.:ular agent to promote it only if, for any agent A and any event E, E's
141
being ; constitutes a reason for A to promote E. But this claim is false. The
fact that Reagan's publicly advocating passage of an anti-abortion amendment
will impress Jerry Falwell may indeed be a reason for Reagan to openly push
for the adoption of such an amendment. The same fact, however, is hardly a
reason for a "pro-choice" liberal to promote Reagan's supporting passage of a
Constitutional amendment prohibiting abortions. Similarly, it may be a reason
for Moore to remove himself from the path of a certain truck that hiE doing
so will prolong his life; but l\I'oore's having this reason for getting out of the
truck's way does not imply that every agent has reason to promote any event
that will prolong his own life. A cancer victim like Fred may have no reason
at all for promoting events that will prolong his life.
Whether or not an event E's being ; is a reason for an agent A to
promote E often depends on further facts facts about A, about E, and about
the world in general. In our discussion of Reagan and the anti-abortion
amendment it has been stipulated that Jerry Falwell's support will help to get
Reagan re-elected. It is in virtue of this fact and Reagan's desire to serve
another term that sentence (35) states a reason for him to push for the
adoption of an amendment prohibiting abortion. If Reagan were to become
disgusted with politics and want only to retire to his ranch as soon as
possible, it might be quite irrelevant to him whether his actions impress Jerry
Falwell. Furthermore, if Reagan did want to be ra-elected, but Falwell's
assistance were a definite political liability, the fact that Reagan's open
support of an anti-abortion amendment would impress Falwell favorably might
also fail to be a reason for Reagan to advocate passage of such an
amendment. In fact, it co~ld be a compelling reason for Reagan to refrain
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from lending his voice to the anti-abortion chorus.54 The points I am making
here bring to mind some of Judith Thomson's remarks' in "Reasons and
Reasoning."S5 Speaking about what I shall later refer to as "epistemic
reasons", Thomson notes that certain moral philosophers have appeared to
claim that
Reasons are implicitly general -- what is a reason for thinking
one person acted wrongly must equally be reason for thinking
any other person acted wrongly.56
Yet, as Thomson points out, this claim is just not true.
54The fact that an event's being ; can be a reason for someone not to
promote it is problematic for Nagel. Consider the following sentence:
(39) Pressler's telephone's ringing at 3:00 a.m. tomorrow would
prevent him from getting the sleep he desperately needs.
(39) is a' true sentence that clearly states a reason for rne not to promote my
telephone's ringing at the ungodly hour of 3:00 a.m. Since it states a reason,
anyone who ascribes to P1 is, for all intents and purposes, committed to the
truth of the sentence that is formed by replacing the occurrence of Pred, in F
with (39)'s predicate, Thus an advocate of P1 is committed to the truth of
(40) Everyone has reason to promote any event that would
prevent him from getting the sleep he needs.
But (40) is manifestly false. And insofar as P1 requires that (40) be true if
(39) states a reason, P1 is' itself false.
55Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Reasons and Reasoning", in Philosophy in America,
Max Black, ed., pp. 282-303.
56,bid., p. 291.
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For example, things being as they now are, the fact that a quite
specific child, Jonathan, now looks uncomfortable is a reason for
thinking he has just done something wrong; but this would not be
quite generally a reason for thinking this of anyone, or even a
reason for thinking this of Jonathan at any time whatever. 57
In short, whether or not a thing's being " is a reason for believing it to be 't
often depends on a number of facts about the thing in question. At a certain
point in his life Jonathan may tend to exhibit a very special type of behavior
when he has just done something wrong. But others may not behave in a
similar way after they have done the very same sorts of things that Jonathan
has done. Moreover, at a later point in his own life, Jonathan's behavior
patterns might change. The conduct he had previously displayed after doing
things he shouldn't have done may then appear only when he is introduced to
strangers. After such a change has taken place, behavior that had formerly
been a reason for thinking that Jonathan had done something wrong no longer
would be. Instead it would be a reasen for thinking that he was being
introduced to a stranger.
The position that Thomson is criticizing in the case of reasons for
believing is precisely parallel to the view that Nagel adopts with respect to
reasons for acting. Thomson has sho\ 1 .that a certain thing's being (I may, in
a given situation, be a reason for believing it to also be '/', even though it is
not the case that for any x whatever, x's being ; is always a reason for
believing that ft is also". Likewise, in the realm of reasons for acting I have
shown that a particular event's being ; may, in a given situation, be a reason
for a specific agent to promote it, even though it is not the case that for any
event E and agent A, E's being ; is always a reason for A to promote E.
57/dem•
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By now it should be quite evident that the theory of reasons that Nagel
presents in The Possibility of Altruism is seriously flawed. Our discussion of
Nagel's theory was motivated by our search for a clear characterization of the
distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. At first it looked as if
Nagel's distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons might help
us to understand the difference between moral and non-moral reasons.
However, we discovered that Nagel's distinction is anything but a model of
clarity. The notion of a free agent-variable plays a crucial role in his account
of the difference between agent-neutral reasons and agent-relative reasons.
But Nagel doesn't seem to have a very clear conception of what It is for the
predicate of a sentence to contain or fail to contain a free agent-variable.
Moreover, when we ourselves tried to capture as much in Nagel's conception
as is clear, the principle we formulated U.e., P5) was found to provide an
unacceptable standard for distinguishing moral from non-moral reasons. Some
sentences that stated obviously non-moral reasons had predicates which did
not contain free agent-variables. Conversely, moral reasons were stated by
sentences whose predicates contained free agent-variables. Thus it was
concluded that Nagel does not show us what the basic difference is between
moral and non-moral reasons. Furthermore, some of our counterexamples to
the Identity Hypothesis (viz. the hypothesis that the agent-neutral/agent-relative
distinction is the same as the moral/non-moral distinction) also proved to be
counterexamples to principle P1. The basic import of P1 is that reasons for
acting must be general. Thus the fact that P, is false means that, like
reasons for believing, reasons for acting need not be general.
Having now argued that we cannot learn anything from Nagel about the
distinction between moral and non-moral reasons, I would like very much to
be able to offer a satisfactory characterization of that distiction. However, I
am not able to do so. Thus for the time being I can only suggest that we
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consult our moral intuitions and the best available moral theories when we
want to know whether a given fact is a moral reason for us to do something.
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PART TWO
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CHAPTER 4
MORAL SKEPTICISM
4.1. Mackie's Argument from Relativity
Assuming that the definition of moral absolutism that I presented in the
previous chapter is satisfactory, we are now in a position to examine and
evaluate a variety of philosophical arguments whose conclusions imply that
absolutism is either false or unjustified. The first class of arguments that we
shall look at are those which purport to show either that there are no moral
facts or that we have no justification for believing that there are. J.L.
Mackie's "argument from relativity" is one line of reasoning that falls into this
class. It is set out in the following passage from Ethics: inventing right
and wrong:
• • . radical differences between first order moral judgements
make it difficult to treat those judgements as apprehensions of
objective truths. But it is not the mere occurrence of
disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values.
Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology
does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields
1'or investigators to disagree about. But such scientific
disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory
hypotheses based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly
plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same way.
Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people's
adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The
causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that
people approve of monogamy because they participate in a
monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a
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monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy.58
In this passage Mackie seems to be advancing an argument that runs as
follows:
1. Unless every disagreement over a given issue arises
because the parties to it infer conflicting opit,ions about
th~ issue from explanatory hypotheses that have been
adopted on the basis of inconclusive evidence, there is no
fact of the matter on that issue.
2. With respect to any moral issue there are disagreements
which do not arise because the parties hold different
explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence
(because some disagreements on every issue arise because
the parties were raised in different environments with
different practices).
3. Hence, there is no fact of the matter on any moral issue
(i.e. there are no moral facts).
As soon as he presents this argument, Mackie goes on to consider a
possible objection that might be advanced by someone who disagrees with the
argument's nihilistic conclusion:
••. the items for which objective validity is in the first place to
be claimed are not specific moral rules or codes but very general
basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some
extent in all society. . .. It is easy to show that such general
principles, married with differing concrete circumstances, different
existing social patterns or different preferences, will beget
different specific moral rules•..•59
58J.L. Mackie, Ethics: inventing right and wrong., p. 36
59,bid. p. 37.
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Mackie agrees that his argument from relativity would be adequately answered
if all moral disagreement could be accounted for in a manner that is
compatible with the view that all society accepts the same basic moral
principles. Such an account would claim that all moral disagreements are
merely differences of opinion over derivative ethical principles and over the
application of ethical principles to particular circumstances. It would maintain
that these differences of opinion either arise from differing factual beliefs or
from the mistaken application of derivative moral rules to circumstances in
which the factual presuppositions for their application are not met.
But why exactly is it that the argument from relativity would be
undermined if such an account of ethical disagreement were correct? It must
be because this sort of an account of moral conflict provides grounds for
rejecting premise (2) of that argument: if there is universal agreement at the
level of basic moral principles and conflict arises only over how to apply
these principles, then moral disagreement will result from the adoption of
different explanatory hypotheses or speculative inferences based on
inconclusive evidence. For example, suppose that the basic principle accepted
by everyone were some version of act utilitarianism. There would then be
disagreement over moral issues only insofar as there were dis8gr eerTlent over
such things as
(8) what effects would be produced by particular actions, and
(b) which actions are in fact available to agents.
But disagreement over these questions would be a matter of different
speculations made on the basis of inconclusive evidence.
Nevertheless, Mackie ultimately rejects the view that all people accept the
same basic moral principles and are willing to submit all ethical questions to
the arbitration of those principles. As he says,
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in ordinary moral thought ... much ;s concerned ... with
what Hare calls "jdeaJ~" or, less kindly, "fanaticism". That is,
people judge that some things are good or right, and others are
bad or wrong, not because--or at any rate not only because--they
exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit
acceptance could be claimed, but because something about those
things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though
they would arouse radically and irresolvably different responses
in others.6o
The idea here is that a person can be so thoroughly committed to a particular
moral position that no argument based on the incompatibility of that position
with a set of supposedly basic moral principles will cause him to revise his
commitment. Or, two people can be so intransigently committed to opposing
ethical views about a given action that no amount of argument will convince
either party to revise his convictions about· the action.
The claim that certain kinds of moral dispute are irresolvable will be
familiar to anyone who has read the ethical writings of Ayer, Stevenson, and
Hare. Just how much mileage can be gotten out of this claim, however,
depends on what it really .is for two individuals to have an irresolvable
disagreement over a particular issue. Some comments about irresolvability are
thus in order.
First of all, when people call a given dispute irresolvable, what they often
mean is that, for one reason or another, the parties to it continue to disagree,
even though each has brought forward aU of the considerations that he can at
the time conceive to be relevant to changing his opponent's mind. But this is
not to say that if one of the disputants thinks about the matter a while
longer, he will be unable to think of new considerations which will change his
eo I bid. pp. 37 - 38.
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opponent's mind. It is a mistake to think that because no one can (for the
moment, or even for years or centuries) come up with a compelling
consideration against a certain view, there is no such consideration to be
found. We too qUickly think that if we can't come up with something, there is
nothing to come up with. 61
A second and more important point is that a disagreement may be said to
be irresolvable in either of two senses. First, we may call a dispute D
irresolvable because there is no argument A which is such that D would cease
to exist if the parties to 0 considered A. But ;n this sense, the existence of
an irresolvable dispute about some issue needn't have any serious bearing on
whether, for that issue, there is an objective fact of the matter. Where people
have important interests at stake, they can hold to their views with remarkable
tenacity. If a disagreement arises over an issue that involves critical concerns
of one or both of the parties, no citation of considerations may bring about a
resolution. And important concerns can certainly be connected with disputes
about issues where we have no doubt that there is a fact of the matter. Lists
that enumerate well-known disputes of this sort are not difficult to construct.
In "The Objectivity of Ethics", Nagel notes that disagreements over
heliocentrism, evolution, the innocence of Captain Dreyfus, and the genetic
contribution to racial differences in 1.0•.are among those where resolution has
been effectively precluded by people's divergent interests.62
6'ln Chapter 7, I elaborate on this point and on those that are mentioned in
the following paragraph.
62Nagel, "The Objectivity of Ethics", p. 21. See Philip Kitcher, Abusing
Science, for a thorough (and thoroughly engaging) analysis of the contorted
arguments that creationists employ in order to justify their adherence of
Biblical accounts of the origin of species.
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A second thing that someone might have in mind when he says that a
dispute is irresolvable is that there simply is no argument in favor of one of
the opposing views whose conclusion must be accepted by any reasonable
person who considers that argument. expect that this is what Mackie has in
mind when he cites the irresolvability of ethical disputes to support the view
that there are no moral facts. However, if one is to appeal to such
irresolvability in arguing against the existence of moral facts, one must
ultimately base one's claims on some well-defined conception of what it is to
be a reasonable person. In short, it is not enough merely to say (as Mackie
does) that rational argumentation in ethics reaches a dead end when the ideals
cherished by some conflict with those that are highly valued by others. The
fact that something is highly valued doesn't mean that it is highly valuable.
Thus, some ideals may simply be more reasonable than others.
Kant certainly would have subscribed to this proposition. For Kant, the
proper ideal of practical reason is defined by the Categorical Imperative. This
Imperative specifies certain tests for evaluating maxims-the practical
principles that people act on whenever they behave in a purposeful manner. In
the recent literature on Kantian ethics, these tests have been collectively
referred to as the "el-procedure".6:3 Roughly, if a maxim fails any of the tests
in the CI-procedure, then any action based on that maxim is morally wrong.
If, on the other hand, the maxim passes the tests specified by the Categorical
Imperative, any action based on that maxim is morally permissible. Thus, Kant
believes that if it is shown that the maxim of a given action fails a test in
the CI-procedure, any reasonable investigator would conclude that the action is
morally wrong. An individual who admits that the action's maxim fails one of
63See Barbara Herman, Morality as Rationality, chps. 4 - 6; Onora Nell,
Acting On Princi,ple, chp. 5 ; John Rawls, "Remarks on Kant's Ethics", pp. 1-6 -
1-10.
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these tests is simply being unreasonable if he refuses to admit that the action
is wrong because he adheres to some ideal that conflicts with the Categorical
Imperative.
I suspect that Mackie would respond to Kant's proposal by saying that the
Categorical Imperative is simply one moral ideal among many. In short,
Mackie would say that Kant cannot justify the privileged status that he accords
to the CI-procedure. And, in order to support his position, Mackie might turn
to some version of foundational ism. Broadly construed, foundationalism is the
view that a belief is justified only if either it is self-justifying or it ultimately
derives warrant only from self-justifying beliefs. Modifying slightly a
definition of self-justification suggested by James Cornman,64 we may say
that
(Of ,) A belief b is self-justifying = Of. b is justified and it is
not the case that b would be justified only if it were
justified by some relationship that it has to other beliefs.
On the basis ot a foundationatist theory, Mackie might argue that no rationally
compelling case can be made in favor of any substantive ethical statement
because (8) substantive moral beliefs aren't themselvE!..~ ,-self-justifying and (b)
such beliefs can't be confirmed through any relation that they bear to beliefs
that are self-justifying.
84James Cornman, "Foundational versus Nonfound~tional Theories of
Justification," in Pappas and Swain, Essays on Knowledge and Justification.
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4.2. Two Skeptical Arguments Based on Foundationalism
In the remainder of this chapter will examine two versions of
foundational ism which seem to lend support to MaCKie's moral skepticism.
Each of these versions maintains that all self-justifying beliefs are either
(a) beliefs whose objects are propositions which merely give
phenomenal descript,'ons of immediate sense experience, or
(b) beliefs whose objects are simple analytic propositions.
However, t"e two theories part company over the issue of how self-justifying
beliefs relate to other justified beliefs. According to one of them, the object
of every justified belief that is not self-justifying is reducible to statements
which can be inferred by deduction or sim~Je enumerative induction from
statements that are olJjects of ~dlf-justifying beliefs. I will refer to this
theory as "the reductionist view". The reductionist view was strongly
advocated by classical logical positivists such as Schlick, Carnap, and Ayer.
For example, in Language, Trutl7 and L.ogic and The Foundations of Empirical
KnOl/Vledge Ayer subscribed to a pcc;ition which he lat~r summarIzed as
follows:
Experimental reason:ng can carry us forward on a given level ; on
the basis of certain sense-experiences it allows us to predict the
occurrence of other sense experiences. . .. Whdt it does not
permit us is to jump from one level to another; to pass from
premises concerning the contents of our sense-experiences to
conclusions about physical objects . . . [unless these conclusions
are analyzable into ~tatements which only mention the contents
of actual or possible sense-experiences].65
Furthermore, given that Ayer was convinced that certain beliefs about ph'f'sical
65A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, pp. 76 - 78~
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objects and the theoretical entities of science are justified, he considered the
analysis of statements about such objects and entities into propositions which
are solely about sense experience to be one of the essential er".terprises of
epistemology. For Ayer, an accurate analytic reduction was necessary for any
precise statement of the evidential relations between self-justifying beliefs and
non-self-justifying beliefs. In fact, he was committed to the very strong claim
that if there is no way to analyze talk about physical objects and theoretical
entities into purely phenomenal talk about sense experience, ordinary
observation reports and scientific theories are devoid of cognitive meaning.
An alternative to the reductionist view is a position that I will call "the
explanatory posit view". According to this position, we can be justified in
believing a proposition that is not an object of a self-justifying belief if, by
supposing that proposition to be true, we can best explain the truth of certain
self-justifying beliefs. In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell
implicitly subscribed to the explanatory posit view. Russell claimed that we
are justified in believing many propositions which imply the existence of other
persons, everyday physical objects, and invisible theoretical entities becauae
the supposition that these propositions are true helps us to best explain the
truth of self-justifying beliefs about our immediate sense experience.66
It is not very difficult to see why advocates of the reductJonist and
explanatory posit views have often also been proponents of moral skepticism.
To begin with, it is obvious that when we say of a person that he ought to
act in a certain way or that it would be morally wrong for him to act in some
other way, we are not directly making phenomenal judgments about the
contents of our immediate sense experience. Thus, given either of the
66Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 21 - 24.
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foundationalist positions that I have described, if any ethical convictions are
to be justified, they must either be non-self-justifying beliefs or beliefs whose
objects are simple analytic statements. Let us explore the suggestion that
some ethical statements are analytic.
Among the propositions of morality, quite a number might be supposed to
be analytic. Consider, for example, (1) - (3):
(1) If it would be morally wrong for an individual not to keep
the last promise that he made, then he ought morally to
keep that promise.
(2) If it would be morally permissible for an individual to
have an abortion, then it wouldn't be morally wrong for
her to have an abortion.
(3) If an individual ought morally not to torture sentient
beings, then it would be morally permissible for him not
to do so.
These seem as good candidates for analyticity as any statements. Notice,
however:, that they are all universally quantified conditionals whose
antecedents and consequents are moral statements. From statements of this
sort we cannot justifiably infer any substantive moral conclusions unless we
already have some justified substantive moral beliefs. Thus, for example,
from (1) we could justifiably conclude that Robert Vesco ought to keep the
last promise that he made only if we were already justified in believing that it
would be morally wrong for Vesco not to keep that promise. But it has not
yet been shown how we could be justified in believing that it would be
morally wrong for a particular individual not to keep the last promise that he
made. In general, since we can't directly infer substantive mor~1 jUdgments
from moral statements that can plausibly be regarded as analytic, anyone who
advocates either the reductionist position or the explanatory posit view must
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maintain that if any substantive ethical opinion is justified, it ultimately
derives its warrant from its relation to beliefs whose objects are purely
phenomenal propositions (Le. propositions which merely give phenomenal
descriptions of immediate sense experience).
4.2. 1. The reductionist argument
However, if one subscribes to the reductionist position, one might want to
argue that our substantive moral convictions really aren't justified because they
don't bear the proper relation to purely phenomenal beliefs. Just such an
argument can be found in Language, Truth. and Logic. There Ayer argues that
none of our substantive moral beliefs are justified because the objects of
those beliefs can't be inferred by deduction or simple enumerative induction
from statements which are objects of purely phenomenal beliefs.67 One can
make such inferences only if the objects of substantive moral beliefs are
analytically reducible to propositions which only give pnenomenal descriptions
of actual or possible sense experience. But Ayer maintains that no such
reduction is possible.68 To support this contention, he tries to show that none
of the following three proposals are acceptable :
(a) To call an action right is to say that it is generally
approved of.
(b) To call an action right is to say that one approves of it
oneself.
(c) To call an action right is to say that it would produce as
great a net balance of pleasure over pain as any
alternative action.
67Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, pp. 102 - 113.
68 I bid., pp. 104 - 106.
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With respect to the first of these proposals, Ayer reasons as follows: if (a)
were true, then anyone who asserted that some actions which are generally
approved of are not right 'Nould be contradicting himself. But a person who
makes such an assertion does not contradict himself. Hence, (a) is false. 69 By
similar reasoning, Ayer convinces himself that (b) and (c) are no better off
than (a).70
(a) - (c) may be regarded as loosely formulated analyses of a particular
class of substantive moral statements. Now, none of these suggested
analyses proposes a reduction of any moral statement to a proposition that is
transparently nothing more than a phenomenal description of actual or possible
sense experience. However, Ayer clearly believed that whenever an individual
A says of an action X either that (I) X is generally approved of, or that (ii) he
approves of X, or that (iii) X would produce as great a net balance of pleasure
over pain as any alternative action, A is stating a proposition that can be
analytically reduced to a purely phenomenal description of actual or possible
sense experience. Thus Ayer thought that if either (a), (b), or (c) were true, a
crucial prerequisite for justified substantive moral belief would be met. On
the other hand, he also thought that any proposed analysis of moral
statements into purely phenomenal propositions aboui. sense experience would
be vulnerable to an argument similar to the one that he employed against (a).
Consequently, Ayer maintained that we are not justified in believing any
69,bid., p. '04.
70 lt is obvious that Ayer's arguments borrow much from G.E. Moore's
criticisms of naturalism. (See Principia .ethica, pp. 5 - 21 ; see also Ethics,
p. 46.) However, unlike Ayer, Moore did not use the unanalyzability of ethical
concepts as a stepping stone to moral skepticism and nihilism. No doubt this
was due to the fact that Moore rejected the radical empiricism embraced by
Ayer and other logical positivists.
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substantive moral statements. Even more strongly, the verificationist criterion
of meaningfulness that Ayer subscribed to led him to conclude that moral
statements are u~terly devoid of cognitive meaning. 71
It is clear that it is not reasonable to subscribe to moral absolutism if
Ayer has given us a sound argument for the claim that there are no justified
substantive moral beliefs. For if no one is justified in believing any
substantive moral statement, no one will be justified in holding that people
sometimes make correct statements when they assert sentences of the
following form :
N1 ought morally to VP 1 •
And, if we aren't justified in holding that correct statements are sometimes
made by asserting such sentences, we also aren't justified in believing that
III. Some completions of sentence schema (F-3) are true:
(F-3) If N2 were to say that N, ought morally to
VP, , what N2 would be saying would be
correct.
But (III) is one of the conjuncts of MA 11 ' the proposition that I have
identified with moral absolutism. Thus, assuming that this jdentification is
appropriate, no one will be justified in embracing moral absolutism if Ayer has
convincingly shown that there are no justified substantive moral beliefs.
However, Ayer's argument is far from convincing. In the first place, one
might claim that Ayer begs the question when he tries to establish that the
following proposition is false:
71 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, pp. 106 - 107.
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(a) To call an action right is to say that it is generally approved
of. 72
According to Ayer, (a) is false because
(4) No one would be contradicting himself if he said that
some generally approved-of actions aren't right.
But (4) won't seem evident to anyone who subscribes to (a) ; and it doesn't
seem that there is any argument in favor of (4) that would be found
compelling by a supporter of (a). Thus, when Ayer appeals to (4) in order to
refute (8), he is offering an argument that couldn't possibly sway anyone who
accepts (a). Indeed, Ayer's "refutation" of (a) seems to amount to little more
than the mere assertion that (a) is false. If this isn't begging the question,
what is 173
But question-begging is really the least of Ayer's problems. It is now
almost universally acknowledged that there are fatal flaws in the reductionist
position that provides the basic premises in his argument for moral skepticism.
74 For example, no one seriously doubts that we are all justified in believing
many statements about everyday physical objects ; but it is quite impossible
to analytically reduce such statements to propositions which give purely
phenomenal descriptions of actual and possible sense experience. Harman
describes the basic problem very nicely in the following passage:
72 1 thank Judith DeCew for bringing this objection to my attention.
73Similar question-begging charges have been levelled against Moore's
famous Open Question Argument. See W.K. Frankena, "The Naturalistic
Fallacy", in Theories of Ethics, Philippa Foot, ad., pp. 50 - 63.
745ee, for example, R.M. Chisholm, "The Problem of Empiricism", Journal of
· Philosophy, vol. XLV, no.19 (September, 1948), pp. 512 - 517 ; Chisholm, Theory
of Knowledge, pp. 126-127 ; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief, pp. , 16-1 1S.
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... according to phenomenalism, statements about objects in the
external world can be translated without loss of meaning into
statements about the possibility of one's own experience. , ..
Now, it was always embarrassing to . , • phenomenalisr:n that no
one was ever able to give a single example of such a translation.
Lately it has become clear that the required sort of translation is
impossible....
[T]o say that there is a typewriter on your desk is not to say,
among other things, that under certain purely experiential
conditions it would look to you as if there were a typewriter on
your desk. For these conditioJ1S must include such things as that
your eyes are open, that nothing opaque intervenes between you
and the typewriter, that you have not just taken a hallucinogenic
drug, and so on. A statement of relevant conditions must speak
not only of possible experience but also of things in the external
world. There is no way to translate simple statements about
objects in the external world, without loss of meaning, into
statements that are solely about possible experience.75
To sum matters up, if the reductionist position were true, we would only be
justified in believing propositions which imply the existence of physical
objects if such propositions could be analytically reduced to statements which
make purely phenomenal claims about possible sense' experience. However,
there is no doubt that we are justified in believing certain propositions which
imply the existence of physical objects; and there is likewise no doubt that
these propositions can't be analyzed into purely phenomenal statements about
possible sense experience. Consequently, the reductionist position is false.
And, given that it is false, even if Ayer could show that substantive moral
statements can't be analytically reduced to propositions that are solely about
possible sense experience, this irreducibility would not establish that no
substantial moral beliefs are justified.
75Gilbert Harman, Thought, pp. 10 - 12.
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However, we can't lay moral skepticism to rest simply by defeating
arguments for that doctrine which are based on the reductionist position. As I
have already indicated, an argument for moral skepticism seems to flow very
naturally from the explanatory posit view. According to this view, we are
justified in believing a substantive moral proposition P only if the supposition
that P is true helps to explain the truth of certain purely phenomenal
statements. But it is arguable that moral hypotheses don't really help us to
account for the truth of any such statements.
4.2.2. The explanatorv posit argument
The most plausible way for substantive moral hypotheses to play a role in
explaining the truth of phenomenal statements is by helping to explain human
behavior. An advocate of the explanatory posit view will surely want to say
that suppositions about human behavior help us to account for the truth of
certain phenomenal statements. So, if moral hypotheses enter into
explanations of human behavior, they will also, in a derivative way, play a
role in explaining the truth of phenomenal statements.
Now then, there is no doubt that we often do appeal to moral hypotheses
in explanations of people's behavior. A person who broods and merely picks
at his food may explain his behavior by saying that he did something wrong
and is depressed by his moral failing. Similarly, someone who writes a letter
to the president of Argentina imploring him to put an end to the use of
torture in Argentinian priso.ns may explain his action by asserting that the
torture of human beings is always wrong and that, in writing his letter, he is
trying to bring about a morally better world.
Despite the fact that moral hypotheses are used in explanations of
people's actions, the moral skeptic will claim that their use plays no essential
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role in the explanations. Insofar as such hypotheses enter into an explanation
of some piece of behavior, the skeptic will say, their only value lies in the
fact that they indicate certain bel iefs which help to motivate the behavior.
Thus the individual who cites the wrongness of torture in his account of why
he has written a certain letter to Argentina's president is, in stating this
alleged fact, merely indicating that one of the things which motivated him to
write the letter was his bel ief that torture is wrong. Had he left out his
reference to the moral status of torture and merely cited his bel ief that
torture is wrong, his explanation would not have bee~ any less complete. Th~
moral hypothesis is thus quite superfluous to explaining why the letter was
written.
The defender of justified moral belief might respond to the skeptic's
position in the following way:
You claim that moral hypotheses contribute to an explanation of
an individual's behavior only by suggesting beliefs which help to
motivate that behavior. But why don't you say the same thing of
many non-moral suppositions? Jones may explain to us that he
is planing the bottom edge of a certain door because the door
has been scraping against the floor. If we here apply the
reasoning you used in the case of the letter writer, the
supposition that the door has been scraping the floor should be
regarded as having explanatory value only insofar as it indicates
that Jones bel ieved the door to have been scraping the floor.
But it is clear that the claim about the door can do more than
merely suggest that Jones had a certain belief. It can help to
explain why he had the belief. And, similarly, moral hypotheses
can help to explain people's moral beliefs.
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To the position just described, the moral skeptic has a ready reply. He
can justifiably complain that the defender of ethics has merely stated that
moral hypotheses have genuine explanatory utility: no example of how these
hypotheses enter into explanations of moral beliefs has been provided. On the
other hand, the skeptic will say, it is not difficult to indicate, at least roughly,
how statements which describe physical events (e.g. the scraping of a door on
a floor, the breaking of a thumb in an Argentinian jail) help to explain \Nhy
people have some of the beliefs they have. Thus in the case of Jones we
may say that the door's scraping against the floor scratches the floor's
surface; light reflected from the moving door and the damaged floor, together
with sound waves produced by the scraping, then strike Jones' sensory
receptors causing a particular pattern of neurological activity; this activity
leads in turn to the formation of a belief that the door has scraped against
the floor.
The moral skeptic may then go on to say that, not only has the defender
of ethics not shown how moral hypotheses help to explain why people have
the moral beliefs that they have, but he O.e. the skept~c) can provide a
perfectly good framework for the explanation of moral beliefs in which ethical
claims play no useful role. A reasonably plausible account of the acquisition
of moral beliefs might run as follows:
The existence of social cooperation depends on the existence of
a set of behavioral conventions which are by and large accepted
by the cOl)perating individuals. Through the process of
socialization, those who grow up in a given society acquire
knowledge of the principles that characterize its convantions
together with dispositions to approve of actions that accord with
these principles and disapprove of behavior that fails to accord
165
with them. Furthermore, insofar as an individual's acceptance of
conventional principles leads him to disapprove of doin9 certain
things that he would do if he gave in to his strongest desires or
followed the course dictated by prudence, he comes to feel that
something outside of himself demands that he not act in certain
ways. But when he looks around for something that makes these
demands on him, he sees nothing but the actions that he
disapproves of. He thus concludes that it is the actions
themselves which make demands on him. They possess, as it
were, the property of "not-to-be-donene&s." And he comes to
regard his disapproval of an action as a sign that it is not to be
done-or, in other words, that it is morall', wrong. Similar
considerations account for the individual's coming to believe that
other actions are morally right. good. obligatory, etc.
The basic message of a story like the one just recited is that moral
beliefs initially arise from a mistaken objectification of certain experiences
that people have as a result of acquiring a set of dispositions thr()ugh
socialization. It is thus sociological and psychological, rather than ethical,
hypotheses that accuunt for people's moral beliefs.
One way to attack the skeptical argument that I have just been describing
is to question the validity of its foundationalist underpinnings. Ultimately, the
argument is grounded in the claim that all justified substantial beliefs are
either (a) self-justifying phenomenal beliefs or (b) beliefs whose truth would
help to explain the truth of self-justifying phenomenal beliefs. However,
Richard Rorty and Michael Williams have argued that this is not a satisfactory
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picture of justification.76 Indeed, they have argued that many of our bel iefs
are justified even though none of our beliefs are self':justifying. If Rorty and
Williams are right, one obviously can't show that we have no justified
substantive moral beliefs b'l showing that moral hypotheses don't help to
explain the truth of self-justifying phenomenal beliefs. Thus it rTlight be
claimed that there are no sound arguments for moral skepticism based on the
explanatory posit view because that view is an unacceptable theory of
justification.
While it seems to me that Rorty and Williams have presented some
interesting objections to foundationalism, I do not think an opponent of moral
skepticism can simply cite their arguments and then confidently assert that
there is no reason to doubt the existence of justified moral beliefs. S.uch
confidence would only be appropriate if foundationalism were the sole source
of moral skepticism. But it is not. In fact, one can reject all foundationalist
theories of justification and still present an argument for moral skepticism
which is quite similar to the one that was based on the explanatory posit
view. In essence, this is what Gilbert Harman does in The Nature of Morality.
Let us now turn our attention to Harman's argument.
76Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, chps. Ill, IV, and VI.
Williams, op. cit., chps. 2 and 5.
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CHAPTER 5
HARMAN'S SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT
5. 1. The Basic Argument
Harman opens his discussion of moral skepticism by presenting two
examples which are intended to iliustratA an important prims facie difference
between scientific beliefs and moral convictions. In the first of these
examples he asks us to imagine a physicist who observes a vapor trail while
looking through the window of a cloud chamber. Upon seeing the vapor trail,
this physicist immediately thinks, "There goes a proton". Harman suggests
that if we try to explain why this belief comes into the physicist's mind, we
will naturally propose that it has something to do with the fact that he has
internalized a particular physical theory. According to this theory, perhaps,
vapor trails signify the presence of protons. Had the physicist internalized
some other theory, the preser;ce of the vapor trail might have prompted him
to think, "There goes an electron," or even, "There goes an arrow from the
bow of Artemis."
To propose that an individual accepts a certain theory is to put forward a
hypothesis about his psychological make-up or "set", Thus, in explaining why
our physicist comes to believe that a proton has just passed through the cloud
chamber, we will employ hypotheses that purport to describe particular aspects
of his psychological S9t. However, hypotheses other than those about the
scientist's psychology will enter into our explanation. In particular, we will
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surely 'Nant to say something about the presence of the vapor trail in the
cloud chamber. For, evide,1tly, it is not a mere coincidence that the physicist
comes to believe ~hat a proton has just passed through the chamber when he
observes the vl'por trra!l. FI'rthermore, once statements about the p.·esence of
the vapor trail enter into our explanation of the physicist's belief, hypotheses
that help to explain why the trail is in the cloud chamber also become part of
an extended explanation of this belief. So, if the hypothesis that a proton has
passed \ .•rough tho chamber helps to E.ccount for the vapor trail, this
hypothesis will also help to eJ<plain why the scientist comes to think that a
proton has just passed by. And, 1ndeed, current physical theory tells us that
va~or trails in cloud coarrlbers are produced by the passage of protons.
In the exam::>le that has just been described, our scientist comes to believe
a certain physical statement and the very same statement plays a role in
explaining \'Vhy the scientist acquires that belief. Harman contr~·sts this case
w;th the case of someone who comes to have a particular moral conviction.77
He invites us to imagine an individual who sees a group of children pour
gasoline over a cat and set the animal ablaze. Upon viewing this scene, the
observer immediately thinks, "Those children just did something that was
morally reprehensible."
Let us call the observer in this hypothet:cal scenario "Arthur". If we try
to explain why Arthur comes to th;nk that the childr~n have just dona
something morally reprehensible, we will n&turally refer to the fact that the
children poured gasoline over the cat and put a match to the animal. After
all, it was seeing them do this that prorr,pted Arthur to make a mural appraisal
of what they' did. Furthermore, our explanation will contain certain statements
77 I bid., pp. 7 - 9.
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about Arthur's psychological set. We might propose, for example, that he has
internalized certain more or less well articulated moral principles which he
unconsciously refers to wilen he sees what the children are doing to the cat.
A more extensive account of the matter might explain that the moral principles
that Arthur unconsciously employs in arriving at his moral assessment were
internalized through a process of socialization.
What is noteworthy about the sort of explanation that has just been
sketched is that it does not propose that the children did anything that really
was morally reprehensible. As Harman points out, this suggests an important
difference between ethical convictions and scientific beliefs. 78 In explaining
the phy~icist's belief that a proton has just passed through the cloud chamber,
we hypothesize that a proton has passed through the chamber. This fact
accounts for the vapor trail that the physicist observes. On the other hand,
the hypothesis that it was morally reprehensible for the children to set fire to
the cat does not seem to have any place in an explanation of why Arthur
came to think that it was morally reprehensible. Indeed, no moral hypothesis
seems to be helpful in explaining Arthur's belief.
But what if the children perversely set fire to the cat just because it was
morally wrong to do such a thing? If that was why they put a 'match to the
poor animal, then perhaps a moral hypothesis does play a useful role in
explaining Arthur's conviction that the children did something reprehe"sible.
Or,e rrJight propose that, prior to what the children did, it was the case that it
would be morally wrong for them to set the cat on fire. The children
perceived this and just happened to be in the mood to do something morally
wrong. So, they torched the cat. Arthur saw them do this and unconsciously
78/dem.
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submitted a description o~ what he saw t.o his internalized morality. Since
under that description the chlldren'~ act violated the rules of this morality, he
judged that the children had done something mor311y reprehensible.
Harman considers an account of the sort that I have just outl ined, but
concludes that the moral hypothesis that it contains doesn't really have any
explanatory value:
What explains the children's act is not clearly the actual
wrongness of the act but, rather, their belief that the act is
wrong. The actual rightness or wrongness of their act seems to
have npthing to do with why they do it. 79
Moreover, Harman thinks that, just as the hypothesis that the children's act
really was morally reprehensible seems to contribute nothing to our
explanation of why someone came to believe that the act was morally
reprehensible, no moral hypothesis seems really to help us account for
anyone's beliefs about anything. From this and the apparent irreducibility of
moral hypotheses to statements that really do help us to explain people's
beliefs, he concludes that we appear to have no reason to think that there are
any moral facts at all - that is, no reason to think that any moral statements
are correct.
If we call a proposition P "belief-explanatory" just in case the supposition
that P is true helps to explain why someone comes to have certain of his
beliefs, we can give the following summary of Harman's skeptical argument :
(A)
1. Unless some proposition P of kind K is e!ther (a)
belief-explanatory or (b) rGducible to a belief-
79, bid., p. 9.
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explPlnatory proposition, we are not justified in
thinking that any proposition of k!nd K states a fact
(i.e. is correct).
2. No moral proposition is either belief-explanatory or
reducible to a belief-explanatory proposition.
3. Therefore, we are not j'Jstified in thinking that any
moral proposition states a fact O.e. is correct).
15.2. Statements about Grammaticallty: Explanatory Utility
At this point it is worth noting that moral statements are not the only
ones that seem to play no useful role in the explanation of why people think
what they think. In particular, so far as explanatory utility is concerned,
statements about the grammaticality or ungrammaticality of certain strings of
words appear to be on all fours with moral statements. This similarity is best
displayed by means of an example which parallels the case that Harman uses
to illustrate why moral statements seem not really to make any contribution
to the explanation of people's beliefs. Thus, let us suppose that we hear
someone utter the following string of English words:
(1) What bill did you appreciate the fact that Reagan signed?
And let us imagine that, upon hearing this utterance, we think, "That's
ungrammatical." Will an explanation of why we think this involve any use of
the claim that (1) is really ungrammatical? In other words, will the hypothesis
that (1) is ungrammatical help us to explain why we think that it is
ungrammCltical? No more or less, I think, than an appeal to the moral
reprehensibility of the children's setting the cat on fire helped us to explain
why that act was immediately judged to be morally reprehensible by the
person who observed it. In accounting for our grammaticality judgment we
will obviously appeal to our psychological set. It seems p'ausible to say that
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we believe (1) to be ungrammatical because 0) we have internalized certain
rules of grarr,mar which we unconsciously appeal to when we process language
and (ij) (1) does not accord with those rules. Here the role played by
internalized grammatical rules is precisely parallel to the role played by
internalized ethical principles in explanations of our intuitive moral
observations.
Of course, even if (1) does accord with our intefnalized rules of grammar,
we still might never come to make an intuitive judgment about its
grammaticality. The fact that we do make such a judgment is obviously a
result of someone's having uttered that string and our having heard him do so.
Thus by stating that someone has uttered (1) we help to explain why we come
to think that (1) is ungrammatical.
In the explanation that I have been describing, the hypothesis that (1)
really is ungrammatical does not appear at all. However, one might propose
that it would make an appearance if we extended the explanation ,~ith an
account of why (1) was uttered. Now, in some such extensions it is clear that
the ungrammaticaJity of (1) would play no role whatever. For example, if a
performance error were involved in the production of (1L we would not say
that it was uttered because it was ungrammatical. Rather, we would say that it
was produced in spite of the fact that it does not ilccord w;th the speaker's
internalized grammar. But perhaps the utterance of (1) that we hear is not the
result of any performance error. Perhaps this utterance is produced by a
linguistics professor who wants to give an example of a particular type of
ungrammatical string (namely, one that violates John Robert Ross's Complex
Noun Phrase Constraint). In this situation, it might be said, the speaker utters
(1) because it is ungrammatical. ~~owever, to explain the professor's utterance
in this way is exactly analogous to explaining why the children set the cat on
I I.;)
fire by appealing to the moral reprehensibility of that act (and the fact that
the children simply wanted to do something that was morally reprehensible).
Thus, if Harman is correct in suggesting that the children's act is really just
explained by their bel ief that it would be wrong to set the cat on fire and not
by the actual wrongness of that act, we should likewise say that the
professor's utterance is explained by his belief that (1) is ungrammatical and
not by the actual ungrammaticality of (1).
The foregoing considerations suggest that whenever we jUdge a string of
words to be ungrammatical, we can fully explain the jUdgment without claiming
that the string in question really is ungrammatical. But if this is so, then it is
difficult to see why any of our beliefs are explained by statements about the
grammaticality of particular strings of words.
5.3. Statements about Grammaticality: Irreducibility
Furthermore, it can be argued that grammaticality claims are not reducible
to belief-explanatory propositions. Ona such argument runs as follows:
(B)
1. A proposition P is reducible to a proposition a only if
there is no metaphysically possible circumstance in
which P and Q differ in truth-value.
2. For any proposition P that makes a grammaticality claim
and any belief-explanatory proposition a, there is a
metaphysically possible circumstance in which P and Q
differ in truth-value.
3. Therefore, no proposition that makes a grammaticality
claim can be reduced to a belief-explanatory proposition.
On the assumption that the "metaphysical" conception of reducibility that
is formulated in (B)'s first premise is plausible, the issue of whether
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propositions which make grammaticality claims can be reduced to propositions
that are belief-explanatory turns on the truth-value of (B.2). And, in order to
defend (B.2) (thereby opposing the reduction of grammaticality statements to
propositions that are belief-explanatory) one might advance the following
argument:
(C)
1. If (B.2) isn't true, then ttiere is a sentence .!! such that
(a) .!!. is a completion of (F) :
(F) For any word-string! and any language
L, ! is grammatical in L if, and only if,
5, ;
(b) a is a necessary truth ; and
(c) we state a belief-explanatory proposition
when we assert the right-hand side of some
instance of .!!..
2. For any sentence !!, if !! is a completion of (F) and we
state a belief-explanatory proposition when we assert
the right-hand side of some instance of .!!., !! is riot a
necessary truth.
3. Hence, (B.2) is true.
The first premise of this argument seems to me to be quite reasonable.
And, though the second premise makes quite a strong claim, the claim that it
makes is a difficult one to refute. We can see why this is so by examining
sentences (2) and (3) :
(2) For any word-string! and any language L, §. is grammatical
in L if, and only if, ! normally doesn't sound odd to
native speakers of L.
(3) For any word-string! and any language L, ! is grammatical
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in L if, and only if, ~ is assigned a structural description
by the system of grammatical rules that has been
internalized by all native speakers of L.
(2) and (3) are cornpletions of (F) that have a fair amount of initial
plausibility. Moreover, we state belief-explanatory propositions by asserting
the right-hand sides of certain instances of (2) and (3). This being the case, if
the initial plausibility of either (2) or (3) turned out to be a genuine sign of
that sentence's necessary truth, the second premise of (C) would be fal~e.
And, if that premise were false, we would be left without any justification for
(B.2), a cr'Jcial statement in my argument against the reduciblity of
grammaticality claims to propositions that are belief-explanatory_ Indeed, if
the second premise in (C) were false, i ( is clear that (B.2) would also be false.
Happily (for me, at any rate), (2) and (3) can be shown not to be necessary
--truths. Hence, two potential counterexamples to the second premise in (C) fall
by the wayside. Furthermore, by eliminating these potential cOllnterexamples, I
believe that we place the burden of proof on those who think that (C)'s second
premise is false. For if this premis~ were false, there would have to be some
sentence .!! such that
(a) .!. is a completion of (F),
(b) .!. is a necessary trutn, and
(c) we state a belief-explanatory proposition by asserting the
right-hand side of some instance of !!_
But of all sentences that satisfy (a) and (c), none appears more likely to
satisfy (b) than (2) or (3). So, by showing that (2) and (3) are not necessary
truths, we provide substantial confirmation for the second premise in argument
(C). Indeed, we are justified in believing this premise until someone proves
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that there is a sentence satisfying (a) and (c) which does not fall prey to the
sorts of considerations which undermine the necessity of (2) and (3). And,
until someone proves this, no one is justified in holding that (C)'s second
premise is false.
Before I go one to show that (2) and (3) are not necessary truths, I would
like to pause for a moment to explain why (2) and (3) satisfy condition (c)--Le.
why we state belief-explanatory propositions when we assert the right-hand
sides of certain instances of (2) and (3). It seems appropriate to take the time
to explain this because, if (2) and (3) didn't satisfy (c), that fact alone would
be sufficient to falsify the claim that one of these sentences is a genuine
counterexample to the second premise of argument (C).
In order to verify that (2) and (3) really do satisfy condition (c), let us
consider the following sentence
(4) The house needs scraped and painted.
To me, (4) sounds rather odd. However, my friend Loretta believes that (4)
isn't the least bit odd-sounding. Why does she believe this ? Well, the most
obvious explanation is that (i) she is aware of the way (4) sounds to her, and
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(ij) (4) doesn't sound odd to her.SO If a somewhat more substantial
explanation is desired, we can go on to point out that (iii) Loretta is a native
speaker of "Pittsburghese" and (iv) (4) normally doesn't sound odd to native
speakers of Pittsburghese. Furthermore, we might propose that (4) normally
doesn't sound odd to native speakers of Pittsburghese because (4) is assigned
a structural description by the system of grammatical rules that has been
internalized by all native speakers of Pittsburghese.
In this extended explanation ~f why Loretta believes that (4) is not an o1d-
sounding string, there is both a proposition that we would state if we asserted
sentence (5) and a proposition that we would state if we asserted sentence
(6) :
(5) (4) normally doesn't sound odd to native speakers of
Pittsburghese.
(6) (4) is assigned a structural description by the system of
grammatical rules that has been internalized by all native
speakers of Pittsburghese.
SOThe reader may feel that this explanation utterly trivial, almost not any
explanation at all. However, it is worth bearing in mind that many of our
other explanations are no less trivial. Thus to explain why someone believes
that he's not in pain, we might just point out that he isn't in pain.
So far as I can tell, statements about whether or nor a person is in pain
play a role in explanation that is analogous to the role played by statements
about whether or not a particular string sounds odd to someone. If the role
of the one is trivial, then so is the role of the other. And if someone thinks
that statements of J1either kind really have any utilit'/ when it comes to
explaining beliefs, he should maintain either that they can be reduced to
propositions that are genuinely useful in explaining beliefs or that Harman is
mistaken when he says that a claim is justified only if it either helps to
explain why people think what they think or is reducible to statements which
play a useful role in such explanations. For it is obv;ously absurd to claim
that we are never justified in thinking that certain strings of words sound odd
to us or in thinking that we are sometimes not in pain.
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Thus, the propositions that we state by asserting these sentences are belief-
explanatory. Moreover, (5) is the right-hand side of an instance of (2), and (6)
is the right-hand side of an instance of (3). Consequently, (2) and (3) both
satisfy condition (c) :
(c) we state a belief-explanatory proposition by asserting the
right-hand side of some completion of .!..
Given this conclusion (and the fact that (2) and (3) are obviously
completions of schema (F)), we can confidently assert that if either (2) or (3)
were a necessary truth, it would constitute a counterexample to the second
premise of argument (Cj. However, I have already noted that (2) and (3) are
not necessary truths. While (2) may seem to be a fairly plausible
generalization, it is a good deal less than necessarily true. In fact, (2) isn't
even actually true. As numerous generative linguists have noted, there are
many grammatical English sentences that sound odd to native speakers of
English. Consider, for example, the following string of English words :
(7) The man who the boy who the students recognized pointed
out is a friend of mine.
Here we have a string that is unquestionably odd-sounding. However, Noam
Chomsky has convincingly argued that (7) is a grammatical sentence of English
that only sounds odd to us because of certain very general constraints on
human memory.a1 In (8) we have another cass of a grammatical but odd-
sounding English sentence:
(8) The horse raced past the barn fell.
8'Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, .,p. 10-15.
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In general, speakers of English are unable to coherently parse this string until
they are presented with a structurally similar sentence that can be used as a
sort of parsing template. For example, (8) does not seem nearly so strange if
we think of it as synonymous with
(9) the horse that was raced past the barn fell
and as analogous to
(10) The man arrested for the crime committed suicide.
The fact that (8) is structurally similar to such grammatical sentences as (9)
and (10) and that we can eventually learn how to interpret (8) suggests that the
string is reall")' grammatical and that its initial strangeness results from some
standard, though overridable, routine in our parsing procedure. Indeed, this is
just what linguists propose. When· we try to process (8), our standard parsing
heuristics lead us to interpret
(1 1) the horse raced past the barn
as an active sentence. But so long as we give this interpretation to the
occurrence of (11) in (8), the grammatical rules of our language cannot assign a
coherent structure to (8). As Lyn Frazier puts it, our ordinary parsing
heuristics "lend us down the garden path".82 Only when we override these
standard rules and interpret the occurrence of (11) in (8) as a noun phrase are
we able to assign (8) a coherent structural description.
The examples that I have just discussed show very clearly that both of the
following sentences are false:
82Lyn Frazier, On Comprehending Sentences: Syntactic Parsing Strategies.
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(12) (7) is grammatical in English if, and only if, (7) normally
doesn't sound odd to native speakers of English.
(13) (8) is grammatical in English if, and only if, (8) normally
doesn't sound odd to native speakers of English.
But (12) and (13) are instances of (2)
(2) For any word-string ~ and any language L, ~ is grammatical
in L if, and only if, ! normally ~oesn't sound odd to
native speakers of L.
It therefore follows that (2) is false. And, since it is false, it plainly is not a
necessary truth. Consequently, (2) is not a genuine counterexample to the
second premise of argument (C).
While (2) is unquestionably falsified by the data I have cited, none of that
data disconfirms the claim that the following sentence is a necessary truth :
(3) For any word-string! and any language L, §. is grammatical
in L if, and only if, ! is assigned a structural descript!()n
by the system of grammatical rules that has been
internalized by all native speakers of L.
Nevertheless, we can establish that (3) is not a necessary truth. To do so, we
need only describe a metaphysically possible circumstance in which (3) is
false. Thus, let us imagine a situation in which strings of a particular kind K
are regularly produced and understood by most speakers of a language L
(including the socially privileged speakers 0·: L). Imagine further, though, that
the native speakers of L who come from a certain geographic region R do not
standardly produce strings of kind K, can only hazard a guess as to their
meaning, and uniformly consider them to be awkwarj-sounding. These facts
about speakers of L might be best explained by hypothesizing that the
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grammatical rules internalized by most L-speakers assign a structural
description to strings of kind K, whereas the rules internalized by L-speakers
who come from region R do not ass:gn a structural description to strings of
that kind. But in that case K-strings ara not assigned a structural description
by the system of grammatical rules that has been internalized by all native
speakers of L; for th~re simply is no system of rules (let alone a unique one)
that every speaker of L has interr.alized. On the other hand, since most
speakers of L (and, in particular, the ones who are socially privileged) have
internalized a grammar that assigns a structural description to K-strings, it
seems eminently plausible to call such strings grammatical sentences of L. We
thus have a situation in which certain grammatical sentences of a language are
not assigned a structural description by any system of rules that is
internalized by all speakers of that language. And since this situation does
not appear to be plagued by any sort of hlcoherence, we may conclude that
(3) is not a necessary truth.
Although this conclusion is sufficient to show that (3) is not a genuine
countereJ<ample to thi! second premise 'Jf argument (C), I think that we can
easily argue that (3) is false. A natural language such as English comprises
many dialects and millions of idiolets. But tor any two idiolects ~ and y, the
system of grammatical rules wtlich generates structural descriptions for all ~nd
only those sentences that are well-formed in ~ is distinct from the system of
grammatical rule~ which generates structural descriptions for all and only those
sentences that are well-formed in Y... This being the case, there won't be any
single system of grammatical rules which has been internalized by all native
speakers of English. But it follows from (3) that there aren't any grammatical
English sentences unless all native speakers of English have internalized the
very' same system of grammatical rules. Therefore, if (3) were true, theta
wouldn't be any grammatical English sentences. Yet we all know full 'Nell that
(14) is grammatical in English:
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(14) Aardvarks like to eat ants and termites.
Consequently, (3) i~ false.
5.4. Why HarMan's Skeptical Argument is Unsound
Th'Jugh thts connection may not be readily apparent, all of the argume~ts I
have been presenting about sentences ,2) and (3) are related to Harman's
argument in support of moral skepticism. According to this argument, we
aren't justified in believing that thera are any moral facts L ,cause moral
propositions are neither belief-explanatory nor reducible to ...,ropositions that
are belief-explanatory. In section (7.2), ;:>o;nted out that statements about
grammaticalily c.:on't appear to be any more belief-explanatory than moral
propositions. Thus if we simply apply Harman's skeptical reasor.jng about
ethics to the domain 'f grammar, we reach the conclusion that we aren't
justified in believing that therr'\ are any grammetical fact$ unless we can
reduce statements about grammaticallty to propositions that are clearly belief-
explanatory. But the rBasoning that I s~t out in section (7.3) strongly suggests
that such t reduction is not P038ible. Roughlv speaking, the argument against
reducib;!ity runa 18 follows :
(0)
1. Statements about grammat'cality can be
belief-explanatory propolitionl only If
sentence ~ such that
(a) .! it a completion of
reduced to
there is a
(F) For Iny word"string ! and any Il:-,uage
L, ! is orlmma!tcil in L If, end only if,
S1 ;
(b) .! is a necessary truth and
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(c.} we state a belief-axplanatory proposition
when we assert the right-hand side of some
instance of a.
2. For any sentence !!.. if ~ is a completion of (F) and we
state a belief-explanatory proposition when we assert
the right-hand side of some instance of ~, !! is not a
necessary truth.
3. Therefore, statements about grammaticality cannot be
reduced to belief-explanatory propositions.
As we saw, the second premise in this argument (which ;s identical to the
second premise in argument (C)) can be confirmt:ld by showing that sentences
(2) and (3) are not necessary trutns. Moreover, the fact that we could actually
establish that (2) and (3) are false suggests that statements about
grammaticality couldn't b~ reduced to belief-explanatory propositions even if
we replac~d cleuse (b) in (0.1) with
(b. 1) 1!. is true.
If we cannot reduce :;tatements about grammaticality to belief-explanatory
propositions, then the re&soning that Harman smployed in arguing for moral
skepticism would lead us to the conclusion that we have no justification for
believing that there are any grammatical facts. But we clearly are justified in
believing that there are grammatical facts. To be so justified it is sufficient
that we be warranted in believing that certain strings are grammatical
sentences of English. Thus, given that we are entirely warranted in thinking
that (14) is a grammat!caf sentence of English, we are perfectly justified in
believi"9 that there are grammatical facts.
Because we are justified in believing that there are grammatical facts, one
or the other of two things must be the case. Either there is an as yet
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undiscovered way to reduce statements about grammaticaJity to belief-
explanatory propositions (and the merc existence of this method of reduction
justifies us in believing that there are grammatic~! facts). Or, conti"ary to what
Harman suggests, we can be justified in believing that there are facts of a
given kind K, in spite of the fact that propositions of kind K are neither
belief-explanatory nor reducible to propositions that are belief-explanatory.
Of these two alternatives, the latter is clearly preferable. For it is
virtualiy impossible to see how the existence of an undiscovered method of
reduction could justify us in believing anything. But once we reach the
conclusion that we can be justified in believing that there are facts of a given
kind even though no propositions of that kind are either belief-explanatory or
reducible to prvpositions that are belief-explanatory, we must also conclude
that Harman's skeptica' argument is unsound.
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CHAPTER 6
HARMAN'S ARGUMENT FOR MORAL RELATIVISM
Although Harman himself ultimately rejects moral skepticism, his grounds
for doing so are rather different from those that I advanced in the preceding
chapter.83 Moreover, whereas -I have decidedly absolutist leani·ngs; -Harman has
embraced a version of moral relativism. In this chapter, I consider an
argument that he has presented in support of relativism. Briefly stated,
Ha~inan maintains that his relativistic theory of morality helps us to explain
certain facts about the use of ethical sentences that cannot be adequately
accounted for by moral absolutists. In the following section of this chapter, I
review a few salient features of Harman's relativism and state the particular
facts that Harman wants to explain. then present both his relativistic
explanation of these facts and his reasons for claiming that moral absolutists
cannot provide a satisfactory account of them. In section (6.2), I evaluate
David Lyons' attempt to provide an acceptable absolutist explanation of
Harman's facts. Although argue that all of Lyons' explanations are
unsatisfactory, I do not conclude that Harman is right in contending that his
data can't be reconciled with moral absolutism. Instead I show (in section
(6.3)) that Harman himself has presented, and unjustifiably rejected, a perfectly
good absolutist explanation of his data. In the last section, I identify several
flaws in Harman's relativistic explanation and suggest that it is this account,
not the absolutist one, which should be rejected.
83Harman, The Nature of Morality, pp. 131 - 132.
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6. 1. Harmanls Basic Arguments
As I noted in Chapter 1, Harman's version of moral relativism may be
interpreted as the conjunction of statements (I) - (( II)
I. Sentence schemas (f ,) - (f 9) are true :
(f 7) If N
z
says that it would be morally right of
N, to VP, , then, in saying thiS, N2 is
(a) presupposing that the moral
conventions that N 1 intends to adhere
to are the same as those that N2
intends to adhere to, and
(b) stating that, given the moral
conventions that N, intends to adhere
to, it would be reasonable for N, to
VP1 ·
(f8) If N2 says that it would be morally wrong
of N 1 to VP 1 ' then, in saying this, N2 is
(a) presupposing t~t ~t the moral
conventions that N, intends to adhere
to are the same as those that N2
intends to adhe'·e to, and
(b) stating that, given the moral
conventions that N, intends to adhere
to, it would be unreasonable for N, (0
VP1 •
(fg) If N2 says that N, ought morally to VP 1 '
then, in saying thi~, N2 is
(a) presupposing that the moral
conventions that N, intends to adhere
to are the same as those that N2
intends to adhere to, and
(b) stating that, given the moral
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conventions that N, intends to adhere
to, it would be unreasonable for N, not
to VP, .
II. The following sentence schema is true:
(f,O) If N1 would VPz by VP,-ing, the fact that N,
would VP2 by VP ,-ing is a moral reason for
N, (not) to VP 1 if, and only if, by VP2-ing,
N, would promote N,'s (non)comptiance with
some moral convention that N, intends to
adhere to.
III. Not everyone intends to adhere to the same moral
conventions.
Given this theory, if I were to say that
(1) Jones ought morally to get someone to feed her cat while
she is out of town,
I would presuppose (i) and state (ji)
0) The moral conventions that Jones intends to adhere to are
the same as those that I intend to adhere to .
(in Given the moral conventions that Jones intends to adhere
to, it would be unreasonc-ble for him not to get someone
to feed her cat while she is away.
Since not every()ne intends to adhere to the S3me conventions, it is possible
that what presuppose when I assert (1) is false. If it is, and I know that it
is, it would be a misuse of language for me to assert (1).
The specific argument that Harman advances against moral absolutism is
based on the fact that if any of us VJere to assert either of the foll0wing
statetnents, our assertion would sound odd, somehow "too weak":
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(2) Hitler ought morally not to have ordered the extermination
of the Jews.
(3) It was morally wrong of Hitler to have ordered the
extermination of the Jews.84
According to Harman, if we were to assert either (2) or ~3), we would be
implying
.•. that Hitler had a reason (every reason in the world) not to do
what he did. But what is horrible about someone who did what
he did is that he could not have had such a reason. If he was
willing to exterminate a whole people, there was no reason for
him not to do so: th~t is just what is so terrible about him.
That is why it sounds too weak to say that it was wrong of him
to do what he did. It sug~ests that he had a reason not to act
as he did and we teel that any man who could have done what
Hitler did must bfl the sort of man who would not have had a
reason not to do it•
. • . Hitler is outside our morality.•.. [Were we to assert ~~) or
(3), wa] wculd imply that he was someone who acknow:edged the
moral stand3rds we use to judge him. To say, "It was wrrJng of
nitler" or "Hitler ought morally not to have done it" would inlply
that Hitler accepted the relevant moral conventions. But his
actions show that he does not accept those conventions. He is
therefore beyond the paie and an enemy of humanity.as
What makes [an assertion of (2) or (3)] odd, "too weak," is
that [Hitler] seelT'S beyond the pale -- in other words beyond the
motivational reach of the relevant moral considerations.S6
It is not easy tCi discern the precise structure of the argument that Harman
84Harman, "Moral Relativism Defe.,ded." p. 7 ; The Nature of Moral ity, p. '07.
85Harman, The Nature of .Morality, pp. 108 - 109.
8SHarman, "Moral Relativism Defended," p. 8.
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is stating in the foregoing passages. As best I can determine, his reasoning
runs roughly as follows:
1. We know that Hitler ordered the extermination of the Jews.
2. Moreover, we recognize that anyone who was capable of
doing that would not have had any moral reason not to do
it.
3. But anyone who intended to adhere to the moral
conventions that we intend to adhere to would have had a
moral reason not to order the extermination of the Jews.
4. Furthermore, if we Viere to say either that Hitler ought
morally not to have ordered the extermination of the Jews
or that it was morally wrong of him to have done this, we
would presuppose thFtt he intended tv adhere to the moral
conventions that we intend to adhere to.
5. The following sentence schema is true:
If we know that N, VP ,-ed and we recognize
that anyone \Nho was capable of VP 1-iJ1g
could not have had any moral reason not to
VP" it would sound "too weak" to us to
say either that N1 ouqht morally not to have
'/P 1-ed or that it was morally wrong of N1
to have VP 1-ed if
(0 anyone who intended to adhere to the
moral ~onventi')ns that we intend to
adhere to would have had a moral
reason not to VP l' and
(ii) we would presuppose that N1 i"tended
to adhere to the moral conventions
that we intend to adhere to if we were
to say either that N1 ought morally not
have VP 1-ed or that it was morally
wrong of N1 to have VP ,-ed.
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6. Therefore, it would sound "too weak" to us to say either
that
(2) Hieler ought morally not to have ordered the
extermination of the Jews,
or that
(3) It was morally wrong of Hitler to have
ordered the ex ~ermination of the JE:;WS.
As Harman recognizes, the foregoing explanation is not one that a moral
absolutist could happily embrace. Insofar as the explanation assumes that all
of an individual's moral reasons stem from the particular conventions that he
intends to adhere to, it conflicts with absolutism's commitment to the
existence of categorical moral reasons. Thus, if absolutism is correct, there
must be some alternative account of why it would sound odd to assert either
What Harman seems to want to argue is that absolutism is
incompatible with any satisfactory account of why such remarks ,,,..auld sound
odd. However, he does not provide us with a proof that this is so. Instead,
he argues against the adequacy of a particular explanation that doesn't violate
the tenets of moral absolutism. Of course, one need not put much of a dent
in a theory T by demonstrating the inadequacy of a particular explanation that
is compatible with T. After all, even if the explDnation in question is not an
adequate account of the phenomenon that it purports to explain, there may
well be alternative accounts of that phenomenon that are both reasonable and
compatible with T. Thus, if an inadequacy in the particular explanation that
Harman examines :s to cast serious doubt on the acceptability of mcral
absolutism, there must be good reason to think that if the explanation in
question is deficient, there is no satisfactory alternative that respects the
tenets of absoluti~m. Harman apparently believes that there is good reason to
think this because
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(a) his own explanation of why it would sound odd to assert
(2) or (3) is incompatible with absolutism, and
(b) the alternative explanation that he criticizes is the most
pldusible absolutist account87 of the phenomenon that he
has been able to construct.
Given this brief description of Harman's case against moral absolutism, it
is evident that any of the following three strategies might be adoptAd ~y a
qefender of absolutism:
0) Criticize Harman's o\lvn relativistic explanation of ""hy it
would sound odd to assert (2) or (3).
(ii) Arguf\ that Harman has not presented sound objections to
the absolutist explanation that he considers.
(iii) Present an account of why it would sound odd to assert
(2) or (3) that is compatibla with moral absolutism but
immune from the criticisms that Harman has advanced
against the absolutist explanation that he considers.
David Lyons adopts the last of these strategies in "Ethical Relativism and the
Problem of Incoherence". But, as I shall shortty argue, Lyons fails to provide
us with a fully satisfactory account of why it would sound odd to say either
that Hitler ought rl10rally not to have ordered the extermination of the Jews, or
that it was morally wrong of him to have ordered their extermination.
I myself will not pursue strategy (iii) at all. Instead I will follow courses
(;) dna (jO, However, before I begin my defense of rTloral absolutism, t must
87 1n the present ~ontext, the term "absolutist account" should be treated as
an abbreviation for "account that is compatible with moral absolutism," Thus,
by calling an account "absolutist," I don't mean to imply that it is
incompatible with mcral relativism.
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finish presenting Harman's indictment. Thus far I have only said that Harman
considers, and ultimately rejects, a particular absolutist account of why it·
would sound odd to assert (2) or (3); I have not yet indicated what that
account is or why Harman finds it inadequate.
The account that Harman deems unsatisfactory is one that appeals to the
magnitude of Hitler's moral transgression in order to explain the oddness in
assertions of (2) or (3). According to this account,
. . . it is the enormity of Hitler's crime against humanity that
makes such remarks seem too weak•... To say simply that it
was wrong of him to have ordered the extermination of the Jews
suggests that it was only wrong -- that it is wrong only in the
way in which murder is wrong. And, given what Hitler did, that
is as if one were to say that it was naLlghty of Hitler to have
ordered the extermination of the Jews.SS
Harman rejects this explanation because he believes that, even where
someone has committed a crime as enormous as Hitler'~ it may not sound odd
to say that it was morctlly wrong of the individual to have done what he did.
As Harman points out, Stalin was a mass murderer VJho ordered the purges of
the nineteen th:rties knowing that millions would be killed. HovJever, Harman
suggests that we might think of Stalin as someone WilO was really only trying
to do the right thing. In short, we might suppose that Stalin himself hated the
prospect of killing so many people, but believed that Lenin's revolution would
collapse unless its enemies were purged from Russian society. Harman goes
on to say that if we thought of Stann in this way but still disapproved of his
policies, it would be perfectly natural for us to make either of the following
claims:
88Harman, The Nature of Morality, p. 107.
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(4) Stalin ought morally not to have ordered the purges.
(5) It was morally wrong of Stalin to have ordered the
purges.Sg
According to Harman, remarks like these wouldn't sound odd to us even if we
fully realized the enormity of the crime that Stalin committed when he ordered
the purges. Thus, Harman concludes, it is not the enormity of an individual's
crime that determines whether it will sound odd to say that he ought morally
not to have comrrlitted that crime. In short, if it were the enorrnity of Hitler's
crime that rTlakes it odd to say that he ought morally not to have ordered the
extermination of the Jews, we would also expect it to be odd to say that
Stalin ought morally not to have ordered the purges. For just as Hitler's "final
solution" was responsible for millions of deaths, so were Stalin's purges.
However, since it need not be odd to say that Stalin ought morally not have
have ordered the purgf::!S, the enormity of Hitler's crime does not explain why
it would sound cdd to say that he ought morally not to have ordered the
exterminatfon of the Jews.
6.2. Lyons' Attempt to Explain Harman's Data
Although David Lvons has denied that Harman has made a ~onvincing case
against moral absolutism, he has not {to my knowledge) denied the cogency of
Harman's contention that the magnitude of Hitler's crime is not responsible for
the fact that it would sound odd to say either that
(2) Hitler ought morally not to have ordered the extermination
of the Jews,
or that
a9/bid., pp. 107 - 108.
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(3) It was morally wrong of Hitler to have ordered the
extermination of tne Jews.
Instead of arguing that the ·oddness of such remarks really can be explained
by citing the enormity of Hitler's crime, Lyons suggests that an absolutist can
account for the relevant data in other ways. In particular, Lyons claims that
. . • the data assumed by Harman [can] . . . be accounted for . .
by refer[ring] to our substantive convictions about the
pointlessness of advising a oarson when we cannot influence him
and, more generally, the unfairness of judging a person ... by
standards other than his own90
However, the factors that Lyons cites cannot explain all of Harman's data.
Most notably, they can't explain why it would sound odd to assert (2) or (3).
Consider the matter of pointless advice. I agree with Lyons that it would be
odd for us to try to influence someone by means that are certain not to
produce the effect that we desire. To take a case in point, we a!1 know that
Hitler believed the Jews to be a blight upon the human race. He thought that
. they were inherently. corrupt and that they therefore had to be exterrninated in
order to protect the well-being of society. In light of the fact that Hitter had
such beliefs, it is clear that one could not have dissuaded him from
implementing his "final solution" by telling him that it would be morally
wrong of him to pursue such a monstrous policy. To have thus attempted to
influence Hitler would have been pointless. And, given the obvious
pointlessness of trying to influence him in this way, it would have been odd
for anyone to have chosen such an approach. In general, where it is certain
that an agent wouldn't be moved by a particular appeal to mr>rality, it would
90Lyons, "Ethical Relativism and the Problem of Incoherenc.e," pp. 223 -
224.
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be odd to make that appeal in order to influence him. This explains why it
would have been odd for someone to have tried to get Hitler not to order the
extermination of the Jews by telling him that it would be morally wrong to
issue such an order.
However, since we all know that Hitler has been dead for over 35 years, it
is plain that we wouldn't be trying to influence his decision if we said either
that
(2) Hitler ought morally not to have ordered the extermination
of the Jews,
or that
(3) It was morally wrong of Hitler to have ordered the
extermination of the Jews.
But if we wouldn't even be trying to influence Hitler by saying these things,
then in saying them, we clearly wouldn't be making a pointless attempt to
influence him. Consequently, the oddness of asserting (2) or (3) can't be due
to the fact that such assertions would constitute pointless attempts to
influence Hitler. Would t~ey then be pointless attempts to influence someone
other than Hitler? I see no reason to think so. After all, it is perfectly
normal to make moral claims without intending to influence anyone.
Furthermore, even if we did intend to influence someone's decision by
asserting (2) or (3), there is no particular reason to suppose that this attempt
would be pointless. Whether it would be pointless depends both on the
people we would be trying to influence and on the effect we would be trying
to produce in ~hoge people. Since we don't know either of these variables,
there is no justification for the claim that we would be engaged in pointless
advice-giving if we asserted (2) or (3).
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A further point should also be mentioned. Harman does not merely say
that it would be odd for us to assert (2) or (3); he says that such assertions
would sound "too weak." This is a particular sort of oddness, one that is
quite distinct from the oddness that attaches to pointless assertions. Thus,
even if we would be engaged in a pointless attempt to influence sameone's
decisions if we asserted (2) or (3), this pointlessness would not account for
the fact that our assertions would sound "too weak."
To sum matters up, an appeal to "the pointlessness 01~ advising a person
when we cannot influence him" does not explain why it would sound odd,
somehow "too weak," to say either that
(2) Hitler ought morally not to have ordered the extermination
of the Jews,
or that
(3) It was morally wrong of Hitler to have ordered the
extermination of the Jews.
For, in the first place, we might make either of these remarks without trying
to influence anyone. Secondly, even if we did try to influence someone by
asserting (2) or (3), there is no a priori basis for assuming that our attempt
would be pointless. Finally, even if our assertion of (2) or (3) would
constitute a pointless attempt to influence sameone's decisions, that
pointlessness 'Nouldn't explain why our assertion would sound "too weak."
Of course, Lyons hasn't claimed that all of Harman's data are to be
accounted for by appealing to the notion of pointlessness. He has indicated
that some of the data should be explained by referring to "the unfairness of
judging a person by standards other than his own." Thus, let us consider the
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proposal that it would sound odd for us to assert (2) or (3) because these
assertions would be based on standards that Hitler didn't subscribe to..
If this proposal were correct, one would expect any moral apprai~1J of
Hitler to sound odd if it is based on standards that Hitler didn't accept. But
this simply isn't the case. Even Harman admits that there is no oddness in
saying that Hitler was an evil man, a moral monster.. 91 Yet, in making such a
claim about Hitler, we are obviously judging him by standards that he didn't
subscribe to.
In short, we are judging Hitler by standards other than his own whether we
claim that he was evil or that it was morally wrong of him to have ordered
the extermination of the Jews. Thus, if the latter claim sounds odd because it
is based on standards that Hitler didn't subscribe to, the former claim should
also sound odd. Since it doesn't, the oddness of the latter claim does not
derive from the fact that it is based on standards that Hitler didn't accept.
It is worth mentioning one further consideration that defeats any attempt
to explain Harman's data by referring to the unfairness of judging someone by
standards other than his own. If it were unfair to judge someone by
standards that he doesn't subscribe to, one would expect that it would sound
too strong for us to say either that
(2) Hitler ought morally not to have ordered the extermination
of the Jews,
or that
(3) It was morally wrong of Hitler to have ordered the
extermination of the Jews.
9'Harman, "Moral Relativism Defended," p. 7 ; The Nature of Morality, p. 109.
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For we would be judging Hitler by standards other than his own if we made
either of these claims. However, it wouldn't sound at all too strong for us to
assert (2) or (3). As Harman tells us, these assertions would sound too weak.
Thus, far from explaining Harman's data, any unfairness in our assertions of (2)
or (3) would suggest that these data are false.
If the arguments that I have been presenting are sound they show that
Lyons has failed to provide a satisfactory account of why it would sound odd
for us to assert (2) or (3). The oddness of such assertions cannot be
explained by appealing to the pointlessness of trying to influence someone by
means that are certain not to produce the desired effect. Nor can their
oddness be accounted for by any appeal to the unfairness of judging an agent
by standards other than his own. Consequently, even if such appeals are open
to the moral absolutist, their availability doesn't show that absolutism is
compatible with a satisfactory explanation of the data that Harman cites in his
argument for moral relativism.
6.3. The Flaws in Harman's Argument Against Absolutism
Nevertheless, I am confident that Harman's data pose no real problems for
those with absolutist sympathies. To the extent that these data are valid, I
see no reason to think that they favor relativism over absolutism. Harman, of
course, thinks otherwise. He has argued that relativism provides a better
explanation of the data than absolutism. However, his argument is far from
compelling. In the first place, he does not present a convincing case against
the only absolutist explanation that he considers. Furthermore, his own
relativistic explanation is highly dubious.
Harman has told us that a moral absolutist might appeal to the enormity
of Hitler's crime against the Jews in order to explain why it would sound odd
for us to say either that
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(2) Hitler ought morally not to have ordered the extermination
of the .Jews,
or that
(3) It was morally wrong of Hitler to have ordered the
extermination of the Jews.
On this view such remarks would sound odd because the utter heinousness of
what Hitler did calls for even stronger condemnations. To only assert (2) or
(3) would be to indulge in a strange sort of understatement. It would be
rather like calling someone imprudent after one learns that she drinks and
smokes heavily in spite of being a diabetic who has had a recent brush with
cancer.
But Harman ultimately rejects this account of why it would sound odd for
us to assert (2) or (3). According to Harman, jf the magnitude of Hitler's crime
is what makes it odd to say that it VVdS wrong of him to have ordered the
extermination of the Jews, then it should always sound odd to say that it w~s
wrong of so-and-so to have done such-and-such when we know that so-and-so
committed an enormous crime by doing such-and-such.· However, Harman
claims, this is not the case. To support this claim, he points to the fact that
it could be perfectly natural for someone who is fUlly aware that millions
were murdered in Stalin's purges to assert either of the following statements:
(4) Stalin ought morally not to have ordered the purges.
(5) It was morally wrong of Stalin to h-ave ordered the purges.
Harman says that these statements wouldn't sound odd if they came from the
mouth of someone who disapproved of what Stalin did, but believed that
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Stalin himself dreaded the prospect of the purges and only ordered them to
avoid what he thought were even greater evils. Thus, Harman concludes, since
it needn't sound odd to assert (4) or (5) even when one recognizes the
enormous loss of life that Stalin caused, the enormity of Hitler's crime against
the Jews is not responsible for the fact that it would sound odd for us to
assert (2) or (3).
While there may appear to be some merit in what Harman is saying,
believe that this merit is merely apparent. As I shall now try to show, his
argument relies on an overly narrow interpretation of what determines a
crime's magnitude. Once one recognizes just how narrow this interpretation is,
the deficiencies in Harman's argument are readily apparent.
Harman correctly points out that Stalin committed an enormous crime
when he instituted the purges of the 1930's. However, Harman treats this
crime as if its enormity were purely a function of the number of people who
were liquidated in the purges.92 This is extremely misleading. If one views
Stalin merely as someone who was responsible for a vast amount of killing,
one overlooks many of the factors that made his crime so terrible. Indeed, if
Stalin had only been guilty of killing millions, his crime wouldn't have
compared to the crime that Hitler committed when he ordered the
extermination of the Jews. Hitler did much more than preside over the killing
of six million individuals; he terrorized his victims, humiliated them, and
robbed them of their self-respect; he tortured them, starved them, and herded
them about like animals. And though Hitler may have thought that his
treatment of the Jews was fully justified, no even vaguely plausible case can
be made in favor of the atrocities that he orchestrated. If one overlooks
92Harman, The Nature of Morality, pp. 107 - 108.
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many of these atrocities or fails to appreciate their utter lack of justification,
one simply doesn't recognize the full enormity of Hitler's crime against the
Jews. Similarly, if the crime that Stalin committed when he initiated the
purges is truly comparable to the crime that Hitler committed when he ordered
the extermination of the Jews, one doesn't appreciate just how awful Stalin's
crime was unless one recognizes both that he employed methods no less
horrible than Hitler's and that no serious moral argument can be offered in
support of his policies. But it is quite possible not to recognize these things
even when one is aware that Stalin ",,\las responsible for the liquidation of
millions of people who were (often unjustly) judged to be enemies of the
revolution.
Now then, Harman has tried to demonstrate that our recognition of the
enormity of Hitler's crime is not what makes it odd for us to assert the
following statements:
(2) Hitler ought morally not to have ordered the extermination
of the Jews.
(3) It was morally wrong of Hitler to have ordered the
extermination of the Jews.
Harman's argument is based on the contention that, even if we realized the
enormous number of people who were killed in Stalin's purges, it might be
perfectly natural for us to say either that
(4) Stalin ought morally not to have ordered the purges,
or that
(5) It was morally wrong of Stalin to have ordered the purges.
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But it should be clear from my remarks in the preceding paragragh that even if
Harman's contention is correct, it can't support the conclusion that he has
inferred from it. What Harman needs to show is that even though Stalin
committed a crime that is comparable in enormity to Hitler's crime against the
Jews, we could be fully aware of the enormity of what Stalin did and still
assert (4) or (5) without any oddness. However, have already pointed out
that if Stalin's crime was as awful (or nearly as awful) as Hitler's, a person
wouldn't appreciate its full magnitude if he were only aware that Stalin was
responsible for the killing of an enormous number of people. Someone who
only knew this might be able to assert (4) or (5) without any oddness. But
this hardly shows that there are circumstances in which it would sound
perfectly natural for someone to assert (4) or (5) when he knows the true
magnitude of Stalin's crime.
Indeed, if Stalin's crime actually rivalled Hitler's in enormity, I doubt that
there are any circumstances of this sort. Once we have recognized that
Stalin's purges were as inhumane and unjustified as Hitler's final solution, an
assertion of (4) or (5) sounds no less odd than an assertion of (2) or (3). To
merely say that Stalin ought morally not to have done what he did is to
understate the matter in the extreme. Furthermore, I don't believe that the
oddness of this remark is noticeably diminished if we think of Stalin as
someone who dreaded the prospect of the purges and only instituted them
because he was convinced that the revolution would collapse unless its
enemies were eradicated. After all, we're talking about a man whose policies
were genocidal, a man who sanctioned the use of monstrous methods to
stamp out the expression of every idea that he deemed unacceptable. Does it
really matter that Stalin may have thought that he was only trying to do the
right thing? I can imagine that Torquemada was only trying to do the right
thing when he had people tortured and burned at the stake in order tl') root out
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and destroy heresy in 15th century Spain. can even imagine that he
genuinely regretted having to use these methods in the pursuit of his goal.
But even V'/hen I imagine these things, I still find it odd to say only that
Torquemada ought morally not to have had people put on the rack and burned
alive. To say this is to make a statement that fails to reflect the full extent
of Torquemada's wrongdoing.
In general, if we know that N1 has committed an utterly heinous crime by
VP 1-ing, it is inappropriate to say only that N, ought morally not to have VP 1-
ad. Furthermore, the inappropriateness of such a remark is not mitigated by
the belief that N1 was just trying to do what he thought was right when he
VP1-ed. Of course, even if N1 has committed a thoroughly atrocious crime by
VP1-ing, we might not realize the full extent of the injury he has caused.
Alternatively, we might think that there were strong (though ultimately
inadequate) moral reasons for N1 to have VP1-ed. In either of these
circumstances it is possible that we wouldn't find it odd to say that N1 ought
morally not to have VP 1-ed. But in such circumstances we don't really
appreciate the full magnitude of the crime that N1 committed when he VP 1-ed.
When someone has violated the requirements of morality, the magnitude of
his crime is a function both of the injury he has brought about and of the
moral considerations that favor whCJt he has done. As I have indicated,
however, Harman completely ignores the latter factor when he discusses the
crimes of Hitler and Stalin. Furthermore, when he talks about injury, the only
thing he mentions is that Hitler and Stalin were both responsible for killing
millions of people. Thus, Harman incorrectly treats the magnitude of what
these men did as if it depended solely on the number of people that they
killed. What I have tried to show is that an important part of Harman's
argument against moral absolutism is invalidated by his overly narrow view of
lU4
wh~t determines the enormity of the crimes committed by Hitler and Stalin.
In short, Harman hasn't demonstrated any deficiency in the proposal that the
enormity of Hitler's crime is responsible for the fact that it would sound odd
for us to make either of the following claims:
(2) Hitler ought morally not to have ordered the extermination
of the Jews.
(3) It was morally wrong of Hitler to have ordered the
extermination of the Jews.
And, since this proposal is perfectly consistent with moral absolutism, Harman
hasn't given us any reason to doubt that absolutists can adequately explain
why it would sound odd for us to assert (2) or (3).
6.4. Objections to Harman's Explanation
On the other hand, there are good reasons for rejecting the relativistic
explanation that Harman has proposed. As I suggested in section (6.1),
Harman's account can be thought of as a six-step argument that runs as
follows:
1. We know that Hitler ordered the extermination of the Jews.
'2. Moreover, we recognize that anyone who was capable of
doing that would not have had any moral reason not to do
it.
3. But anyone who intended to adhere to the moral
conventions that we intend to adhere to would have had a
moral reason not to order the extermination of the Jews.
4. Furthermore, if we wer~ to say either that Hitler ought
morally not to have ordered the extermination of the Jews
or that it was morally wrong of him to have done this, we
would presuppose that he intended to adhere to the moral
conventions that we intend to adhere to.
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5. The following sentence schema is true :
If we know that N1 VP ,-ed and we recognize
that anyone who was capable of VP ,-ing
could not have had any moral reason not to
VP l' it would sound "too weak" to us to
say either that N1 ought morally not to have
VP1-ed or that it was morally wrong of N,
to have VP ,-ed if
0) anyone who intended to adhere to the
moral conventions that we intend to
adhere to would have had a moral
reason not to VP l' and
on we would presuppose that N1 intended
to adhere to the moral conventions
that we intend to adhere to if we were
to say either that N1 ought morally not
have VP 1-ed or that it was morally
wrong of N, to have VP ,-ed.
6. Therefore, it would sound "too weak" to us to say either
that
(2) Hitler ought morally not to have ordered the
extermination of the Jews,
or that
(3) It was morally wrong of Hitler to have
ordered the extermination of the Jews.
One problem with this explanation is that it implies that we would be making
a false presupposition if we were to assert either (2) or (3). From steps 1 and
2 in the explanation, it follows that Hitler hat1 no mo(al reason not to order
the extermination of the Jews. Furthermore, step 3 claims that anyone who
accepted the same moral conventions that we accept would have had a moral
reason not to order the extermination of the Jews. Thus, it is a consequence
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of steps , - 3 that Hitler didn't accept the same moral conventions that we
accept. According to step 4, though, we would presuppose that Hitler ·did
accept the same moral conventions that we accept if we were to assert either
(2) or (3). it therefore follows from Harman's explanation that we \NQuld be
presupposing something false if we asserted either of those sentences.
However, I don't see any reason for thinking that we would make a false
presupposition if we said either that Hitler ought morally not to have ordered
the extermination of the Jews or that it was morally wrong of Hitler to have
done this. In fact, these statements seem to me to be perfectly true. They
resemble the claim that we would make by asserting (6):
(6) Hitler wasn't as good a person as Ghandi.
Given that Hitler was an inhumane monster while Ghandi was almost a saint,
this claim is a gross understatement of the Fuhrer's moral deficiencies; it
sounds too weak in the same way that an assertion of (2) or (3) sounds too
weak. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Hitler wasn't as good a person as
Ghandi.
Since (2) and (3) seem so similar to (6), there is a strong prima facie case
against Harman's account of why it would sound odd for us to assert either of
the former sentences. Unlike this account, the absolutist explanation that I
defended in section (6.3) does not imply that we would be saying something
false if we asserted (2) or (3). Thus, other things being equal, the absolutist
explanation is preferable to the account that Harman favors. Of course,
Harman does not think that other things are equal. But we have seen that his
argument against the absolutist account is unsound; that is, he fails to show
that there are any real deficiencies in the view that our recognition of the
enormity of Hitler's crime is what makes it sound odd for us to assert (2) and
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(3). Hence, until Harman comes up with better arguments than he has so far
offered, there is good reason to regard the view that he rejects as superior to
the relativistic explanation that he advocates.
An even more serious problem with Harman's explanation is that it
contains a claim which is patently false. According to the second step of this
explanation, we recognize that
(7) Anyone who was capable of ordering the extermination of
the Jews could not have had any moral reason not to
order their extermination.
But I, for one, most certainly don't recognize this. In fact, I think that Hitler
himself had every moral reason in the world not to order the extermination of
the Jews. And I take it that most people with absolutist sympathies would
agree with me.93 Thus, step 2 in Harman's explanation is false.
Since Harman clearly doesn't want an explancttion that rests on a false
premise, he must either revise or reject his account of wh'y' we think that
assertions of (2) and (3) sound too weak. However, the prospects of his
coming up with a plausible revision don't look very promising. The best that
he could do would be to restrict his explanation to an account of why
assertions of (2) and (3) sound too weak to those who believe (7). But those
who believe (7) constitute only a subset of the people who think that
assertions of (2) and (3) sound too weak. So, even if Harman were to revise
his explanation, he would still need an account of why assertions of (2) and (3)
sound too weak to some people \.vho don't believe (7). It seems to me that
93Most , but presumably not all. For National Socialism and moral
absolutism are. entirely compatible. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to supp~se
that Hitler was a moral absolutist.
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Harman could best fill this gap by suggesting that when people who don't
believe (7) find that assertions of (2) and (3) sound too weak, their reaction
stems from their recognition of the enormity of Hitler's crime. However, if
Harman were to make this suggestion, he would be putting forward an
explanation that he had previously declared unacceptable. Thus, he would have
to admit that his objections hadn't been well-founded. More importantly, the
explanation he would be proposing would be one that seems just as applicable
to people .who believe (7) as it does to those who don't. Thus, Harman's
relativistic explanation would become entirely superrluous.
All of the foregoing arguments suggest that it is relativism, rather than
absolutism, which is riddled with problems.
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CHAPTER 7
ROOTS OF NIHILISM, SKEPTICISM AND RELATIVISM
7. 1. Introduction
Although there are not many philosophers who would deny the truth of the
following statement, many would disagree as to why it is true:
(I) There are numerous cases in which an ethical dispute
between two individuals reaches a point where each party
thinks that his opponent has failed to provide a compelling
argument, yet neither party can think of any further
arguments in support of his position that are more
compelling than the ones he has already given.
Let us call any dispute "apparently irresolvable" if each participant finds his
opponents' arguments unconvincing and no participant can think of any new
considerations in favor of his position that are more compelling than those
that he has already cited. It seems to me that a major source of moral
nihilism, moral skepticism, and moral relativism is the conviction that we can
only account for the truth of (I)--i.e. the existence of numerous apparently
irresolvable ethical disputes--by adopting a position which implies that we
have no knowledge of any absolute moral truths. For example, one
explanatit:.,n of why each of the parties to an apparently irresolvable ethical
'dispute. is unable to come up with any argument that his opponent finds
compelling is that there simply are no compelling reasons for his opponent to
change his mind. And one might go on to suggest that these reasons are non-
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existent because the disputants adhere to different basic moral ideals. This,
of course, is the position that Mackie advocated in the "argument from
relativity" that we examined in the first section of Chapter 4. It is also a
view which has been embraced by Hare and Harman.94
In the present chapter I shall point out a number of factors which give
rise to the phenomenon of apparently irresolvable ethical disagreement. It
seems to me that these factors are quite sufficient to account for the
existence of this phenomenon. But I shall argue that none of them gives us
any reason to doubt that we have knovlIledge of absolute moral truths.
Furthermore, I shall indicate that, although the factors which make it difficult
for us to resolve ethical disputes have an especially powerful influ,~nce on the
way people respond to arguments that challenge their moral opinions, the
same or very similar factors also affect the way they react to arguments that
challenge their non-moral opinions.
7.2. Non-Epistemic Influences on the Reoolvability of Moral Disagreements
7.2. 1. Self-esteem and moral convictions
A fundamental reason why ethical disputes are often very difficult to
resolve is that people standardly attach a great deal of importance to moral
judgments which either are directly about them or reflect on them indirectly.
Generally speaking, people feel that if they ought morally to act in a certain
way, they have an overriding reason to act in that way. And, in perceiving
that they have such a reason to do something, they feel a motivational "tug"
in the direction of doing it. Furthermore, if they do not do what they believe
94Hare, Freedom and Reason, chps. 6,8 & 9 Harman, The Nature of Moral ity,
pp. 103 - 112.
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they ought morally to do, they usually feel shame when they reflect on their
failure to abide by the imperatives of morality. To experience shame is to
experience a diminution in one's own estimation of oneself: it is to suffer a
loss of self-esteem. The extent to which an individual's sense of his own
worth is diminished when he admits that he is guilty of moral wrongdoing is a
function of several factors. Among the most important of these are his
perception of the seriousness of the wrongdoing and the degree to which he
believes himself responsible for what he has done. Thus, other things being
equal, we would expect a person's estimation of his own worth to be less
adversely affected by his belief that he wrongfully neglected to do his fair
share of last week's house chores than by his belief that he wrongly beat his
wife. Likewise, we would expect an individual's self-esteem to suffer less in
the first of the following two cases than in the second:
(a) he believes that he has done something that he ought
morally not to have done, but thinks that, when he did it,
he had no good reason to think that he was doing anything
wrong;
(b) he believes that he has done something that he ought
morally not to have done, and also thinks that, when he
did it, he had good reason to think that he was doing
something wrong.
The fact that we usually feel shame and a loss of self-esteem when we
believe that we are violating the demands of morality provides us with a
strong motive to refuse to admit that we are violating these demands. And,
since our estimation of our own worth will suffer most if we believe
ourselves to be guilty of a serious moral lapse, our motive for refusing to
admit that we are doing anything wrong becomes all the more intense as the
seriousness of the charge against us increases. An individual's tendency to
deny moral wrongdoing and to search for excuses is most pronounced when
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the charge against him is most grave. Thus a pilot who has laid waste to an
inhabited village by dropping napalm cannisters and anti-personnel bombs has
done something which is so obviously horrible that he must believe his actions
to be morally justified. It would be psychologically devastating for him to
admit that there is no moral justification for the destruction and agony he has
caused.
One reason, then, why many moral disputes appear to be irresolvable is
that their resolution is threatening to the self-esteem of one or more of the
disputants. If an individual's estimation of his own worth would diminish
were he to admit that certain of his moral beliefs are wrong, he has a strong
motive to reject as unsound any argument which purports to show that these
beliefs are mistaken.
In one sense, the fact that an individual's self-esteem would be shaken if
he came to doubt or disbelieve a certain proposition P is a reason, indeed a
very good one, for him to continue to believe P and to deny the soundness of
arguments which purport to establish that P is false. However, there is also a
sense in which this fact provides the individual in question with no reason at
all either for maintaining his belief in the truth of P or for rejecting arguments
that purport to show that P is false. The difference between these two
senses is nicely illustrated by the plight of Winston Smith in George Orwell's
novel, 1984. It is clear to all readers of 1984 that Smith has solid evidence
that the government of his country, Oceania, systematically feeds its citizens
false information. Thus, Oceania's government claims that the nation has
always been allied with Eurasia in a war against Eastasia. But Smith distinctly
recalls that, only a few hours ago, the government asserted that Oceania had
always been at war with Eurasia and allied with Eastasia. The government
also claims that Jones, Aaronson, and Rutherford betrayed important military
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secrets to the Eurasian General Staff at a meeting in Siberia on Midsummer
Day, 1963. But Smith has seen a clipping from an old newspaper which
reports that, on the date in question, the three men attended a Party function
in New York. Given this and other evidence, Smith is justified in concluding
that his government systematically distorts the truth.
However, from a purely self-interested perspective, Smith has
overwhelming reason to believe that the government always reports the facts
accurately. For if he believes this, he will be permitted to lead the normal
life of an ordinary citizen. To be sure, the citizen of Oceania leads a far
from wonderful life. Nevertheless, if Smith harbors any doubts about the
government's veracity, he will certainly be discovered by the Thoughtpolice.
Then he will be brutally tortured until his personality and will are destroyed.
And this fact is a powerful reason for him to believe in his government's
veracity-in spite of his having more than adequate evidence that Oceania's
government distorts the truth.
What is to be noticed about Smith's situation is not that he has a self-
interested reason to believe something and a non-self-Interested reason to
disbelieve it. Rather, the important point is that Smith's reasons for believing
that Oceania's government is not truthful either entail or are evidence that the
government is not veracious. However, his reason for holding that the
government always report~ the truth neither entails nor constitutes evidence
that the government is veracious.
Where R is a reason for! to believe P, and R either entails or is evidence
for P, let us say that R is an epistemlc reason for ! to believe P. Winston
Smith, then, has certain epistemic reasons for thinking that his government
reports the facts inaccurately. But insofar as his only reason to believe that
Oceania's government does not lie to its citizens is the fact that his failure to
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adopt this belief will lead to his being brutally tortured, Smith merely has a
non-epistemic reason to believe in the veracity of the government.
Now then, insofar as the prospect of suffering a loss of self-esteem gives
an individual a reason both for believing a certain moral proposition P and for
refusing .to accept the soundness of arguments which purport to show that P
is false, the reason in question is non-epistemic. And, although the distinction
that I have drawn between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons does not
seem to preclude the possibility that one and the same reason might be both
non-epistemic and epistemic, in most cases, the fact that an individual !
would avoid a loss of self-esteem by believing P and by rejecting arguments
which purport to show that P is false is only a non-epistemic reason for! to
do these things. For, generally speaking, the fact that ! would protect his
sense of his own worth by doing these things neither entails nor is evidence
for either the truth of P or the unsoundness of arguments in favor of piS
denial. Thus, though a member of the secret police who tortures prisoners of
conscience may preserve his self-respect by believing that his actions are
morally justified, the fact that he can protect his self-esteem by maintaining
this belief neither entails nor is evidence for the claim that his actions really
are morally justified. Insofar as his continued belief in thA permissibility of
torturing prisoners of conscience is motivated by a desire to preserve his
sense of his own worth, what motivates him to believe as he does has no
bearing on the truth or falsity of that belief.
Of course, it is not only in the realm of morality that protection of 5e11-
esteem plays a role in determining the beliefs that people have and the
arguments that they find unacceptable. The value of a scientist's research is
undermined by the discovery that his findings are based on mistaken
theoretical claims. And it is almost inevitable that his perception of the worth
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of his life will be tied to his perception of the value of hi::; research. Thus,
one way for a scientist to preserve his self-respect is to reject arguments
which purport to show that his theoretical assumptions are erroneous.
Although his criticisms of these arguments may be val id, the tact that his
self-esteem would be damaged if he accepted the arguments is obviously not
an epistemic reason for refusing to accept them. To the extent that a
scientist adheres to a theoretical claim merely because giving it up would
lower his estimation of his own worth, he is no different from the man who
protects his self-respect by continuing to believe that he is morally justified in
torturing people simply because they have "subversive" political views.
Where a disagreement fails to get resolved because the position adopted
by at least one of the disputants is motivated more by non-epistemic than by
epistemic considerations, the persistence of the disagreement in no way
suggests that the disputed issue is one about which there is no absolute fact
of the matter. We have grounds for doubting that there is an absolute fact of
the matter with respect to a particular issue on!y when we have evidence
which suggests that epistemic considerations do not decisively favor one side
of the issue over the other. This being the case, to the extent that
considerations of self-esteem are responsible for the persistence of a moral
disagreement, the fact that the dispute goes unresolved fails to give us any
reason to doubt that there is an absolute fact of the matter about the disputed
issue. Furthermore, insofar as the difficulty of resolving Athical disputes can
be traced to the tenacity with which people resist challenges to their sense of
their own worth, it does no harm to admit that ethical disputes are often more
difficult to resolve than factual disagreements. All that such an admission
indicates is that, generally speaking, the belief that one is guilty of moral
wrongdoing poses a greater threat to one's self-respect that the belief that
one has made a factual error.
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7.2.2. Moral beliefs as unwanted constraints on action
The loss of self-respect that people often experience when they accept
moral propositions that reflect unfavorably on their actions or intentions is
only one non-epistemic motive for refusing to accept such propositions. A
further non-epistemic reason for not admitting that a certain moral proposition
is true is that this admission may place one in the position of feet ing
constrained to abandon a plan or course of action that one has an interest in
following. In general, people's moral beliefs function as constraints on their
behavior. When an agent ! believes that it would be morally wrong for him
to VP, , this belief is an obstacle to !'S VP ,-ing. The obstacle that the belief
constitutes may of course by overcome by other motivations; but insofar as it
is something which itself has a motivational influence that must be overridden
if ! is to VP 1 ' it is a constraint against !'S VP ,-ing .
Now then, to the extent that an agent ! has an interest in VP 1-ing, he also
has an interest in not having beliefs that would get in the wa't~ of his VP ,-Ing.
Hence, where! has an interest in VP ,-ing, he has an interest in not believing
the proposition that it would be morally wrong for him to VP 1. But this
proposition is in no way disconfirmed by the fact that ! has such an interest
in not believing it. Thus, imagine that a former CIA agent named Wilson can
make phenomenal profits by selling sophisticated small arms to a country
which exports terrorism. If Wilson believed that it would be morally wrong
for him to provide weapons to that country, this belief would get in the way
of his doing something that he has a clear interest in doing. So, Wilson has
an interest In not believing that it would be morally wrong for him to sell
arms to the country in question. But the fact that he has such an interest
clearly has no bearing on the question of whether it would or wouldn't be
.
morally wrong for him to sell weapons to that country. For, regardless of
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what the correct answer to this question is, Wilson's interest in sa,"ing
weapons to the country in question will give him an interest in not believing
that it would be morally wrong for him to do so. Consequently, if someone
argues against the moral permissibility of Wilson's prospective arms sa'e and
Wilson is motivated to reject this argument by his interest in not placing
obstacles in the way of the sale, his rejection of the argument will not raise
any questions about its soundness.
In general, whenever an individual ! has an interest in VP 1-in9 and a's
believing a certain moral proposition P would be an obstacle to his VP 1-in9,
the fact that this belief would be such an obstacle is a non-epistemic reason
for! not to believe P.. But the same fact is not an epistemic reason for! not
to believe P if !'S believing P would be an obstacle to his VP1-in9 regardless
of whether P is true or false. Hence, where !'S belief in P would be an
obstacle to his VP ,-ing independently of P's truth-value and ! is motivated to
doubt or disbelieve P by his interest in not having this belief get in the way
of his VP1-ing, his failure to accept P does not suggest that he has any
compelling epistemic reason to doubt or deny that proposition. Similarly,
where Q believes that P is true but cannot convince ! to accept P, the fact
that ! does not find Q's arguments persuasive will not suggest that Q has
failed to present! with compelling epistemic reasons to believe P if
(I) ! has an interest in VP 1-ing,
(ii) !'S belief in P would be an obstacle to his VP ,-in9
regardless of P's truth-value, and
(iii) ! rejects Q's arguments in order to avoid this obstacle.
In these circumstances there is an apparently irresolvable moral disagreement
between ! and Q, but the apparent irresolvability doesn't indicate that the
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opinions of both ! and Q are equally justified by epistemic considerations.
This being the case, there is no basis for claiming that the disputed issue is
one about which there is no absolute fact of the matter.
I have now set out two (non-competing) explanations of why many ethical
disagreements go unsettled. First, I have noted that the resolution of these
disagreements is hampered by the fact that a person's self-esteem is usually
tied to his image of himself as someone who acts in accordance with the
demands of morality. Insofar as an individual's sense of his own worth will
be shaken if he accepts moral propositions which state or seem to him to
imply that he is guilty of moral wrongdo-ing, he will tend to resist arguments
that purport to establish the truth of those propositions. Second, I have
pointed out that the resolution of ethical disagreements is hindered by the fact
that their resolution would often require one of the disputants to believe a
moral proposition whose belief is a constraint against his doing things that he
has an interest in doing. Since he has an interest in not being subject to such
a constraint, he will tend to object to arguments advanced by his opponents.
What is significant about these explanations of why ethical disagreements
often go unresolved is that they do not provide any support to the view that
the apparent irresolvability of the disagreements stems from inherent limits to
the epistemic reasons that can be advanced in favor of moral claims. There
may be decisive epistemic reasons for an individual to believe that it would
be morally wrong for him to VP 1 even though he is motivated to avoid this
belief either by a concern for his self-esteem or by a desire to avoid
unwanted obstacles to his VP1-ing. In general, to the extent that an individual
is motivated to accept or reject a proposition by either a concern for his self-
respect or a desire to avoid an unwanted psychological obstacle to the pursuit
of some attractive course of action, he is motivated by purely non-epistemic
factors.
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Lest my argument be misunderstood, I should point out that I have not
been claiming that every unsettled ethical dispute would be resolved were it
not for the fact that one or more of the disputants is prejudiced by either a
concern for his self-esteem or a desire to avoid moral beliefs that would
obstruct his plans. All that I have wanted to indicate is that
0) these purely non-epistemic motives contribute significantly
to the persistence of many ethical disagreements, and
(ii) so far as these motives are responsible for the persistence
of an ethical dispute, its apparent unresolvability provides
no evidence that epistemic considerations fail to come
down decisively on one side of the issue under dispute.
7.3. Moral versus Physical Constraints
Throughout the preceding section I have stressed that an individual's moral
beliefs can constrain his actions and affect his self-esteem. I also noted that
the truth or falsity of a moral belief is quite irrelevant to its effect on a
person's self-respect and its function as an obstacle to action. For example,
whether or not homosexual relations are morally wrong, a person who firmly
believes that they are will suffer a loss of self-esteem if he has sexual
intercourse with a member of his own sex. Similarly, his belief that
homosexual relations are morally wrong will be an obstacle to his having them
whether or not they really are morally wrong.
What I want to focus attention on now is the fact that the truth of a
given moral proposition does not affect anyone unless someone believes that
proposition. If we believe that it would be morally wrong for us to VP 1 '
that belief will normally constitute a constraint against our VP 1-ing. And, if
others believe that we ought not to VP 1 ' this belief may motivate them to
prevent us from VP1-i"g. But if neither we nor anyone else took any
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cognizance of morality, no one would be constrained to act in accordance with
morality's demands-that is, nothing would prevent us from violating moral
imperatives or even impose a penalty on us for violating them. Thus, even if
it were morally wrong for us to have sexual relations with members of our
own sex, the moral impermissibility of such relations would not adversely
affect anyo"e's self-esteem and would not place obstacles in the way of
anyone's actions. if no one believed that these relations were morally
impermissible.
Whereas an action's moral impermissibility would not impinge on anyone's
life if no one believed it to be impermissible, many facts about the physical
world seem to influence our lives independently of our beliefs about those
facts. If a man who fancies himself a patriot wants to shoot someone who
has made an obscene gesture at the American flag, he won't come any closer
to his goal by refusing to accept the fact that he is pulling the trigger of an
unloaded gun. Likewise, if a mountain climber has failed to hammer his
petons in securely, his belief that they are firmly in place will not delay his
downward plunge when· he slips off the icy ledge on which he has been
precariously balanced.
Insofar as an individual has any plans at all, certain facts about the
physical world will impinge on his life. And these facts do not cease to have
an effect if the individual simply refuses to admit that they exist. As Richard
Rorty has noted, physical reality "shoves us around" whether we like it or
not.95 We cannOt avoid entering into causal relationships with objects in our
physical environment. And these relationships are at least partly responsible
for the things that happen to us. However, there doesn't seem to be any
95Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 375.
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causal connection between the things that happen to us and the moral status
of our actions. Even if we look at the unhappy fates that certain individuals
have suff~red after acting in ways that are standardl' held to be wrong, it
doesn't seem that the actual wrongness of their acts is responsible for their
unfortunate circumstances. For example, if Smith loses bot:' his job and his
friends after it becomes public knowledge that he physically abuses his wife,
his fall from grace seems to stem from people's moral bel iefs about him, not
from the actual moral status of his actions.
Rorty suggests that most people's doubts about the reality of the moral
domain stem from the fact that the moral status of our actions never causes
anything.96 However, I.don't think that this suggestion is wholly accurate. It
is true that if ethical statements did occur in causal explanations, the objective
reality of moral facts would not be seriously questioned. Yet there are facts
of other kinds whose reality is not usually questioned even though statements
of those facts do not play a role in causal explanations. Thus, suppose that I
have an impacted wisdom tooth which is giving me a lot of pain. If the pain
will become chronic and only grow more intense if the tooth is not removed,
there is obviously a· reason for me to get it pulled. Nevertheless, no
statement of the following sort will appear in any causal explanations :
(1) The fact that my wisdom tooth will continue to give me
pain if it isn't removed is a reason for me to get it
pulled.
If I go ahead and get the tooth pulled, we might give causal explanations of
my action which include certain propositions describing my pain and my
beliefs. But no proposition which says that such-and-such was a reason for
me to get the tooth extracted will appear in these explanations.
96/dem.
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In general, reason-ascribing statements (i.e. 5tatements which describe
things as reasons for people either to act in certain ways or to have certain
beliefs) will not play a role in causal explanations. These explanations may
contain statements about many things that we would normally call reasons ;
but the statements themselves will not refer to them as reasons.
Since reason-ascribing statements np·/er enter into causal explanations, we
would expect general skepticism about the truth of such statements to be just
as widespread as moral skepticism if people's doubts about the moral realm
primarily stemmed from the fact that ethical propositions don't play a role in
causal explanations. However, there is no widespread skepticism about the
truth of reason-ascribing statements. Indeed, I don't think that it would be
very easy to find anyone who maintains either that no "reason-ascribing
statements are true or that we have no justification for believing that any such
statements are true. What we can find are people who are skeptical about a
parti~ular class of reason-ascribing statements ~ the class of statements
which claim that certain facts constitute categorical moral reasons for us to
act or not act in certain ways. I expect that some of this skepticism stems
from the widely-held belief that a person can't really ha,ve a reason to do
something unless he would promote the satisfaction of one of his own desires
by doing it. Those who hold this belief will not see how it is possible for
there to be any categorical moral reasons. However, I don't find it in any
way self-evident that a person's reusons must flow from his own desires.
Nor am I acquainted with any compelling argument in support of this view.
Thus, until such an argument is forthcoming, the moral absolutist need not
worry that he is committed to a doctrine which violates some iron law about
the source of reasons.
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7.4. F\Jfther Remarks on IrresolvabUlty
In the first section of this chapter, 1 tried to show how the resolution of
moral disa~,reements is impeded by the influence of certain non-epistemic
motivat~uns. At this point I would like to propose several further factors that
are responsible for the persistence of these disagreements. Once again, my
basic goal is to demonstrate that the prevalence of apparently irresolvalble
ethical disputes is entirely compatible with the truth of moral absolutism.
7.4.1. A hypothetical moral disagreement
In a typical moral dispute betwaen two individuals, neither of the
disputants will advance a very sophisticated argument in support of his
position. Imagine, for example, that Doe and Roe have a moral disagreement
about government safety regulations for auto"-10biles. Doe thinks the federal
government ought to require that every new car be equipped with an airbag--a
balloon-like device that is installed underneath the dashboard and is designed
to inflate automatically during accidents, thereby preventing the car's occupants
from being thrown into the windshield. Roe, on the other hand, believes that
it would be morally wrong for the government to require airbags in all new
cars. If Roe were to ask Doe to explain why the government should require
the installation of airbags in new cars, C,oe might simply say that the
requirement would save thousands of lives each year and would prevent an
even greater number of serious, non-fatal injuries. And, upon hearing this
answer, Roe might point out that while the airbags would probably save lives
and prevent injuries, .:! law requiring ali new cars to be equipped with airbags
would interfere with people's freedom to choose how safe they want to be.
At this point, the argument between Doe and Roe is likely to deteriorate very
quickly. Doe will probably admit that a law requiring airbags would restrict
freedorrl of choice. However, he will say that, in his opinion, the number of
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lives that such a law would save outweighs the loss of freedom that it would
entail. In response to this claim, Roe will probably say that Doe is
underestimating the value of freedom. Once Doe and Roe have expressed their
views on the relative values of freedom and safety, they are likely not to be
able to think of very much more to say. Con~equently, their disagreement will
go unresolved.
7.4.2. The road to relativism and nihilism
Now then, since neither party to the dispute has been able to come up
with an argument that either justifies his position or undermines his opponent's
claim, each may come to the conclusion that there is no rational way to settle
their disagreement. If Doe and Roe adopt this view of the matter, they may
.be attracted to some brand of emotivism. For example, they may decide that
(a) different people have different moralities,
(b) moralities are systems of dispositions for having pro and
con attitudes, and
(c) there is no objectively neutral standpoint from which to
evaluate the relative merits of different moralities.
Given this basic framework, it won't be difficult for Doe and Roe to explain
why reason is incapable of resolving their dispute. In brief, they have a
disagreement in attitude that arises from differences between their respective
moralities. Since there is no neutral perspective from which objective
comparisons between moralities can be made, it is impossible for either of
the disputants to demonstrate that his opponent's attitude is mistaken.
Instead of turning to emotivism to explain the irresolvability of their
disagreement, Doe and Roe might take a somewhat more moderate course.
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They might decide that the reason why neither of them can establish the
superiority of his position is that there is no absolute fact of the matter about
whether the government ought or ought not to require that all new cars be
equipped with airbags. By concluding that there isn't any absolute fact of the
matter, Doe and Roe do not commit themselves to the r.ejection of moral
absolutism. As have already pointed' out, moral absolutism is perfectly
consistent with the existence of a certain amount of indeterminacy in ethics.
However, if Doe and Roe feel compelled to conclude that there is no
absolute fact of the matter about the moral status of the government's
requiring airbags in all new cars, they are bound to find themselves saying
"No fact of the matter" in many other contexts. Indeed, we can expect each
of them to discover that in most cases where he has a moral disagreement
with someone over an important question, the dispute will go unresolved. In
these disputes, each party will present a consideration or two in favor of his
position; ~ut neither party will be able to say very much about why the
considerations he has advanced have more weight than those that have been
advanced by his opponent. The parties will then be tempted to account for
their failure to come up with compelling arguments by suggesting that there
are no compelling arguments to be found. And from here it is a short step to
the belief that there is no absolute fact of the matter about the issue they t3re
discussing.
When people find themselves saying, "No fact of the matter," on almost
every occasion where a serious moral disageement arises, it is very easy for
them to become convinced that absolute moral facts are a fiction. Once
someone reaches this conclusion, he can say either that there are no moral
facts at all or that the only moral facts are relative ones. In short, he can
opt for either nihilism or relativis,,,.
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Because people are so often unable to conceive of anything beyond the
most elementary moves in moral argumentation, it is not surprising that they
come to think that there are no moves beyond the elementary ones. They
might not think this way if there were a recognized group of moral experts
who received special training, employed rigorous methods of enquiry, and
produced original results whose accuracy could be tested by reliable
procedures. However, there is no such group of experts. Consequently, most
people's inability even to imagine how to go about constructing a compelling
moral argument tends to convince them that it is impossible to construct such
arguments. This tendency is enhanced by people's need to believe that their
actions conform to the demands of morality. Insofar as people have this
need, they are likely to find a certain amount of comfort in the idea that
reason cannot make any contribution to the resolution of an ethical
disagreement when there are significant moral considerations on each side of
the disputed issue. For if reason is impotent in situations where people have
to weigh the relative importance of competing moral considerations, each
person can be confident that there are few resources available to those who
might want to argue that his actions are morally wrong. In section (8.2) I
discussed the fact that a person's need to believe that his actions are morally
acceptable might lead him to reject rrstionally compelling arguments that
undermine the moral legitimacy of his behavior. But it is also important to
realize that this need is one factor which motivates people to deny that there
are any rationally compelling arguments about the relative stringency of
competing moral considerations. This denial is a prerequisite to acceptance of
the reassuring and often expressed view that, so long as en individual has
thought seriously and carefully about a difficult moral decision, his choice is
morally acceptable if he thinks that it is.
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7.4.3. Overlooked arguments
Although most people are unable to produce anything more than the most
rudimentary arguments in favor of their moral opinions, this inability is not
difficult to reconcile with the view that those opinions often can be backed up
w;':h very complex arguments. Indeed, the fact that people usually fail to
provide substantial arguments in support of their moral jUdgments is less often
due to a shortage of such arguments than to people's lack of imagination and
their lack of practice in defending their opinions. Consider, for example, our
hypothetical dispute between Doe and Roe over the mandatory installation of
airbags in automobiles. The only thing that Doe was able to say in favor of a
law requiring airbags in new cars was that the law would save thCJusands of
lives and prevent an even greater number of serious injuries. However, this is
far from the only argument that can be advanced in favor of the law. Had
Doe been somewhat more imaginative, he might have said something like this :
Almost anyone would be acting irrationally if he knew how
effective airbags are in reducing serious injury, but nevertheless
purchased a car that wasn't equipped with one of those devices.
Given (a) the irrationality of making such a purchase, (b) the real
risk of serious injury that a person incurs by riding in cars not
equipped with airbags, and (c) the fact that a large percentage of
the population will buy cars that don't contain airbags if they
have the option of doing so, the usual presumption in favor of
giving people the freedom to make their own decisions is
overridden in this case. In general, the value of letting people
make their own choices diminishes when the liklihood of an
irrational choice is high and irrationality poses a serious threat to
the chooser's happiness.
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Once a presumption in favor of allowing free choice in a given
context has been overridden, it is replaced by the presumption
that choice in that context ought to be constrained. This new
presumption can itself be overridden by certain considerations.
For example, if the social and monetary costs of effective
constraint are bound to be high, it may be best not to prevent
people from making their own decisions. But the costs imposed
by a law requiring that all new cars be equipped with airbags
would not be exorbitant. Quite the contrary. The expense of
enforcing such a law and the inevitable increase in automobile
prices that would follow its implementation would be more than
offset by the benefits that would derive from the decreased
number of serious injuries and fatalities. In the first place, by
preventing many deaths and grave injuries, a law requiring airbags
in all new cars would tend to lower insurance rates. This
decrease in rates might even be sufficient in itself to
compensate people for the increased cost of new cars.
Secondly, when a person is killed or injured, those who love and
depend on him suffer emotional trauma and, not infrequently,
economic loss. So, by bringing about a significant decrease in
the number of fatalities and injuries caused by car accidents, an
airbag law would protect many people's emotional and economic
well-being. Thirdly, because such a law would prevent millions
of serious injuries, it would allow society to reallocate resources
that must now be used to treat accident victims.
These last three points sugg.est another way to argue for a law
requiring the installation of airbags in new cars. When important
social resources are being used to repair damages or injuries that
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could be eliminated by preventing people from pursuing a certain
course of action and these lost resources are greater than those
that are saved or generated by allowing people to pursue the
course in question, the government ought to prevent people from
pursuing that course unless the imposition of this constraint on a
person would seriously interfere either with his freedom to
formulate his own plan of life or with his success in carrying out
that plan. Now, there is no question that important social
resources are being used to treat and care for victims of
automobile accidents. It is likewise clear that much of this drain
on society's resources would be stopped if the government
prevented people from buying new cars that are not equipped
with airbags. Furthermore, by preventing people from doing this,
the government wouldn't be eliminating a practice that saves or
generates resources which come close to matching those needed
to pay for the treatment of injuries that wO'Jld not occur if
airbags were installed in all new cars. Lastly, if the government
did not allow a person to purchase a new car unless it was
equipped with an airbag, it would not be imposing a significant
constraint either on his freedom to devise his own life plan or
on his successful pursuit of that plan. Therefore, the government
ought to require that an airbag be installed in every new car.
So far as my purposes are concerned, it is not important whether either
of the foregoing arguments constitutes an entirely satisfactory defense of the
position that the government ought to require the installation of airbags in all
new cars. What Is important is that each of the two arguments that I have
outlined goes well beyond Doe~s simple assertion that many lives would be
saved if there were a law requiring that all new cars be equipped with airbags.
230
Thus, both arguments include numerous premises about the benefits and costs
of such a law. In addition, the first contains a premise about the rationality
of ·purchasing automobiles that aren't equipped with airbags. All of these
statements are non-moral, :'-'1d the truth of some of them is certainly open to
question. This provides an opportunity for counterargument from those who
oppose mandatory installation of airbags in new cars. And, once these
counterarguments are set out, they will themselves be open to attack from
proponents of mandatory airbag installation. I f each side in the disagreement
were to continue to match t~le other side's arguments with new ones of its
own, this process of claim a~d cOLJnter-claim would eventually lead back to a
complicated tangle of problems involving economic theory and the theory of
rational choice. Indeed, it may well be that certain of the non-moral questions
that bear directly on the dispute between Doe and Roe cannot be definitively
answered until fairly deep theoretical issues are settled. This suggests that
the resolution of moral disagreements is often blocked by the fact that
resolution would require agreement on complex non-moral questions. To the
extent that this is so, it is just not plausible \0 claim that moral disputes go
unresolved because the disputants reach a point where there is no longer any
possibility of further argument. What is plausible is that the disputes go
unresolved because the .arguments that would be needed to settle them are
highly complicated and theoretical.
7.4.4. The appeal to intuitions in moral enquiry
But let us suppose that opponents of airbag legislation don't dispute any
of the non-moral statements that appear in the two arguments that
constructed on behalf of those who support this legislation. Does this
supposition imply that there no longer remains any rational way to resolve the
ethical disagreement between Doe and Roe? Not at all. Each of the two
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arguments contains moral as well as non-moral premises. For example, in the
first it is claimed that the strength of the moral presumption in favor of
allowing people to make their own decisions varies inversely with increases in
(a) the likelihood that they will choose irrationally and (b) the probability that
irrationality will lead to consequences that would be severely detrhnental to
their well-being. In the second argument there is a premise that sets out
certain conditions under which the waste of social resources gives rise to a
moral requirement on government to restrict people's options. Both of these
proposals have implications that extend well beyond the immediate focus of
the dispute between Doe and Roe. This being the case, Doe might. defend the
statements by appealing to Aoe's moral intuitions about cases that have no
direct connection with automobile safety. He might try to show that the truth
of these intuitions can best be accounted for by supposing that the two
statements are true. Roe, on the other hand, might try to explain the truth of
his intuitions in a way that doesn't lend support to these statements.
Furthermore, he might attempt to turn the tables on his opponent and show
that Doe's own moral intuitions can't be reconciled with the principles that are
needed to justify a law requiring the installation of airbags in new cars.
As the preceding remarks suggest, appeals to people's moral intuitions
play a crucial role in ethical enquiry. However, it is also implicit in these
remarks that conflicts of intuition don't cut off the possibility of further
argument. Indeed, they usually call for further argument. Intuitions are far
from infallible. If some of our intuitions conflict with the intuitions of
someone else, we can often present good reasons for doubting the correctness
of his intuitions by making direct and indirect appeals to a third set of
intuitions. Direct appeals to such a set are common in analogical arguments.
Thus if I have a mor,,' intuition about a particular situation that conflicts with
someone else's intuition about the same situation, I can call his intuition into
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question if (a) its truth cannot be reconciled with the truth of certain ethical
intuitions about analogous cases and (b) there are good grounds for trusting
the latter intuitions. I might also undermine the credibi lity of my opponent's
intuition by showing that it is incompatible with some well-confirmed moral
principle. In doing so I would be making an indirect appeal to a set S of
ethical intuitions i.f the credibility of the principle stems either from its role in
explaining the truth of the intuitions in 5 or from its relation to other
principles that help to account for the truth of the members of S.
It is perhaps worth mentioning that there is nothing suspect in the idea
that the credibility of a moral intuition can often be undermined by showing
that it does not cohere well with other moral intuitions. It is entirely
legitimate to use some moral intuitions to criticize others. After all, a moral
intuition is simply a moral belief that arises spontaneously, rather than through
any conscious inference or calculation. And it is a common practice in every
domain of human enquiry to undermine the credibility of certain spontaneous
beliefs by demonstrating their lack of coherence with other such beliefs. To
mention a fairly trivial case, some people who look at figures A and B in the
following diagram will immediately judge that the vertical line in A is shorter
than the vertical line in B.
A. B.
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Individuals who have this intuition about the relative lengths of A and B can
come to see that they are mistaken by measuring the two verticals with a
ruler. When they hold a ruler up against the vertical in A, they will
spontaneously judge it to be one inch in length. Likewise, when they measure
the vertical in B, they will immediately judge it to be one inch long. Since
these "ruler assisted" judgments conflict with the initial intuition that the
vertical in A is shorter than. the one in B, some belief has to be jettisoned.
In this case the most reasonable course is to give up the initial intuition.
Once it is recognized that we can tpst the validity of a moral intuition by
making direct and indirect 3ppeals to other moral intuitions, it is not difficult
to see that this testing process may involve extremely complex reasoning.
Thus, every time that a moral principle is cited either to justify or to
undermine a given intuition, the principle itself can be tested through appeals
to ethical intuitions. As I indicated in the last paragraph, to the extent that a
principle P helps to expl2lin the truth of some subset of our moral intuitions,
there is a prima facie case in favor of P. On the other hand, if we have
intuitions that seem to be incompatible with P, there is a prima facie case
against that principle. The strength of these competing cases will depend on
a variety of factors. Among the most important of these are
(a) the range and credibility of the intuitions whose truth we
seem to be able to explain -by appealing to P,
(b) the range and credibility of the intuitions with which P is
supposed to be incompatible,
(c) P's "fit" with other well-confirmed principles,
(d) the plausibility of the non-moral statements that must be
conjoined with P in order to give it explanatory force,
(e)· the plausibility of the ·non-moral statements that are
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appealed to in trying to demonstrate that P is incompatible
with certain of our moral intuitions.
In making determinations lbout (a) - (e), there is room for any number of
arguments. For example, one might attempt to undermine the credibility of the
intuitions that are supposed to support P by showing that they are based" on
mistaken non-moral beliefs. Alternatively, one could try to cast doubt upon
the intuitions that are supposed to be incompatible with P by showing that
they stem from people's internalization of certain highly questionable moral
principles. The questionable nature of these principles might be brought out in
various ways. Thus, someone could argue that it would be necessary to make
several ad hoc assumptions in order to reconcile the principles with certain
data provided by our moral intuitions. Another strategy would be to try to
show that even the most promising arguments in support of the principles
contain highly questionable premises. These questionable premises may be
either moral or non-moral statements.
7.4.5. The need for argumentative proficiency
The foregoing remarks suggest that people are usually mistaken when they
think that they are involved in a dispute where all possibility of further
rational debate has beer; exhausted. There are alme"st always additional
arguments to examine when the parties to a disagreement decide that they
have irreconcilably different intuitions about the relative weights of competing
moral considerations. Once we see that these arguments exist, the attraction
of moral skepticism and moral relativism begins to wane. The skeptic and the
relativist would have us believe that the very nature of morality precludes the
resolution of many ethical disputes: the disputes go unresolved because
there are no absolute moral facts. However, if we realize that people rarely
exploit more than a small fraction of the moral arguments that they. might use
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tn defend their own opinions and undermine the views of their opponents, we
can see that there is no need to appeal air' r,1 to the non-existence of moral
facts or to their inherent relativity in order to account for the prevalence of
apparently irresolvable moral disagreements. Thus, one reason why there is
such an abundance of these disagreements is that most people aren't very
good at constructing moral arguments. Our hypothetical dispute between Doe
and Roe typifies the lack of sophistication and imagination that most people
exhibit when they are called upon to defend their ethical opinions. If the
population in general were more proficient at constructing and evaluating moral
arguments, and this improvement in proficiency were accompanied by a
heightened concern for the truth, there would certainly be a significant
reduction in the number of apparently irresolvable ethical disagreements.
These disagreements would not be eliminated, of course. But those that would
remain would not pose a serious threat to moral absolutism. Many of the
remaining disagreements would persist because their resolution would require
the resolution of highly technical and theoretical issues. These issues might
go unsettled for a long time. However, it is hardly surprising that this should
be so. As problems become more technical, fewer people can be found who
have the knowledge, the skill, and the perseverance that are necessary to
solve them. Moreover, as questions become increasingly theoretical, it
becomes increasingly difficult to settle them by employing standard decision
procedures. None of this poses a particular problem for ethics. After all,
there are many disputes in physics that persist for decades or even centuries
because they involve issues which are either technically complex or
theoretically controversial. The existence of such disputes does not constitute
a good reason to doubt or deny that there are any physical facts. Nor does it
suggest that there is never any absolute fact of the matter when there is a
disagreement about an object's physical properties. Likewise, then, the
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persistence of ethical disputes that involve difficult technical and theoretic,,1
questions does not justify the adoption of either moral skepticism or moral
relativism.
7.4.6. The practical costs of trying to convince one's opponents
Progress in moral theory and the discovery of new evidence may bring
about the resolution of many long-standing ethical disputes. However, there is
no doubt that indefinitely many ethical issues will never get settled. Some of
these issues will go unresolved simply because people perceive that very little
would be gained and much might be lost by taking the trouble to try to
resolve them. If N1 is about to VP 1 and think that it would be morally
wrong for him to do this, might try to persuade him not to VP 1 by
attempting to convince him that he would be violating the demands of
morality by VP1-ing. However, if N1 has already VP ,-ed, it is too late for me
to get him not to do so by arguing that he did something morally wrong by
VP1-in9. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that I would only succeed in annoying
or hurting N1 if I tried to convince him that it was morally wrong for him to
have VP 1-ed. If I have affection for N1 ' I won't want to hurt him; and if I
think that my arguments are likely to annoy him, I will probably want to avoid
the unpleasantness of his reaction. Moreover, I will have an additional
interest in not irritating N1 if I suspect that the irritation will turn into a
lasting resentment that will color all of N,'s future dealings with me.
7.4.7. Genuine irresolvability
Although many ethical disagreements go unresolved either because the
personal costs of trying to resolve them are high or because the likely
benefits "f resolution are low, the persistence of other ethical disagreements
can be traced back to underlying non-moral issues that cannot be settled
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because it is impossible to obtain the evidence that is needed to resolve
them. If a moral disagreement falls into this latter category, neither side in
the dispute will be able to present a case that would have to be acceptod 'oy
any reasonable individual who ur:~erstands it. But this doesn't mean that one
side won't be correct and the other incorrect. T·here is often an absolute fact
of the matt'3r about a particular issue even when there is no way to show
what the fact of the matter is. Thus, suppose that my wife and I have
different recollections about what we had for dinner last Monday. think that
we ate bluefish, but my wife's memory informs her that we dined on
mackeral, not bluefish. Now, neither my wife nor I keep a diary. So we can't
consult a IJritten record to resolve our disagreement. Furthermore, we won't
find any telltale scraps bv digging through our garbage; for better or worse,
the sanitation department has taken away all remains of the relevant meal.
Finally, since we didn't have dinner guests last Monday, my wife and I can't
appeal to anyone else's memory to settle our dispute. In short, the evidence
that we would need to determine who is right is non-existent. Neve, theless,
this much is perfectly clear: one and only one of the following statements
is correct:
(a) My wife and I had bluefish for dinner last Monday.
(b) It is not the case that my wife and I had bluefish for
din~er last Monday.
The impossibility of obtaining sufficient evidence to resolve a moral
dispute is most common where counterfactual questions are involved. Thus,
imagine that ,l,aron and Zelda have an ethical disagreement over their
government's adoption of 21 certain policy P. Aaron thinks that it was wrong
for the government to adopt P while Zelda believes that the government was
morally justified in doing this. As Aaron and Zelda debate the matter, it
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becomes clear that their moral dispute is based on a difference of opinion
over what would have happened if the government hadn't adopted P. However,
neither party has managed to present a compelling case against his opponent's
position. One explanation aT why this is so is that each person can
reasonably maintain his opinion in the face of the most cogent counter-
evidence that it is possible for anyone to obtain. In other words, the totality
of possible evidence underdetermines the answers to the counterfactual
questions which underlie the ethical disagreement between Aaron and Zelda.
This does not mean that there are no correct or incorrect answers to these
counterfactual questions. It may well be that Zelda is right while Aaron is
wrong. If this is indeed the case and, in addition, Aaron and Zelda have
correctly identified the connection between the counterfactual issues that
divide them and the mora; status of the government's adoption of policy P,
then Zelda will be right when she says that the government was morally
justified in adopting P and Aaron will be mistaken when he denies this. Of
course, there won't be any way to show that Zelda's position is better than
Aaron's; but the fact will remain that she is right and he is wrong. Thus,
there will be an absolute moral fact of the matter even though there can never
be enough evidence to determine what the fact of the matter is.
In the two preceding paragraphs I have stressed that a dispute may be
impossible to resolve even though one side in the dispute is correct and the
other side incorrect. In other words, there can be an absolute fact of the
matter about a given issue even when there ;s no way even in principle to
resolve a disagreement over what the fact of the matter is. Nevertheless, I
am perfectly willing to admit that there may be, indeed that there probably
are, moral issues about which there are no absolute facts of the matter. By
making this admission, am not committing myself to the denial of
absolutism in ethics. Moral absolutism could be true even if there turn out to
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be infinitely many moral issues about which there are no absolute facts of the
matter. All that is required for the truth of moral absolutism is that there be
some absolute facts of the matter in ethics.
240
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ayer, Alfred Jules. Language, Truth and Logic. New York: Dover Publications,
Inc. 1952.
Ayer, Alfred Jules. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. New York: St.
Martin's Press 1940.
Ayer, A.J. "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements". In A.J. Ayer, Phi losophical
Essays, pp. 231 - 249. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1954.
Ayer, A.J. The Problem of Knowledge. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England:
Penguin Books Ltd. 1956.
Bambrough, Renford. Moral Scepticism and Moral KnOWledge.
Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, Inc. 1979.
Atlantic
Brandt, Richard B. Ethical Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc. 1959.
Brandt, Richard B. "Ethical Relativism". The Encyclopedia of Phi losophy, Vol. 3,
pp. 75 - 78. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. ~ The Free Press.
1967.
Brentano, Franz. The Foundation and Construction of Ethics.
Human;ties Press, Inc. 1973.
New York:
Cartwright, R. "Propositions". In R.J. Butler (Editor), Analytical Philosophy, pp.
81 - 103. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1962.
Chisholm, R.M. "The Problem of Empiricism". The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.
XLV, no. 19 (September, 1948), pp. 512 - 517.
Chisholm, Roderick. Theory of Knowledge.
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1977.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Chomsky, Noam. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
M.I.T. Press 1965.
Cornman, James. "Foundational versus Nonfound\ I(ional Theories of
Justification". In George S. Pappas and Marshall Swain (Editors), Essays
on Knowledge and Justification, pp. 229 - 252. Ithica, New York: Cornell
University Press. 1978.
Feldman, Fred. I ntroductory Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc. 1978.
Foot, Philippa. "Moral Relativism". In Michael Krausz and Jack W. Meiland
(Editors), Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, pp. , 52 - 170. Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 1982.
Foot, Philippa. "Reasons for Action and Desires". In Philippa Foot, Virtues and
Vices, pp. 148 - 156. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
1978.
241
Frankena, W.K. "The Naturali.:. .ic Fallacy". In Philippa Foot (Editor), Theories of
Ethics, pp. 50 - 63. New York: Oxford University Press. 1967.
Frazier, Lyn. On Comprehending Sentences: Syntactic Parsing StratAgies.
University of Massachusetts (Amherst) doctoral dissertation. 1979.
Reproduced by the Indiana University Linguistics Club. Bloomington,
Indiana.
Gewirth, Alan. "Positive 'Ethics' and Normative 'Science'''. In Judith Jarvis
Thomson and Gerald Dworkin (Editors), Ethics, pp. 27 - 47. New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers. 1968.
Hare, R.M. The Language of Morals. New York: Oxford University Press 1969.
Hare, R.M. Freedom and Reason. New York: Oxford University Press 1965.
Harman, Gilbert. "The Inference to the Best Explanation". The Philosophical
Review, Vol. 74 (1965), pp. 88 - 95.
Harman, Gilbert. "Moral Relativism Defended". The Philosophical Review, Vol. 84
(1975), pp. 3 - 22.
Harman, Gilbert. The Nature of Moraltity. New York: Oxford University Press
1977.
Harman, Gilbert. Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1973.
Harrison, Jonathan. "Ethical Objectivism". The Encyclopedia of Phi losophy, Vol.
3, pp. 71 - 75. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free
Press. 1967.
Herman, Barbara. Morality as Rationality: A Study of Kant's Ethics. Unpublished
Harvard University doctoral dissertation. 1976.
Herman, Barbara. "On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty", The
Philosophical Review, Vol. XC, No.3 (July 1981), pp. 359 - 382.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers 1964.
Kaplan, David. "Quantifying In", In Leonard Linsky (Editor), Reference and
Modality, pp. 112 - 144. London: Oxford University Press. 1971.
Kitcher, Philip. Abusing Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press 1982.
Lemmon, E.J. "Sentences, Statements, and Propositions". In Jay F. Rosenberg
and Charles Travis (Editors), Readings in the Philosophy of Language, pp.
233 - 249. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1971.
Lyons, David. "Ethical Relativism and the Problem of Incoherence", In Michael
Krausz and Jack W. Meiland (Editors), Relativism: Cognitive and Moral,
pp. 209 - 225. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
1982.
242
Mackie, J.L. Ethics.· inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth, Middlesex,
England: Penguin Books Ltd. 1977.
Moore, G.E. Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press '965.
Moore, G.E. Principia ethica. London: Cambridge University Press 1971.
Nagel, Thomas. The Possibility of Altruism. London: Oxford University Press
1975.
Nagel, Thomas. "The Objectivity of Ethics". Unpublished paper presented at
Tufts University. 1980.
Nell, Onora. Acting On Principle. New York: Columbia University Press 1975.
Prichard, H.A. "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake]". In H.A. Prichard,
Moral Obligation, pp. 1 - 17. London: Oxford University Press. 1968.
Quine, W.V.O. "Reference and Modality". In Leonard Linsky (Editor), Reference
and Modality, pp. 17 - 34. London: Oxford University Press. 1971.
Quine, W.V.O. "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes". In Leonard Linsky
(Editor), Reference and Modal ity, pp. 101 - 111. London: Oxford
University Press. 1971.
Rawls, John. "Remarks on Kant's Ethics". Unpublished excerts from two
fectures delivered at Oxford University in May, 1978.
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1979.
Ross, W.O. The Right and The Good. London: Oxford University Press .930.
Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. New York: Oxford University
Press 1959.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existential ism and Human Emotions. New York: Philosophical
Library, Inc. 1957.
Stace, Walter Terence. "Ethical Relativity". An excerpt from The Concept of
Morals. Reprinted in Paul Taylor (Editor), Problems of Moral Philosophy,
pp. 52 - 66. Belmont, California: Dickenson Publishi~g Co., Inc. 1968.
Stevenson, Charles L. Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press
1944.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "Reasons and Reasoning". In Max Black (Editor),
Philosophy in AmerlcB, pp. 282 - 303. Ithica, New York: Cornell
University Press. 1965.
Williams, Michael. Groundless Belief. New Haven: Yale University Press 1977.
